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Abstract
The thesis examines the phenomenon of organised political violence in Nigeria 
exploring its root cause(s) and sustaining factor(s), using the extreme terrorist
activities of the Boko Haram sect as a case study. The severe negative impact of this
sect on the fabric of Nigerian society has led to a burgeoning scholarly literature
investigating the sect and the phenomenon of organised political violence which, for
the most part, concentrates on the gamut of political, economic and social ills that are
held to drive violence in the country. The thesis contends that, whilst these variables
are symptoms or outcomes of political violence, it is the tacit political culture adopted
violence and the groups that use violence. Elements of elite political culture such as
zero sum politics, political elite manipulation of social cleavages and identity politics,
themselves enabled by elite involvement in governance, leads to mis-governance by
the elite in power and the concomitant emergence of social movements or groups to
movements are, in turn, co-opted by individuals within the elite who use the
periods. Thi 
violent groups. When the alliance with the movement ceases to benefit the elite and/or
the level of violence becomes counter-productive, as was the case the northern
political elite and Boko Haram, the elite reverses its rhetoric, recasting the movement,









            
         
           
             
    
            
             
                
  
            
             
            




     
 
 
                
           
                 
     
  
   
 
                
              




Organised political violence in Nigeria is a prevalent and continuing aspect of
independent history. This phenomenon manifests itself in diverse forms
such as electoral violence, terrorism, religious and ethnic clashes. The pervasiveness
of this phenomenon ensures a continuous and expanding discourse on the root causes
and dynamics of organised v 
in the scholarly literature, whilst certainly present or linked to specific manifestations
of organised political violence, do not, on the findings of this thesis, essentially
capture its core driving force in Nigeria. Instead, the research is focused on the role of
-connection with
politics and governance as the fundamental cause and driver of organised political
violence in the country. It investigates how elite political culture has produced and
sustained organised violent groups in general and more specifically, the Boko Haram
sect or movement. The thesis concludes that organised violence in Nigeria is the
manifestation o 
goals.
1.1 Clarification of Key Terminologies
Central to this thesis are the role of the State, the government and political elite as
regards using and responding to political violence. Given the ambiguity concerning
some of the key terms, it is pertinent to clarify what is meant by these concepts when
used in this research.
A) State
There are diverse existing definitions of a State within the context of a country or a
polity. As such, each country develops its own understanding of what the State is




             
           
          
 
             
                
              
              
                  
                
         
         
              
            
   
 
                
          
              
             
              
               
             
       
 
            
part from understandings developed during the emergence of the nation State in the
West. Correspondingly, this thesis regards the State exclusively from a political
relationship with the government, political elite and social movement groups.
C.Wright Mills asserts the relevance of State power, as political power concentrated
at the executive level and managed by the political elite and its relational actors in its
citizens. However not all agree with Wright Mills that State rulers serve only their
interests. Van Creveld highlights the separation of the State from the rulers and the
ruled, in as much as a State owes its existence to the presence of a population and a
government 
duties to the populace with the aid of formal institutions that are a direct extension of
attention remains consistent with clear duties or tasks
enacting laws, dispensing justice, raising revenue, determining currency and
definition of a State fails to acknowledge influencing factors or forces such as the
representatives of the governing authority and the populace. He presumes that the
representatives of informal
States (1970:11-
is a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie to further economic interests through ties with
the political elite and government officials. Likewise, Aborisade and Mundt
(2001:117) depict the Nigerian State as a political structure that is influenced by the
personal interests of the government officials. Therefore, the Nigerian State is not a
neutral entity separated from the rulers and the economy as posited by Fukuyama and
Dahl, but an avenue for access to political power and wealth by the political elite.
combination of the political elite and the government, where the political elite are
actually the possessors of State power.




             
        
                
                
                
             
              
              
       
 
              
           
             
              
                
            
  
 
              
             
             
             
          
 
 
   
 
             
            
            
             
includes two key characteristics the presence of a legitimate government and the
Weber argues that the primary functionality of
the State and the reason for its existence is hinged on its ability to maintain order(s)
through the use of force or the threat of force, with the aid of formal institutions.
rulership are necessarily bound together and that it is the latter which is the basis of
legitimate government and the government as a reflection or a representation of a
State. The insistence of violence as a tool limited to the governing authority highlights
the availability of violence as a tool for the representatives of the government and
their allies political elite.
These theorists were seeking to capture the political reality in Europe. It is these
realities that were propagated in Nigeria initially through colonialism and afterwards
through the influence of the international system of States and their conduct. The
Nigerian political class has to a large extent imitated these behaviours and values. It
asserts as loudly as any Western State that it alone has the legitimate use of force.
Notwithstanding, the State allows the influence of social groups on the governing
authority.
Hence when this thesis discusses the State it refers to the legitimate government
within the political territory designated as the Federal Republic of Nigeria tasked with
the administration of public affairs through the aid of institutions comprised of the
refers to one of the thirty-six administrative districts and Abuja, designated as states
that comprise the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
B) Government
The universal perception of government is interpreted to be the highest level of
political appointment such as the offices of the president, governor, prime minister
and senate president. Therefore, government is portrayed as a term for the




            
             
     
 
    
 
               
             
             
             
              
          
         
          
          
               
              
            
           
 
       
 
            
             
             







economic, social, legal and national security. In addition, this thesis refers to
government as the management of State affairs by the appointed officials in the
interests of the political elite.
C) Political Elite
For the purpose of this thesis, the political elite are identified as persons with the
power to influence and make decisions that affect the political environment. They are
powerful players who, although they may not belong to the same political network,
share the same goals of exercising political power and the economic advantages of
exercising power. In the Nigerian context, and for the purposes of this research the
political elite includes the president, ministers and other elected federal
parlementarians; state governors, commissioners and other state legislators; local
government chairmen; traditional rulers (often also religious leaders in northern
Nigeria); certain influential religious leaders; executives of major companies; and
senior military officers. It is not the aim of the research to explore the internal
dynamics of political elite membership, but rather to investigate the impact of a tacit
political elite culture on the incipient means and methods of social movements
responding to the governance strategies of the political elite.
D) Political Culture and Elite Political Culture
This thesis interprets political culture as the behaviour, values and interests of
political actors that impacts on or influence political behaviour in a State. Elite
political culture is defined as the behaviour, values, and beliefs of influential political




     
 
      
 
              
             
            
              
               
              
             
                  
      
           
          
  
 
            
         
           
           
           
            
  
 
1.2 Justification of Study
1.2.1 The Main Argument
The main argument of this study is that the development and sustenance of organised
provoke violence or adopt violence to achieve political aims (see chapter two for
contextual analysis of elite political culture and governance in Nigeria). The dynamics
of State governance - intentional activities designed to shape the flow of events is
shaped by the political elite desire to maximise State power and wealth. There is a
culture of exploiting office for personal gain and denying rivals access to State power,
where resistance fails it is a culture that will offer unsatisfactory dialogue. Ultimately
it is a culture that where all else fails will resort to violence to achieve their goals. The
, shaped by political elite actions
and values generates organised violence for its own ends. However, scholars
exploring the phenonmenon of organised political violence have isolated alternative
rationales.
Since Boko Haram began its campaign of violence, scholars and other commentators
unemployment, rampant poverty, government corruption, colonialism, religion in the
political environment and global jihad movement. Within the Nigerian public sphere,
scholars, commentators and represenatives of the State such as security agencies,
governors and federal legislators have generally had recourse to the above





          
   
 
              
             
            
             
           
            
            
                
            
     
              
              
                  
              
                
          
  



















Figure 1: illustrating the root cause and the symptoms
Source: Author (2015)
The thesis will argue that these acceptable causes, whilst relevant to the rise of Boko 
political culture of self-interest that is the primary cause of the persistence of
organised violence in Nigeria. The other accepted causes are, in reality, symptoms
and or outcomes and not the fundamental rational. The study concedes a relationship
between the above mentioned symptoms or outcomes and the emergence and
sustenance of organised violent groups in Nigeria. This research argues that the
emergence of organised violent groups is attributable to the concentric rings of
causative factors, and that these factors are not at the core but form the outer rings,
enabling or amplifying organize political violence in Nigeria (indicated in Figure 1).
At the core of the rin 
access to State power with the resultant violent consequences. It is argued that the
predominant mindset of the political elite is one of seeking the attainment of political
power not as a means to serve citizens, but as the chief end in itself. The political elite
covet the grant of access to the public purse for personal enrichment and the
hardened over the years, and has found expression in a chain of events leading to the




          
             
            
       
 
                 
              
               
          
 
            
             
           
             
                 
            
             
             
              
              
            
 
             
           
            
 
      
 
               
              
             
 
 
subsequently sustained organised political violent activities in Nigeria. This mindset
is identified as selected elements of the prevailing elite political culture a
willingness to use violence, access to State power for financial rewards, and
politicization of existing dissention by social groups.
It is pertinent to state that in this thesis elite political culture is depicted to be shaped
or influenced by the actions and agendas of the political elite. In essence the
emergence of organised violent groups is termed to be a consequence of the actions of
the political elite, particularly in their approach to State governance.
The distinctiveness of Boko Haram in relation to previous organised political violent
groups in Nigeria is located in its adoption of extreme terrorism, notably suicide
attacks, modelled on the tactics used by Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups,
notably Al Qaeda and, more recently, Islamic State. That Boko Haram has been
chosen as the key case study for this research is a result of that terrorist group being
the most recent manisfestation of political violence. It is hypothesised that a
successful annihilation of Boko Haram will not secure a permanent end to organised
political violence in Nigeria. Should the political elite culture remain unaltered then it
is predicted that this culture will generate further groups willing to use violence. A
pattern of social movements adopting to political violence can be seen over the last
decade: the Maitatsine crisis, Kala Kato, Sara Suka, Niger Delta militants, the
-iterate,
the research does not aim to replace wholesale alternative rationales for the propensity
towards organised political violence in Nigeria, but rather to reposition these
rationales in relation to the core causative factor, the prevailing elite political culture. 
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives
The aim of this research is to test the proposisiton that the emergence of organised
political violent activities Boko Haram is rooted in elite political culture and their





     
           
 
 
        
 
 




         
 
     
 
             
          
            
            
           
                
  
         
     
 
           
            
            
            
              
1. of governance has promoted
the emergence and sustenance of organised political violent groups in Nigeria.
2.
co-option of religion in the course of governance.
3.
-insurgency and counter-terrorism response to
organized groups.
4.
the emergence and sustenance of the Boko Haram sect.
1.3.1 Research Objective 1
Objective one focuses on establishing the extent to which political elite approach to
governance promotes the emergence and sustenance of organised political violent
towards governance on the emergence of social movement groups and these groups
transition to organised political violent groups. An analysis of the relationship and
alliances between complicit political elite and social movement groups and political
violent events will be carried out. This will be achieved with the aid of theories such
as the p 
choice theory and global surveillance mode of warfare framework.
1.3.2 Research Objective 2
Objective two concentrates on analyzing the emergence and sustenance of organised
governance, elite political culture and the implication of religion. This will be
governance, elements of elite political culture and the development and sustenance of
organized political violent groups. In addition this objective also focuses on analysing




                
            
             
              
              
          
           
 
     
 
           
       
             
            
  
 
     
 
            
               
               
             
          




of religion by the political elite in the political sphere and how this has facilitated the
emergence and sustenance of organised political violent groups. This will be achieved
by examining the relationship between the state level government and Islamic sects in
the northern region of Nigeria. Further analysis will be carried out on the political
violent activities as a basis of the elements of elite political culture. Theories applied
radicalization, rational choice theory, network analysis, global surveillance mode of
warfare framework, elite theory and religion in the political sphere theory.
1.3.3 Research Objective 3
emphasis placed on Boko Haram. Previous counter terrorism and counter insurgency
measures adopted by the State were examined
activities from its inception to its transformation to a terrorist organization. This was
political culture and the transition of social movement groups to organised political
violent groups.
1.3.4 Research Objective 4
Objective four addresses the emergence and transformation of Boko Haram into a
terrorist organization in line with elite political culture in Nigeria. The aim is to test
the thesis core hypothesis by using a case study - Boko Haram and examining its
emergence in line with the noted attributes of governance and elite political culture.
violence, rational choice, framing theory, anti-social movement theory, greed and




     
 
            
             
             
             
              
            
            
               
              
 
 
      
   
 
     
 
             
            
          
              
           
1.4 Notes on Methodology
This study critically analyses the emergence of Boko Haram as a social movement 
group and its transformation to a violent terrorist group as a result of
political culture and its approach to governance. Given the perceived damage to the
fabric of the Nigerian society wrought by Boko Haram, the phenomenon has been
widely explored in the academic literature and by the media. However, much of the
literature relates to the merits and demerits of the counter-insurgency strategy of
Nigerian governments and the international community. The role of the political elite,
and of their political culture, is much less visible in the literature. This research aims
to fill this vacuum. The figure below is an illustration of the research process.
Figure 2: Research Process Flow Chart
Source: Author (2013)
1.5 Data Collection
In order to empirically respond to the over-arching aim and the subsidiary objectives,
both secondary and primary sources were employed. The collection of primary data
presented significant challenges to conventional collection methods. For instance, the
use of questionnaires was rejected due to the personal risk involved in distributing the




            
            
             
         
  
               
            
              
            
          
           
            
            
            





     
   
communication with potential respondents it also became clear that it would be
prohibitively difficult to obtain authentic data given the fear engendered by Boko
Haram. The researcher was equally aware of reports of attacks on civilians suspected
of informing on, or conversing about, Boko Haram activities.
There was also a strong likelihood that if they did participate in the study, respondents
would self-censor the responses. Therefore, focus groups were also rejected as there
was a probability that the participants would not be willing to express their actual
views in a group setting. Hence, data collection was limited to face-to-face semi-
structured interviews, telephone interviews, and the collection of transcripts of
sourced from media interviews of respondents who were unavailable for face-to-face
or telephone interviews, statements released on YouTube by Boko Haram and the
collection of relevant articles from local newspapers from the northern states where
Boko Haram is active, many unavailable electronically via the Internet and only
available as hard copies. These were obtained from the national library in the federal
capital, Abuja.





        
 
 
   
   
 
            
            
              
            
           
           
         
 
              
              
             
            
  
           
             




As indicated earlier, many of those contacted as potential respondents were initially
reluctant to be interviewed. The researcher became reliant on the snowball sampling
technique to gather respondents whilst in the field. Having gained the trust of five
influential respondents willing to ask colleagues to participate in the study, the
snowballing technique proved successful. For ethical reasons, and to allay the
concerns of potential respondents anonymity was guaranteed and assurance was given
in the form of written and signed consent documentation.
As is usual with the semi-structured interview technique a set of core questions were
asked at each interview and the opportunity given for the interviewee to expand into
other areas he/she felt germane (see Appendix One). The researcher was also at
liberty to follow-up these unforeseen areas for research. This allowed the interviews
lowing a
preconceived direction (Fontana and Frey 1998: 52). Whilst this prolonged the




              
            
 
              
            
           
          
             
           
             
          
           
            
             
 
           
             
              
            
         
            
              
           
            
            
             
               
            
 
          
             
             
          
             
areas relevant to this research could be pursued without the interviewer having to ask
leading questions. Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 1 hour 45 minutes.
A total of 40 interviews were conducted, out of the 50 initially proposed (see
Appendix Two). Respondents were approached based on their area of expertise and
evidence of engagement with the Boko Haram phenomenon and/or other organised
political violent activities in Nigeria. Interviews were conducted with respondents
from the academic field. This was based on journal articles and analytical reports
published. Respondents sourced from the security sector included senior and junior
officers, who had interrogated or engaged with Boko Haram and similar groups. More
senior officers were interviewed than junior officers. Junior officers required
clearance from senior officers on what should be termed confidential. However,
information regarding the operational activities of Boko Haram, as well as supporting
documents, were accessed by the researcher in the course of the interviews.
The security agencies interviewed included the State Security Service (Lagos, Abuja,
Borno, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Rivers, Kano and Plateau states), Joint task force in Plateau
and Borno states, Nigerian Police force in Abuja and the Counter Terrorist Unit in
Abuja. The decision to interview journalists was premised on the publication and
interaction with Boko Haram members. Other respondents included one
undergraduate student from the University of Maiduguri in Borno state, residents in
northern Nigeria and Civil servants. The aim was to get the perspective of respondents
who are involved in researching, countering and analysing the Boko Haram
movement as well as other organised violent groups in Nigeria. Boko Haram
members were not interviewed for risk and ethical reasons. Direct Boko Haram
contributions to the research were limited to audio statements released by the group.
The audio recordings proved relevant as they had not been made public, and gave an
insight to the motivation, recruitment and operational activities of Boko Haram.
The interview process raised ethical issues related to confidentiality. Respondents
were asked to confirm that they understood the research questions and were not
coerced. Consent forms were made available. Permission was also sought prior to the
audio-recording of conversations. When declined, permission was sought to take




            
          
  
       
 
        
 
           
             
             
              
             
             
              
                
              
             
           
            
            
 
      
 
government agencies. Acadmics were the only group content to waive anonymity (see
Appendix Two). For the purpose of identifying anonymous sources, rank,
from the Counter-
by name of government ministry is used.
1.5.2 Local Newspapers from the Northern Region
The local newspapers selected were the Daily Trust and Leadership newspapers.
These newspapers devote more journalistic time and space in their editions to Boko
Haram than other national or regional newspapers. Selection of these newspapers was
predicated on their availability from the National Library in Abuja, but also their wide
area of coverage across the northern states of Nigeria and reputation for diligent
journalism and objectivity. Both papers are circulated widely across 16 states in the
northern region, as well as Abuja. Daily Trust has more influence within the northern
region a result of its wider coverage of events in rural areas and its publication in
Hausa and Arabic. Readership of these papers is not limited to the professional class.
This is reflected in the wide spectrum of topics covered: international news, national
news, local news, sports, arts, entertainment, politics, travel, religion, and business,
although emphasis is placed on news from the northern region. Furthermore, columns
for public notices, opinions and letters give evidence to its diverse readership.




               
            
            
           
            
           
            
             
            
            
  
      
 
              
            
           
           
              
            
           
        
           
  
 
    
 
            
           
             
             
        
  
 
Both papers are privately owned and claim to be independent of the State; this was
demonstrated by the arrest of the general manager of Leadership following the
publication of an article critiquing the ruling party, the Democratic Party
(Leadership 2007). The accuracy of the newspapers reports concerning Boko Haram
activities was cross-checked against reports from other media sources and the other
core sources interviews, transcripts of parliamentary debates and the scholarly
literature. Another crucial attribute of these papers is that they cover extensively
issues regarding Boko Haram crisis compared to other papers in the State. This
proved useful in understanding the impact of the different perceptions of interest
groups and State actors in classifying Boko Haram, the response process implemented
and the socio-
transformation to a dangerous terrorist organisation.
The column reserved for opinions and letters, gave voice to the a cross-section of
society, albeit largely those able to read and write, including university students,
unemployed youths, civil servants, blue collared workers, victims of Boko Haram
violence, and religious leaders. Examples include articles published by members of
the ruling and opposing parties who used this avenue to defend and reproach each
other for being allies of Boko Haram (Leadership December 2011and Daily Trust 
2011). Articles targeted towards the federal government on the ineffectiveness of
counter-terrorism measures by university students and professionals. Furthermore,
some articles published interviews with individuals from different social classes and
occupations.
1.5.3 Legislative Transcripts
The selection of transcripts of legislative debates was focused on exploring the
response before and after major violent attacks undertaken by Boko
Haram. This provided an understanding the political and security terrain of the State,
the idea was to illuminate the intricacies of identified elements of elite political





       
 
             
              
            
              
              
          
 
 
    
 
              
           
          
           
             
            
Image 2: Image of sample legislative transcript
The initial plan was to source debate transcripts from the parliaments of northern
states. This proved impossible due to the unavailability of soft or hard copies of
transcripts. Hence, the study relied on the transcripts of National Assembly and
Senate debates. The northern states are vigorously represented in these fora. A total of
30 transcripts was accessed and analysed, and ten were also coded. Relevant areas of
counter-terrorism debated include the response process and causes of political
violence.
1.5.4 Media Interviews
The decision to transcribe interviews from news reports and TV programmes was as a
result of inaccessibility and unavailability of some of the initially proposed
respondents. Audio interviews from media sources transcribed included interviews of
Wole Soyinka, Nobel Prize author and influential political commentator in Nigeria,
Shehu Sani, human rights activist, Senator and president of the civil rights congress,




             
         
           
           
     
        
 
               
        
           
           
     
           
          
     
 
                
             
              
             
              
              
           
          
            
               
         
 
           
          
             
         
 
members, Jacob Zenn, an American expert on Boko Haram, Senator Zanna of Borno
State, former President Olusegun Obasanjo, former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar,
Yvonne Ndege from Sahara Reporters and Elizabeth Donnelly of Chatham House.
These interviews proved invaluable, as topics discussed bordered directly on research
questions designed for this research.
1.5.5 YouTube Statements released by Boko Haram
A total of ten public statements released by Boko Haram were examined and this was
based on availability, as a result of a
audio and written publications. Excerpts of Boko Haram statements recorded in
journal and newspaper articles were also analysed. Examination of these statements
hoice of tactics. Some these
statements required translating from Hausa and/or Arabic. All the statements were
cross-checked with the other sources used in the study.
1.5.6 Other Data Sources
The size and impact of Boko Haram has led to a growing interest in the phenomenon
in both the Nigerian and international scholarly literature and the media. Both were
extensively sifted as part of the initial literature review, and the large volume of
material that was published up to the commencement of the writing-up process was
also incorporated into the study. Much of this data and argumentation is repetitive and
a particular strength of this study, are the primary data and insights provided by
respondents. For this reason, evidence, data and argumentation sourced from the
interviews conducted with respondents is used extensively throughout the thesis,
including the contextual chapters, rather than being restricted to the substantive later
chapters where the overarching argument is defended and justified.
1.6 Reviewing Methodologies for Choice of Analytical Tools
Key scholars and commentators to have addressed the Boko Haram phenomenon
include Nathaniel Danjibo, Onuoha Freedom, Jacob Zenn, Abimbola Adesoji, James
Forest, and John Campbell. Very little data come directly from members of Boko




           
           
             
          
          
 
             
              
              
            
               
           
 
            
        
            
            
             
         
             
               
             
                
            
            
               
             
           
 
Key analytical tools employed by these scholars include content analysis, thematic
and discourse analysis. Content and discourse analytical techniques are extensively in
terrorism and political violence studies, as well as in examining the emergence, causes
and ideological perspectives of Boko Haram (Brinkel and Ait-Hilda 2012,
Chinwokwu 2014, Idowu 2012, Omotola 2013 and Zenn 2012).
Kumar (2011: 278) stresses the importance of content analysis for examining a text
and the application of this analytical tool helps to highlight the main themes and
patterns that emerges from a text. Moreover, researchers in the fields of terrorism and
political violence studies have applied this form of analysis to identifying the
operational tactics of terrorist groups prior to an attack (Agbedo 2012), to the study of
response (Crelinsten 2002, Forest 2012, Onuoha 2012 and Zenn 2012).
Jackson (2005:31) uses discourse analysis to examine the dynamics of phrases and
govern -terrorism discourse. Similarly, in the Nigerian context, Osumah
by the Nigerian government. His arguments are framed using discourse analysis to
explore the setbacks faced by the security forces. Likewise, Agbedo (2012) analyses
the statements released by Boko Haram. In this research, a combination of discourse
and content analysis was used to identify and develop pa 
identification of extremists believers in their murky domains of operations prior to the
analytical tools is quite rare; there are benefits to using these tools in tandem. Both
analytical tools identify meanings and relate them to the context. They examine the
stability and change of issues relating to the context as well as identify and set the
limits of arguments and create the limitations for probable action. This is
demonstrated in research reports completed by Forest (2012) and Gourley (2012). The
latter focused on the use of secondary data sources in examining Boko Haram as a
strategic economic threat and the possibility of the group becoming a franchise of al-




             
           
            
             
               
            
               
            
              
  
 
    
 
 
     
   
 
             
            
              
In addition to findings regarding the emergence of the group, its violent attacks,
ideologies, leadership styles, possible links with other similar groups beyond State
borders and criticism of the counter terrorism measures implemented, the research on
Boko Haram is still relatively immature, yet growing given the highly negative impact
of its activities on Nigerian society. The focus, to date, of research and comment has
role of external partners, notably the US, in mounting an effective counter-strategy.
This study moves beyond this limited study of the character of Boko Haram, and the
counter-terror strategy to explore the deeper rationales behind the rise of the
movement and how its activities are sustained by the political elite and its inherent
culture.
1.7 Data Analysis
Figure 5: Data Analysis Process
Source: Author (2015)
As indicated in the previous section, data has been analysed using thematic, discourse
and content analysis, guided by the research objectives. Discourse analysis defined by




              
           
           
            
           
             
            
               
             
 
 
            
              
      
          
               
     
             
 
         
            
           
                
          
 
events are produced within a context or social reality. This form of analysis reflects
on socio-political issues and the underlying meaning behind texts or conversations
(Krippendorff 2004). Emphasis is placed on analysing or rather creating an
environment or context within which the text or phenomenon is examined (Bryman
and Burgess 1994).Yates (2004) further describes discourse analysis as the link
between the representation of facts or concepts and the knowledge and/or theories that
supports them. Content analysis is focused on the frequent appearance of words,
themes and phrases in a text (Richardson 2007: 237). The key trait of content analysis
is the use of classifications which are usually sourced from theoretical models and
For this research discourse and content analysis of the transcribed data from
interviews as well as other data sources was undertaken based on the context of
ed from newspapers and other primary
sources was identified, grouped and directed towards various subjects investigated.
For the newspaper analysis, key categories were selected. This was as a result of these
stions. These categories were grouped
into clusters, they include: language and images used to describe Boko Haram, the
-economic,
governance and political challenges); and external influences (global jihad
movements). The language and images used to identify Boko Haram activities were
response to Boko Haram. These clusters were cross-examined with selected themes
identified from a content analysis of the text. The figure below is a sample of the




         
  
 
           
             
             
             
            
         
 
 
Figure 6: Sample of Thematic analysis of Newspaper Content
Source: Author
Likewise, content, thematic and discourse analysis of data sourced from interviews
and legislative debates were analyzed in similar fashion with the exemption of visual
analysis that is the exclusion of pictures depicting the debate proceedings. Figure 9
illustrates samples of the coding process. Colors, letters and numbers were used to
identify reoccurring themes and categories in order to track the frequency of









   
            
            
             
            
          
            
             
           
             
            
               
             
            
Image 3: Sample of Coding
Source: Author
1.8 Triangulation
Olsen (2009) defines tria 
achieve diverse viewpoints or standpoint of a topic investigated. This research as
indicated above adopted a combination of data sources and analytical methods. For
example in cases were respondents observations were perceived to be bias or lacking
in evidence, data sourced was crossreferenced with other data sources such as
newspaper reports or other respondents views. Furthermore, answers to research
questions were sourced from all data gathered, hence ensuring access to different
facets of the same reality or question examined. Yeasmin and Rahman (2012) stress
the importance of triangulation process for the purpose of verification and validity. 
This process ensured that information gathered from the field were subject to a
thorough process of cross checking, for instance data sourced from security officers
from the State security service was cross referenced with data from the joint task force
as well as other security agencies and news reports. This research implementation of




    
  
            
      
    
 
              
              
            
           
 
            
             
      
            
          
   
 
            
             
            
          
 
              
            
             
           
            
              
            
          
cross-referenced with existing scholarly
empirical findings,
records. The same was done for data sourced from newspapers, legislative transcripts
and other secondary data sources.
1.9 Research Limitations
The first set of challenges related to access to Boko Haram members, supporters and
fighters. This was not possible for ethical and risk reasons. The direct involvement of
Boko Haram spokesmen was restricted to its statements made through videos and
audio files uploaded to Internet sites such as You Tube.
The second set of challenges involved access to geographical locations of Boko
Haram activities, this was as a result of ethical consideration grounded on security
constraints. As such, it was difficult
well as source legislative debates from state parliaments to analyse the northern
respondents through telephone interviews, although this reduced the number of
contactable respondents.
The third set of challenges included limited availability of respondents from the
political elite. This was mitigated by access to, and the examination of newspaper,
articles and TV interviews of statements, actions and debates of individual members
of the elite relevant to the research aim and objectives.
The fourth set of challenges included the sensitivity of the Boko Haram case study
and the investigation of Boko Haram activities by the security agencies and
and the response process of the government and security agencies. This posed two
problems: standardized or general answers given by security officials and the
difficulty in accessing the accuracy of information sourced. To address this challenge,
the ethical credential of the research needed to be emphasises and water-tight in terms
of the anonymity and confidentiality processes. In addition all data gathered was





             
             
            
    
 
              
           
         
           
             
 
    
 
             
           
             
              
            
               
         
        
            
             
             
               
           
          
              
 
          
In addition to these limitations, the expanding violent activities of Boko Haram during
the period of research ensured a more published scholarly and media material. Whilst
this might be regarded as a positive development, these sources proved inconsistent,
speculative and usually repetitive.
The fifth set of challenges involved the relative reliance on the responses of the
interviewees. This was again mitigated by cross-checking against the combination of
data sources legislative transcripts, semi-structured interviews, newspaper analysis
and media interviews all addressing the same questions simultaneously. Although this
was time consuming, it proved effective and ensured the reliability and validity of
findings.
1.10 Thesis Structure
This first chapter fulfils the functions of an introduction stating the over-arching aim
and the subsidiary objectives; clarifying and defining key terms; providing an
overview of the argument and the chapter structure. It also details the methodology
used for the research process, explaining how the evidence and data analysed in the
later chapters was collected. Chapters two and three are broadly contextual, and
combined also fulfill the role of a literature review. Chapter two explores the bases of
the core concept at the heart of the thesis, Nigeria 
overlapping conceptulisations of organized violence, exploring how orgainsed
violence in Nigeria, whilst ostensibly driven by religious and/or ethnic factors, is
essentially political in nature, as well as the nexus between political violence and
terrorism. Chapter three also defends the use of multiple theories as analytical tools
used in the analysis of evidence and data in later chapters. Both these chapters also
make use of material gathered from primary sources including interviews with
respondents, transcripts of legislative debates and statements in northern newspapers,
rather than restricting the content to an analysis of the secondary source material.




        
             
    
 
            
              
                
          
 
            
             
            
              
 
               
           
           
    
 
            
            
              
  
governance/government, and its concomitant relationship with organised political
violence in Nigeria stressing the fundamental role of the leite in generating and
sustaining political violence.
Chapter five analyses the influence of religion in Nigerian politics, concentrating in
the context of this research, on Islamic religious associations and sects. The aim of
chapter five is to analyze the influence of religion as a cover for political violence and
as a tool used by the elite to acquire legitimacy.
Chapter six specifically focusses on Boko Haram, analysing how the emergence and
evolution of Boko Haram are intrinsically linked with the political culture of the
Nigerian elite and its reliance on co-opting violent elements from within social
movements, such as the precursors to Boko Haram, in order to coerce the electorate.
Chapter seven analyses the response of the Nigerian political elite in its role as State
and/or state government to political violence, notably Boko Haram, exploring the
negative impact of the government(s) phased response in terms of counter-insurgency
and counter-terrorism strategies.
Chapter eight concludes the thesis, drawing the the findings of the subsidiary
objectives in order to defend and justify the thesis overarching argument concerning





       
    
 
    
 
             
           
             
              
               
          
             
         
 
             
            
           
             
            
 
    
 
            
          
             
           
             
           
          
             
CHAPTER TWO 
CONTEXTUALISING ELITE POLITICAL CULTURE: THE LINK TO
ORGANISED VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA
2.0 Introduction
The discourse of organised violence in Nigeria is dominated by specific elements such
as identity politics, corruption and socio-economic challenges. The transfer of power
from one government to another in Nigeria is shadowed by violence. The prevalence
of organised political violent activities is not limited to electoral periods, or the period
of military rule, but rather is a reflection of the political and social environment in
Nigeria. Hence, organised violent activities are a consistent factor in Niger 
existence. This thesis argues that there is a direct link between organised political
violent, governance and elite political culture in Nigeria.
This chapter serves as the groundwork for the examination of selected elements of
governance and elite political culture that facilitates the emergence and sustenance of
organised political violent groups in Nigeria. A search amongst current literature
yielded little on the nexus between elements of elite political culture, governance and
the emergence and sustenance of organised political violent groups in Nigeria.
2.1 Defining Political Elite
large or otherwise pivotal organisations and movements are able to affect political
stated is indicative of political reflections, notwithstanding classical descriptions of
elites depend largely on the political domination, political capacity and skills of these
individuals within the society (Pareto 1935, Mosca 1939 and Machiavelli). In
addition, current definitions of elites classifies these individuals as a select group who
control resources, control large amount of power, make and influence decisions
affecting political outcomes without being immediately curbed (Mills 1970, Vergara




              
           
            
              
 
 
            
             
              
           
              
            
            
  
 
            
          
           
             
        
 
             
  
             
            
           
             
  
            
limited to individuals who are superior in a specific field as indicated by Bottomore
(1990), but includes individuals whose decisions and interests shape and influence
political outcomes. In essence these individuals are termed as powerful and often
times identified as the ruling elite (Higley 2010, Aaron 1991 and Mills 1970).
Francis
fact ruled by a small group of individuals designated variously as political
involved in the interpretation of the concept of political elite. Zukerman highlights the
problem of recognising who the political elite are and the dynamics of their power
influence within the political environment. Mills identified top business executives as
part of the elite, whose interests are considered in political decisions in exchange for
financial resources in political campaigns. Furthermore, a State where religion is an
influencing factor in the political environment tends to identify religious leaders with
influe 
political environment.
This thesis acknowledges the diversification of political elite and their difference in
ideologies in Nigeria (religious leaders, political leaders, traditional leaders, top
government officials and military leaders) however this research concentrates on two
ideals shared by the aforementioned groups. These are; to access political power and
to maintain control of political power.
who rule society, clearly recognising the impact of political elite on shaping political
behaviour in
political elite as individuals who are directly connected or linked to the governing
governing authority, and their networks explaining the influence of this select group
of people on political behaviour. This observation highlights the connection between
political elite behaviour and its impact or influence in shaping the existing political
cultu political




                
              
              
          
 
              
           
                
  
             
           
             
              
              
           
         
             
             
            
             
           
             
              
 
             
              
             
            
Hence, the political elite not only have this power but apply this power in the political
environment and by so doing shape the political culture. Mosca (cited in Higley 2010)
identifies the political elite as members of the ruling class, those with large financial
resources and whose influences are recognised by those in power.
Mosca identification of the political elite as members of the ruling class serves as
criteria for elite membership; hence individuals identified as political elites are
depicted as part of the ruling class. In the same vein, studies by, Mosca (1939) Dahl
(1958) and Kelle 
members of the political elites are composed of individuals within the ruling class -
political, religious or traditional rulers as portrayed within the Nigerian political
environment. As opposed to Holme (2008) view on the inclusion of professional or
experts in specific fields as members of the political elite, applied to the Nigerian
context, members of the political elites dating from 1960 till date are limited to
civilian and military politicians. Those whom Higley (2010) described as individuals
Kirfordu (2011:27) argues that professionals or experts in
specific fields might not be part of political elite composition in Nigeria, however
they are classed as useful tools in political elites networks in attaining and
maintaining political power in the State. In addition Kirfordu (2011:28) maintains
that there is a prevalence of common political elite background in Nigeria. This
for retaining political office positions and converting formal institutional roles to
(2008), they argue that the political elite structure in Nigeria depends on State
resources (crude oil revenues) as a means for accessing political power and wealth.
organised violence as well as demonstrates the power and influence of this select
group of people in the political environment. This thesis identifies the political elite as
powerful players who, although they may not belong to the same political network,




              
          
         
          
          
               
              
            
           
 
        
 
             
               
               
              
   
              
              
               
 
       
 
               
               
            
            
              
     
           
            
exercising power. In the Nigerian context, and for the purposes of this research the
political elite includes the president, ministers and other elected federal
parliamentarians; state governors, commissioners and other state legislators; local
government chairmen; traditional rulers (often also religious leaders in northern
Nigeria); certain influential religious leaders; executives of major companies; and
senior military officers. It is not the aim of the research to explore the internal
dynamics of political elite membership, but rather to investigate the impact of a tacit
political elite culture on the incipient means and methods of social movements
responding to the governance strategies of the political elite.
2.2 Elite Political Culture Definition within Context
The broad application of the term culture limits the development of a universal
accepted definition of culture across the different fields of study (Tharp n.d). In the
fields of anthropology and sociology, culture is applied as a term to define the beliefs,
languages, myths, morals, values, religious practices and the daily lives of people in a
persistent ways of ord 
serves as a process that influences and shapes the culture of these individuals. Hence
this thesis maintains that the political culture of political elite in Nigeria is influenced
and shaped by the actions of the political elite, as will be demonstrated in succeeding
-political
and physical environment make up his culture.
Political culture is a broad term and not easy to define (Reisinger 1995). Bove (2002)
argues that the presence of similar elements in the concept of political culture does not
necessarily explain the behaviours and orientation of individuals and mass of the
population towards politics in a society. As such, Rosenbaum (1975:6) and Almond
(2006) propose the need to clarify the core components attached to political culture to
address the implications of political ac 
environment. Likewise, Welch (2013) argues that while political culture does not




               
             
               
          
 
             
                
    
            
           
               
            
            
             
             
            
              
               
           
           
   
 
            
            
              
          
            
            
       
 
political actors or in the case of this thesis the outcome or consequences of political
elite actions and decisions. As such in this research, definitions and interpretation of
this concept will be aligned to an examination of political elite actions and impact on
the emergence and sustenance of organised political violence in Nigeria.
Welch (2013:2) claims that, despite the diversity of approaches taken by scholars in
the area of political culture, there seems to be a broad agreement as to its definition
environment. Reisinger (1995:2) describes
way each aspect of culture, including ethnicity, belief systems and ideology, and
significantly the representatives of these sub-cultures can affect or influence political
behaviour at all levels of the State. In the same vein, Almond (2006) argues that
individuals involved in the political system, rooted in the behaviour, values and
interests of the political actors. This thesis agrees with Almond, ultimately finding
that political elite values and actions shapes or influences elite political culture which
outcomes. Furthermore, Elazar (1972) stresses that political culture is shaped by an
individual that is political elite beliefs and perceptions about governance, in particular
how they think and their approach to governance. This view is supported by Baba
(2015) who argues that elite political culture is shaped by the values of the political
elite. These values according to Omodia (2011) include limited populace political
participation, patronage politics, and zero sum politics, further examined in successive
chapters.
Jones (1992) and Diamond (1993:8) contend that political culture focuses on elements
of behaviour, that is the behaviour of political actors (political elites), behaviour
shaped by past events and cultural norms, and that the behaviour of political actors
influences governance policies. The Nigerian political environment gives credence to
the approach to political culture adopted by Reisinger, Almond and Jones where
ethnicity, religion and personal interests of political actors shape and influence the




        
            
              
              
             
             
          
      
  
 
             
             
             
             
              
               
      
            
              
       
              
            
           
              
     
             
             
Almond and Verba cited in Chilton (1988) defined politic 
empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situations in which
the political actions of the political elite are inclined towards a consistent pattern of
behaviour influenced by the personal interests and values of the elite. This is reflected
cases of electoral campaigns and in the approach to governance. As such, collective
and individual attitudes towards politics are expected to impact on the trends of
political culture exhibited in the Nigerian political environment. Therefore, the
ly influenced by the values attached
power.
Reisinger (1995) stressed the importance of isolating the group whose culture is being
examined; in this case the political elite, recognising the presence of multiple cultures
within a State. He emphasises the influence of sub-groups cultures on other groups
within a society. Matlosa (2003) also contends that the political culture of key
process. More recently, Baba (2015) has also argued that the political culture is the
driver behind the approach to governance of the political elite which itself is the main
reason for the establishment of social m 
approach to State governance, resulting in misgovernance, and the response of the
population to this misgovernance lies at the heart of the overarching argument. It is
liefs about politics and feelings with respect
formation of social movements. That section of the population that decides to rely on
ethnic, religious, ideological or social ties, by supporting social movements, as a
means of communication with the governing authority is a recognisable response
exploited by the political elite. This pattern of behaviour is equally reminiscent of the
paigns and patronage networks. Notably,
or non-violent means is made possible by the support of existing sub-groups within




             
       
 
             
             
              
  
 
              
             
            
             
            
 
          
 
             
            
              
            
           
              
             
            
             
    
           
            
   
 
 
outcome often being the ultimate use of violence and the transformation of social
movements into organised political violent groups.
Khosravi and Fard (2016) define elite political culture as the pattern of behaviours,
mind sets and values of those who influence political outcomes. Hence elite political
culture is shaped by the interests and actions of the political elite. Inglehart (2000)
cultural values
depend
Furthermore, Camp (2001) posits that the values of political elite in relation to State
power and governance are translated into the populace view of State governance and
their assessment of political elite performance. This view maintains that political elite
actions shape and influences elite political culture and its role in the populace
response to political outcomes as a result of political elite values.
2.2.1 Elite Political Culture; the Link to Organised Violence
Since Nigeria gained independence in 1960 the country has suffered a history of
political and electoral violence which has persisted during both military and civilian
regimes. Two notable phenomena have been the consistent calls for a move towards
organised groups in the State and the increased demand for good governance
practices. The prevailing political violence is influenced by the decisions and
behaviours of the political elite in relation to access to State power. This thesis
proposes that the attitude towards governance is based on the elite political cultural
elements zero sum politics, identity politics and politicisation of social cleavages
have served as a catalyst for the emergence of organised political violent groups.
decades of violence, ethnic
and religious rivalries, low performance of the governing authority, politicisation of





        
   
 
     
             
             
             
              
        
           
          
           
              
    
           
             
           
      
 
Figure 7: Key Elements of Elite Political Culture
Source: Author (2015)
Anazode, Uchenna and Uche (2010)
governance as a result of the prevailing political culture. Omodia (2011) referred to
the negative perception of the government and its governance process by the populace
due to the interference of the political elite in governance processes. This research
argues that the populace in Nigeria are involved in politics. Baba (2015) and Jawondo
(2011) maintains in politics is manifested in the
development of social movement groups allied with political parties for political
representation. The shortcomings of governance have led to structural and
institutional weakness and in response the establishment of social movement groups
whose goals have been, at least ostensibly, to leverage change from state and federal
government. However, the underlying
in government, created an enabling environment that ensured alliances between these
groups and interested members of the political elite. Chapter four will further explore
this contention using network analysis, rational choice theory and the global




         
            
          
        
 
               
               
           
              
             
     
 
        
          
            
               
           
             
             
              
              
 
               
            
 
             
               
             
            
            
              
e towards governance, embedded in its political culture, has
created space for organised political violence in Nigeria. Gurr asserts that, given
prolonged extreme frustration with government, people will eventually resort to
violence (Gurr 1970:24). Likewise, Omotola argues that:
If you go through the history of Nigeria, you discover that any strategy outside violence
in your engagement with the Nigerian state is like entering into a dialogue with the
dead, because over the years successive Nigerian governments have demonstrated their
low appreciation for dialogue in resolving issues, until groups resort to violence in their
demands, either legitimate or not, they hardly get any government attention and there
are so many examples motola 2013)
subsequent calls for socio-economic development through non-violent and
administrative channels were ignored by the government. The implementation of
violent strategies by Niger Delta social movement groups finally secured the attention
of the government. The same was also reflected in the eastern and western parts of
Nigeria, although the challenges were limited to insecurity and political inclusion
respectively. Another crucial aspect is the impact of the existing culture of violence
and zero sum politics element of the elite political culture. Okeke and Chukwuka
(2005) assert that the influence of military rule impacts on the political orientation of
the elite. This assertion is supported by Mr S, a senior state security officer:
Under the military era there was no active involvement of the people, a lot of
dissent was expressed it was forcefully put down (Interview, Mr S 2013).
the military elite during the military regime. Significantly is the presence of these
military elite in the current political system and the impact of their political values on
State governance. Hence, despite the advent of civilian rule, elements of the military
style of governance persisted. These elements include the dictatorial culture of the
elite, access to political power through violence; especially during elections, and a




            
               
               
            
              
              
            
             
             
              
             
              
             
           
 
 
              
              
             
              
               
      
            
              
             
           
             
             
             
key government positions. The above mentioned are interpreted in this thesis as
values of the political elites. In particular, the military style of governance is reflected
in the pervasive use of violence by the government to achieve stated objectives or as
an expression of communication. Key examples include the use of political thugs
which is a constant during elections at the different levels of government and the
wider the use of violence to suppress dissent. For example, the 1999 Odi massacre
groups to influence government decisions. In the same vein, Hayes and McAllister
(2005) argue that the dependence on violence by the governing authority ensures the
this observation. This assertion is supported by Lafantasie (2011) who argues that, in
addition to the historical existence of violence as part of the political culture, the
absence of good governance or government misrule are at the root of organised
violence in a society. The centrality of violence to elite political culture coupled with
a record of unsatisfactory governance creates the perfect scenario for the creation of
an enabling environment for the emergence and sustenance of organised violent
groups.
Elite political culture is linked to the high concentration of power at the executive
level, the strong influence of religion and ethnicity instigated by the political elite in
records a high concentration of power at the executive level. Siollun (2009) and
Omodia (2011) maintain that the high concentration of power at the executive level is
a deliberate move by the political elite to maintain or control State power and by
extension State resources. In addition Siollun
the challenges of limited political participation and the recycling of top government
officials and leaders in the State. These contentions not only highlight the values of
the political elites but also indicates how these values shapes the prevailing elite
political culture. Hill (2012:53) identifies this phenomenon as the precursor of
dynamics of ethnic and religious conflicts as a result of political competition, draws
concentrates power at the executive level meaning that decisions are taken at the





             
             
             
            
      
 
               
   
          
    
 
                 
 
         
                
              
 
            
  
            
              
             
            
              
             
            
     
 
             
            
          
           
            
Furthermore, the influence of ethnicity and religion in the political sphere is fostered
by the political elite recognition of these social groups as tools for political
mobilisation and in some cases political legitimacy. A senior state security officer in
northern Nigeria in response to the politicisation of religion for political mobilisation
by the political elite states:
There is a correlation between religion and politics and that is why we have problems
dealing with violent
were certain political forces who were benefiting from these movements mandate 
(Interview, Mr K 2013)
In the same vein, Mr S shares the same view with Mr K, he maintains that:
e always appropriated religious sentiments to further their political
interests in this instance too, that was clear in the case of the romance between Borno
state governor at that time and elements of Boko Haram (Interview, Mr S 2013)
Likewise, Reisinger (1995) asserts that sub-cultures and social groups within a society
- and post-
independence period records the entrenching of ethnic and religious divisions as a
means to access or garner popular support by the elite. This pattern of political
behaviour, whilst evident in other polities, has proven a reliable and egregious source
of violence in Nigeria. Examples include the eruption of inter-ethnic clashes in
periods leading to elections in the Niger Delta region and religious clashes in northern
Nigeria during and shortly after the elections. In essence, the creation of an
environment conductive for violence is made possible by the importance of violent
coercion to elite political culture.
The ideology of reward-seeking as being synonymous with exercising power is a core
element of elite political culture. Various scholars and analysts both domestic and
international (Onuoha 2012; Abimbola 2010; Campbell 2012; Forest 2012; and
Perouse de Montclos 2014) consistently highlight the predominant trait of corruption
and lack of transparency in the governance process, fuelled by patronage networks.
43
These observations are further validated by reports of missing funds and structural 
challenges. As suc 
backlash given concrete form by the establishment of social movement groups. This 
observation is supported by Baba (2015), who asserts that the formation of social 
movement groups in Nigeria is a direct response to popular frustration. Likewise, the 
transformation of these social movement groups to organised political violent groups 
elite. 
 
2.3  Governance 
 
The purpose of this section is to highlight that aspect of State governance process that 
allows political elite interference that leads to unsatisfactory outcomes of governance 
with violent results. A selection of relevant definitions and interpretations of State 
 due to 
an overlap of both evidenced in Nigeria.  
 
public affairs. Hence, governance as a concept has shifted from the legitimate 
authority to administer the affairs of a State to a more particular idea relating to 
-
defined and contentious measure of whether 
interchangeably (Peters 2011, Mayntz 2001 and Fukuyama 2013). However, Rhodes 
(1996) cautions that while there are similarities in traits relating to governance and 
government, it should not be applied interchangeably. This thesis identifies 
authorised to direct that process at federal and state level. Accordingly, the process of 





            
    
 
             
            
            
                
          
           
           
         
            
             
  
               
           
              
             
             
             
            
             
               
      
 
      
 
             
            
           
Overlapping power relationships between the political elite and government lies at the
heart of this thesis.
The recent scholarly and practical pre-occupation with the idea of governance has led
the process of State governance varies from State to State. Different governments
adopt, adapt and formulate governance approaches suited to their respective needs or
in the case of this thesis the needs of the political elite and government officials. As
such, the governing authority develops an understanding and representation of
governance dependent on its pre-conceived notions or the precedents of its
governance processes. This indicates a pattern of governance behaviour subsequent to
change dependent on the ruling authority and the political
governance. Rhodes (1996) argues that, while governance is an administrative tool for
the government, the process involved is not dependent on the government or ruling
-organizing, inter-organizational
of the process but relies on networks, for example as part of the privatisation and
contracting of public services. In contrast, studies on governance by Fukuyama
(2013), Peters (2011) and Mayntz (2001) identify governance as a tool used by the
government for the administration of their affairs and the extension of government to
include non-State actors in State management. For the most part the process of
governance is not limited to the ruling authority but spans across networks comprising
of relational non-State actors whose interests in State affairs coincides with the
government. In particular, the governance process in Nigeria is centred on the ruling
authority. The inclusion of networks in this process is limited to the discretion of the
political elite and their patronage networks.
World Bank defined governance as,
The tradition and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This
includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, the




              
      
 
          
 
 
           
           
            
               
 
             
           
            
            
           
            
            
              
            
            
             
          
             
          
                
            
          
               
              
               
           
             
            
and the respect of citizens and the State institutions that govern economic and social
interactions among them (World Bank 2007).
Similarly, the United Nations Commission of Global Governance defines governance
as,
A continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interest may be
accommodated and co-operative actions may be taken. It includes formal institutions
and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that
people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interests.
These definitions focus on the election of governments and the management of the
State through the effective administration of institutions by the ruling authority.
Stoker (1998) contends that governance in the 21st century, especially in the
developed world, involves partnership between the State and non-State actors in the
administration of State affairs particularly in infrastructural services and the social
environment. Furthermore emphasis is not placed on a distinct political system of
governance for States. This observation is supported by Fukuyama (2013) who argues
that governance is not dependent on the political system but rather on capacity and
autonomy. Governance is a fundamental requirement of any form of government. As
such governance is an administrative and managerial process. A process requiring the
presence of institutions as indicated by the above definitions to function, regardless of
the political system practiced. Nonetheless, the definitions above indicate the
departure of governance as a process of managing State resources in favour of the 
creation, development and inclusion of institutions to facilitate the governance
process. This is the case in Nigeria. It is inferred that governance as defined by the
UN and World Bank should contain elements for the formulation and implementation
of policies that ensures nation-building and national security. Furthermore, these
definitions legitimise the use of force as an element of governance in relation to the
implementation of policies judged to be in the interest of the State. Another key
observation from the definitions above is the allusion to the absence of politics in the
governance process. Fukuyama (2013) asserts that autonomy absence of political
interference -should be an element of governance in order to ensure effectiveness in




            
    
 
              
            
            
               
            
          
           
            
           
            
            
            
            
   
            
      
 
           
              
               
         
            
          
            
          
governance process is a key component of governance. This argument is further
examined in chapter four.
exercise of authority. Tradition may be defined as a pattern of behaviour that is
transferred from one generation to another and impacts on reality (Graburn 2001).
between the political elite culture and government. Therefore, tradition is construed to
be the principles that govern the political behaviour of a society and by extension its
governing officials, in this case, the tradition towards governance by the political
elite. The acquisitive approach of the government/political elite influences the
governance might not reflect the universal expectation of governance (Peters 2011).
However, the World Bank and UN definitions depict governance as a process
concentrated on State development, growth and service provision to the population
within a political territory. Rather the expected outcome of governance by the
populace, and the interpretation of governance by the ruling authority, are dependent
on the existing manifestation and historical representation of governance in the State.
Likewise, Rosenau (1992: 21) argues that the concept of governance which includes
institutions and informal mechani 
Therefore, the process of governance is influenced by preconceived notions and the
motivations of the governing officials.
co 
governance activities are concentrated on the development of institutions by the
government and the inclusion of non-State actors in State governance, which is in line
with the core premise of the thesis that the nexus between the political elite culture
and government impacts governance, which generate violence. For example, the 
Hisbah, the Islamic police located in the northern majority Muslim states, a quasi-
autonomous non-governmental agency, play a contentious role in maintaining Islamic
religious laws, but are also accused of provoking violence between the diverse




           
     
      
           
              
             
              
            
            
               
            
            
  
            
           
           
          
            
            
             
 
            
            
              
          
              
          
responsible for governance, and the inclusion of the private and non-governmental
-4) definition of governance confines
governance to the responsibility of the Sta 
outcome of governance therefore giving consideration to national security. In the
same vein, Peters (2011) portrays governance as a tool for collective action in State
administration which is the inclusion of State and non-State actors in the management
of State affairs. This view is shared by Rhodes (1996), who maintains that modern
day States involve the private sector, non-governmental sector and other agencies to
achieve policy goals for example public private partnership. The central government
is not supreme, not if they determine the terms and conditions of the delegation and
outsourcing. Stoker (1998) argues that State power, despite the blurring of lines
between public and private sectors in the business of governance is concentrated
between
the two, but finds that government always maintain primacy in this relationship.
Peters and Rhodes definition of governance highlights the development of institutions
for collective actions but fail to emphasise these institutions being managed by 
individuals or networks of individuals whose decisions are influenced and
characterised by the behaviour and interests of these individuals. As such, the
activities of governance are dependent on the collective interactions of actors within
the institutions regardless of the political system of governance practiced by the State.
agents as the governing authority and principals as the citizens or electorates.
Fukuyama is not concerned with the political system of governance, but rather
concentrates on the outcomes of governance. That is, the quality of services and the
process itself. Therefore, Fukuyama argues that governance, with inclusion or
exclusion of non-State actors, should be a balance of capacity and autonomy. That is




             
             
        
 
          
              
           
          
            
           
            
             
              
            
             
  
 
              
              
             
            
           
        
 
         
 
              
            
             
             
            
              
of positive outcomes and its existence should not be dependent on the particular
political system practiced by the State, specifically the inclusion of the political elite
and their patronage networks as reflected in Nigeria.
The definitions and interpretations of governance cited above captured governance
either as State centric or a combination of State and non-State actors in the
administration of State affairs. The elements or characteristics of governance include
exercise of authority, management of State affairs, leadership selection and
interactions between State and non-State actors. Significant is the use of institutions
by the governing authority in its operations. Furthermore, the implication of
individuals as an important element of governance implies the process of governance
and by extension policies being influenced by the interests and behaviour of these
individuals. As such the outcome and quality of governance is not limited to the
process or operations involved, but rather the competence, or otherwise, and the
outlook and interests of the individuals involved, in this case the Nigerian political
elite.
Governance applied in this thesis is not focused on the legitimacy of the political
system adopted or the merits of the combination of State and non-State actors in
governance operations. It is focused on the actual outcomes of the governance process
on the emergence and sustenance of organised political violent groups in Nigeria.
Emphasis is placed on the government and the political elite-patronage networks
influence on governance and the resulting violence.
2.3.1 Political Elite Attitude towards Governance in Nigeria
Recall that this thesis identifies the political elite as persons with the power to
influence and make decisions that affect the political environment. In 1999, State
independent history was replaced by civilian rule prompting the anticipation of a more
effective system of governance and a more substantive role for civil society and non-
state actors (Arowolo and Aluko 2012). Good governance became the zeitgeist. This




            
           
                
              
           
              
             
           
              
               
             
             
             
             
            
             
  
              
  
 
      
            
           
             
               
            
             
             
            
            
              
          
largely uniformed officers (see Chapter Four), expanded to include, not only former
soldiers, but aspirant and proto-elite individuals from other sections of Nigerian
society. The key priority at this juncture for would-be members of the elite was to put
themselves in a position to exercise authority. Thus, a primary area for the elite
involvement was the manipulation of the electoral process. Rhodes (1996) and
Arowolo and Aluko (2012) claim a link between zero sum politics, the absence of
military rule, when military rulers used violence to access and maintain power, thus
creating an environment where violence became a form of communication between
the government and the populace. This thesis suggest that the constant use of violence
by the political elite and government officials at the local, state and national level for
political benefits has not only encouraged violence but created a market, or an
industry, for organised political violent activities. In addition this also shaped an elite
political culture that depends or capitalises on violence for access to State power.
This phenomenon is indicative of the role political thuggery in federal and local
elections, itself organised and encouraged by the political elite. Power is concentrated
within this set of individuals which tacitly impacts governance (see Chapters Four and
f governance
whereby violence is only justifiable when it is used by the legitimate government for
interests.
Higley (2010:161) highlights the difficulties in demonstratin 
complicity in political violence in order to explain the prevalence of political
instability and organised violence in States. However he argues that disagreements
within the political elite networks can create an opening for violence. The political
elite view political power as their right and command, as well as depend, on organised
violent groups for support. This is reflected in Nigeria where rivalries between
members of the political elite are invariably expressed by violence (see Chapter 3).
Political parties, such as the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Nigeria
Peoples Party (ANPP) have been recorded to have alliances with organised violent
groups to secure electoral victories or political objectives (see Chapters Four and
Eight). Thus, the members of the political elite discovered that in stirring up popular




             
             
       
 
                
    
            
     
 
    
             
          
        
 
           
            
            
            
          
            
           
   
 
               
              
           
 
            
           
malpractice might be turned to their own advantage with violent elements within these
social movements co-opted to provide thugs to manipulate the electorate. Mr B, a
senior security officer in northern Nigeria argues:
Organised violent groups who use terror acts like Boko Haram are as a result of an
agitation against the elite, fa 
the line, politicians found these groups as a conduit in fostering their ambitions 
(Interview, Mr B, 2014).
the Bakassi Boys and
Niger Delta Militants. How the elite co-opt specific communities and causes and their
respective social movements, established as platforms to protest against elite
malpractice, is analysed later in the thesis.
governance downplays the power of the masses, Walker (1966) maintains that
-
barometer (2008, 2009 & 2013) indicate that 80% of the Nigerian population
understand the political system and know what they expect from the governance
process. Moreover, a large percentage of the population expressed distrust of elected
government officials at all levels. Correspondently, these negative conclusions are
reflected in the establishment of social movements or groups whose activities are
geared towards influencing governance policies to address these many complaints. Mr
S observed that:
With the advent of democracy in 1999, there was a feeling of freedom amongst the
people who came out to express their dissatisfaction with the government and try to
convenient for politicians to use those groups (Interview, Mr S, 2013)
Specific examples of these movements include Bakassi, a vigilante group formed in




            
  
 
             
            
 
           
       
             
           
            
           
  
 
               
            
  
 
   
 
               
             
              
             
              
             
            
            
           
 
formed in response to limited political participation (Examined in Chapters Four and
Five).
The political elite perception of governance is grounded on the existing system of
political corruption. This is supported by Ikejiaku (2013) who argues that political
elite comp 
State governance ensures high levels of political corruption consequently leading to
high levels of poverty and insecurity. Hence
governance should be shielded from political interference, and the need to maintain a
regimes in Nigeria. The absence of accountability spurred populace discontent leading
to the establishment of social movement groups prone to transmute into violent
groups (Ikejiaku 2013). Oche of the Nigerian Institute of International Relations
agrees:
disconnected from the masses of the people that does not take cognisance of the basic
consequence of contradictions of governance stirred up by the political elite (Interview,
Oche, 2013)
2.4 Conclusion
Elite political culture and its interface with governance is at the root of the emergence
and sustenance of organised violence in the State. This chapter argues that the
negative outcome of the governance process is a function of elite political culture in
Nigeria. This was examined in relation to the political behaviour and orientation of
the political elite, which highlighted the preference for the use of violence to access
and sustain State power, the ideology that access to State power equals pecuniary
rewards and the creation of patronage networks. Hence the re-occurring pattern of
elite political culture in relation to government selection and the motivation behind




                
           
           
              
          
          
             





























As a result of the above, the outcome of governance was below the expectation of the
populace. Therefore warranting the development of social movement groups as a
requirement to access and advocate for better services from the government.
However, as a consequence of the political culture and attitude of the political elite
towards governance, these social movement groups through alliances with the
political elite amidst other structural factors were subsequently transformed to
organised violent groups, the process of this transformation in relation to the key












               
            
         
             
           
          
 
            
              
           
             
            
               
           
 
      
 
             
             
           
            
            
       
            
        
CHAPTER THREE 
CONTEXTUALISING ORGANISED VIOLENT ACTIVITIES IN
NIGERIA
3.0 Introduction
across the globe marks a shift in the extremity of political violence in Nigeria, this
thesis argues that the causative and enabling factors remain same. The previous
chapter contextualised the concept of governance and the Nigerian elite 
governance framed as a culture that generates and sustains political violence and the
vehicles for this violence, organised political violent groups. This chapter will
establish a working definition of organised violence, political violence and terrorism. 
The chapter is sub-divided into four sections. Section one will clarify and
contextualise the concept of organised violence as it relates to the thesis. Section two
examines the different manifestations of organised violence in Nigeria. Section three
analyses the traditional rationales on the root cause of organised political violence in
Nigeria. Finally, section four will clarify and apply theories of organised violence
relevant to the study. This is to set the theoretical and conceptual background of the
phenomenon of political violence as it relates to the Nigerian polity.
3.1 Operational Definition of Organised Violence
Organised violence is dynamic in nature and no longer limited to interstate conflicts
and civil war (International Peace Institute 2012). Kaldor (2007: 2) new war theory,
advanced in 1999, focuses on conflicts generated internally, conflicts linked to
transnational dynamics and claims to power on the basis of identity, including religion 
and ethnicity. As such, changing patterns in organised violence are acknowledged and
reflected in recent global terrorist activity. N for
example Smith (2004) and Kalyvas (2001) argue that the basic causes of wars 




            
         
  
          
             
             
             
           
             
         
          
               
              
          
           
              
              
            
              
          
            
             
         
 
           
             
             
             
                
         
             
           
            
warfare methods and tactics are different. This observation is reflected in current
terror violent activities globally and Nigeria, in particular.
Cockayne (2006) acknowledges changes in organised violence, citing the privatisation
of organised violence and the declining monopoly of violence by the State as
indicators. This is evident in the growing number of militias and violent groups
fighting for, or against, the State. Recent examples of these sustained wars involving
militias/terrorist groups include conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali and Nigeria.
The diversity of organised violent activities ensures a consistent flow of policy and
scholastic definitions. Different subjective and interpretative classifications are given
to contextualise organised violence. An understanding of organised violence within
the context of this study is dependent on an examination of the definitions of political
violence and terrorism. This is a result of the use of political violence and
terrorism interchangeably with organised violence in policy papers and the
scholarly literature in reference to violent activities and violent groups globally.
Although the term organised violence is understood to be a broad term for violence
perpetrated by a group of people ranging from armed robbery, rape, war and electoral
violence to terrorist activities. The identification of political violence and terrorism as
variations of organised violence sums up the type of violent activity researched in this
study. For example, Shaw (2009) investigates the relationships between different
types of violence and indicates the trend of violence being deliberately implemented
by a group of people. The underlying attribute is the classification of group-induced
violence regardless of motivation under the term organised violence.
The American Association for the Advancement of Science (1996) defines organised
violence as a form of violence committed by a group, government or institution
against persons or a group of people. This definition identifies the perpetrators of
organised violence as a group, and not individuals, although motive is not implied.
Intended victims are classified as more than one person or a group, a form of violence
otion that this violence is political in its motivation
is implied. This view is shared by Clausewitz who contends that violence perpetrated
legitimacy is conspicuously absent, organised violence could either be a criminal





   
            
          
           
            
             
            
             
            
               
            
        
 
            
                 
            
         
             
             
               
            
            
          
               
               
             
  
 
              
               
          
S armed conflict is
with continuity between the clashes, in disputes about power over government and
territo considers organised violence to include violence to attain and sustain
political power. Likewise, Shaw (2009) equates organised violence to political
violence and terrorism, identifying political and social ideological themes as traits of
the perpetrators of organised violence. Shaw asserts that terrorism is a form of
terrorism is a means to produce an expected political outcome. Furthermore, Kaldor
(2007: 4) supports this assertion and posits that organised violence is an umbrella
term for political violence and terrorism concentrating on the deliberate use of
violence by a group against a selected population for political gain. It is construed that
organised violence covers a broad range of violent manifestations such as political,
criminal and social violence perpetrated by a group.
Cockayne (2006) classifies war and terrorism under the concept of organised violence
by alluding to the use of violent tactics and terror tactics by a group of people to
enforce change irrespective of a claim to political legitimacy by these groups.
Furthermore, McCormack (2010) categorizes terrorism as linked to organised
violence. He identifies the presence of adequate justification (in the view of the
perpetrators) for the use of violence. The group engaged in organised violence does
not perceive itself as a criminal organisation as a result of the inclusion of an
ideological goal or legitimate cause. Shaw (2009) highlights the key role organised
violence plays in the revolutionary seizure of power, as such defining organised
violence as the continuation of politics through violence. This reflects Clausewitz 
treatise on war which interprets war as a form of armed conflict between two actors
for political goals. The element of terrorism as a function of war or organised violence
applies terror as a tool to coerce political change by targeting civilians or non-
combatants.
A distinct clarification of the usage of the term organised violence within the context
of this research is required. Organised violence is interpreted to be a form of armed




             
            
              
            
           
     
              
   
     
               
            
 
   
 
 
             
              
               
           
            
             
             
  
          
             
           
            
             
                
            
           
           
               
                
premeditated use of violence by an armed group to inflict physical injury or
psychological harm, as well as the destruction of property, usually perpetrated against
the government or a group of people with similar characteristics, embarked on for the
purpose of righting a perceived wrong or achieving an ideological goal. This
definition categorises Boko Haram within the context of a socio-political motivated
, such as synchronised suicide
attacks, attests to a deliberate decision to employ violence and instil fear within the
its representatives, including
security forces and civilian officials
aims. Organised violence in this research is used to describe all forms of terror tactics
and violent acts perpetrated by the armed groups relevant to this study.
3.1.1 Terrorism
Terrorism has a long history, but the word was coined during the French revolution 
(Jackson and Sinclair 2012). The attacks on the US by al Qaeda terrorists on 11th 
September 2001, propelled terrorism to the top of the list of threats facing the world.
The concept of terrorism is notoriously difficult to define. Governments, scholars,
journalists and security actors each tailor definitions suited to their perception of
terrorism. Shaw (2009) maintains that terrorism is both an instrument of violent
resistance to the State, as well as a tool used by States.
Despite the difficulties in formulating universally accepted definition of terrorism,
three elements are consistently present in proposed definitions. These are the use of
violence; violence aimed at triggering political change; and violence intended to
affect a larger audience than its immediate target. Guelke (1998) and Wilkinson
(2012) maintain that the term terrorism is often carelessly and inconsistently used to
describe any criminal or violent act against the State or a select group of people with
similar or shared characteristics. In the same vein, Noam Chomsky commenting on
the Charlie Hebdo killings on January 2015 highlights the difficulties or
inconsistencies in defining terrorism. Chomsky cites as instances of terrorism the
2004 U.S marine assault on Fallujah, and the death of 50 civilians in December 2014





             
             
            
             
             
            
          
 
            
               
          
              
              
              
            
              
              
  
 
            
          
             
             
            
         
 
 
   
 
             
        
              
Hoffman (2006) and Jackson et al (2011:15) identify the difficulties in developing a
universal definition of terrorism as a result of the changing names, traits and
motivations of terrorist groups. Schmid (2004) supports this assertion and argues that
the difficulties in formulating a universally accepted definition lie in the very diverse
different types and attributes of terrorist groups across the world. These groups have
different motivations and employ different tactics and modes of operation, hence the
challenge of classifying them under one label (Victoroff 2005).
Hoffman (2006) and Brown (2007) assert that terrorism is politically motivated and
targeted at governments. It is focused on instilling fear as well as creating an illusion
of invincibility, thereby fostering insecurity amongst a particular population. Jackson
et al (2011:15) perceive terrorism as a strategy of political violence which any actor
can employ. Toros (2008) and Schmid (2012) argue that terrorism is a violent act
aimed at effecting a political change by targeting a larger audience than its immediate
target. However Wilkinson (2012) contends that terrorism is not a synonym for
political violence in general, and that to make political motivation the central focus of
terrorism is ambiguous, as the term politics is itself broad, especially when related to
power.
Terrorism in this research is understood as a premeditated politically, religiously or
ideological motivated violent act, targeted against non-combatants, an instrument to
coerce the government or a particular group, usually carried out by a clandestine
group, intended to terrify in order to achieve a strategic outcome. This definition
identifies key elements such as strategic goals, deliberate employment of terrors acts
and political discourse in the form of violence.
3.1.2 Political Violence
Political violence, like organised violence and terrorism is a highly disputed term and
is apt for this research. Honderich (1989: 154)




              
              
 
              
           
           
  
   
             
            
            
           
            
         
 
           
            
             
         
 
        
 
            
             
          
              
            
          
            
          
  
           
             
prohibited by law, directed to a change in the policies, personnel or system of
government, and hence also directed to changes in the existence of individuals in the
society
characterisation of politics as a means of striving to allocate power or manipulate the
circulation of power, either among States or among competing socio-political groups
within a State. It further emphasises C. Wright Mills contention that
: 428) defines 
explicit desire
of accomplishing a particular political objective directed at the party in power to
Cognisant of the implied intersection between politics and the use of violence,
political violence is depicted in this study as violence implemented towards achieving
a political goal. Consequently, politically violent acts are intentional and not
irrational, usually embarked upon in pursuance of present or predicted changes within
the external and internal political environment of the State.
Political violence is a violent expression of discontent towards an incumbent
government and its representatives and a means of attaining demands. From this
perspective, the violence perpetrated by Boko Haram is targeted at federal and state
level government officials are understood as political violence.
3.2 Concept of Organised Violent Activities in Nigeria
Organised violence has been manifest in diverse forms throughout the history of
Nigeria. Political violence was prevalent in the mid-1960s, there was civil war from
1967, and recurring religious, ethnic and electoral violence since. Kaplan (2000) 
refers to a shift from organised violence to political terrorism in West Africa. The
history of Nigeria records violence between non-state actors such as religious and
ethnic clashes usually motivated by political interests. However, the present
phenomenon of Boko Haram indicates conflicts not limited to non-state actors, but
include violence between the State and militias or terror groups.
Kaldor (2006: 96) describes a shift in organised violence, identifying globalisation




            
               
            
 
            
              
             
 
 
                
             
               
        
              
           
              
             
              
            
                
 
 
     
 
           
           
              
             
          
              
              
       
  
However scholars such as Booth (2007), Schuurman (2010) and Aston (2005) differ,
arguing that there is no new form of organised violence but rather recurring traits. Yet
the current manifestation of organised violence in Nigeria, Boko Haram, fits better
with
northern region of Nigeria indicate a sustained war with consistent demands, tactics
and the mode of violence have evolved. As such, the recurring traits of religious
identity politics have been mixed with terror tactics not employed in past organised
violence.
In the context of Nigeria, using Boko Haram as a case study, organised violence is not
unavoidable and expected as depicted by Falola (1998: 50) and Abimbola (2010), but
a tool employed for the purpose of achieving a strategic goal by members of the
groups and a independent history reflects an elite
political culture willing to use violence as a means of continuing political and social
discourse. Organised political violence in Nigeria is a deliberate process. Regardless
of any ideological underpinning, violence is used as a means to an end usually
political. However, the degree to which organised political violence in the State has
increased in the last sixteen years is new. Different armed groups or militias have
emerged during this period, each representing a different region, religion, political or
social ideals in the State. Central to this violence is the recurring role of the political
elite.
3.2.1 Political Violence in Nigeria
Organised political violence in Nigeria is manifested in activities ranging from
electoral violence, political assassinations, military coups, riots and terror acts by non-
state actors. There has been a notable shift in the perpetration of political violence
from independence. This is depicted in the transition from military coups and open
demonstrations, to political assassinations (Obadare 1999) and the employment of
terror acts by social movement groups. The mid-1960s ushered in an era of political
violence which was manifest in military coups, the civil war, ethnic clashes and later




             
                
             
             
      
 
 
          
     
 
Electoral violence is the principal locus of political violence in Nigeria. Since the
change to civilian rule in 1999, there has been an increase in the level of violence
before, during and after elections (Adebo, Pitso and Levan 2004 and Human Right
Watch 2003). Graph 1 and 2 illustrate the increase in political violent activities
between the years 2000 to 2014.
Graph 1: Graph showing incidents of political violence in Nigeria




       
    
 
               
             
            
             
   
 
Graph 2: Electoral Violence in Regional Zones
Source: IFRA Nigeria (2015)
This occurrence is fuelled by the political elite perception of State power as a means
to pecuniary gains. The employment of violence is simply a means to anticipated
political benefits. This assertion is validated in chapter four and specifically reflected





         
    
 
            
               
              
          
           
             
             
              
           
             
            
             
       
 
Graph 3: Violence Associated with Identified Political Parties (2006-2014)
Source: IFRA Nigeria (2015)
The 2011 pre- and post-presidential elections were recorded as the bloodiest elections
in the history of Nigeria (Human Rights Watch 2013 and IFRA Nigeria 2015) due to
the magnitude of political violent acts illustrated in graph 2 and 3 perpetrated by
members and supporters of opposing political parties (Abdullahi 2013). Violent
activities related to government elections involved the deployment by political parties
of armed youths commonly, or , to intimidate and actively engage in armed
conflict to ensure political victory (IFRA Nigeria and NSRP 2015). An example of
the Isongo-Furo and the Isenasawo group, an ethnic youth groups in Bayelsa State, by
for the environment and Chief Timi B.P Barijha-Amange respectively (Human Rights
Watch 2003a). This was evident in resulting conflicts between these groups and the
common and attracts little action from the government and its security agencies.
Those arrested for political violence are usually low level thugs, whilst their sponsors




              
     
              
             
          
               
             
              
           
               
            
               
 
 
(ANPP) during the 2003 elections in Edo state resulting in an attack on the
-chairman Marshall Harry. The 2003
gubernatorial elections in Kwara, Delta and Rivers states led to a series of violent
outbursts between the supporters of the PDP and ANPP leading to murders and
destruction of property (Human Rights Watch 2003a&c). Likewise, the 2011
presidential elections led to the death of over 1,000 people as a result of electoral
violence and clashes between PDP and the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) in
Benue state. The riots that followed the Miss World competition in 2002 lasted for
three days degenerating into a religious armed conflict between Christians and
Muslims. The initial political targets of these riot acts of violence were the media and
the Kaduna state government evident by the attack on Thisday newspaper building





             
     
 
              
           
           
             
         
 
     
 
              
            
           
          
          
 
          
            
              
          
              
     
            
      
 
              
           
              
             
           
            
Figure 8: Map of Nigeria illustrating hot spots of political violent activities
Source: NGWAV and AOAV (2014)
Another example is the 2008 Jos riots over the result of local government elections
involving PDP and ANPP, leading to destruction of government properties, disputed
deaths and increased tensions between religious and ethnic groups (Ostien 2009).
Other examples include the post 2011 gubernatorial election protest in Kano and Jos
recording the death of over 200 people (Fick 2011).
3.2.2 Religious Violence in Nigeria
Inter- and intra- religious conflict is prevalent in the northern region of Nigeria (Alabi
2002) and manifests in armed conflict between Christians and Muslims or armed
conflict between competing Muslim sects. In the past, violent clashes between
Muslims, Christians and traditional animist worshippers have also been recorded.
Conflict between Christians and Muslims remain prevalent (Sampson 2012).
Notwithstanding the religious differences that colour the violence, the underlying
motives are political. Violence usually flares during election periods and the drivers
of the violence are the alliances forged between the state political elite and local
religious social movements (further examined in chapter 5). Another entrenched
political motive for violence is political Islam, notably the repeated calls for the full
(Ousman 2012). This is
currently manifested in the emergence of Islamic Movement in Nigeria, Izala, Boko
Haram and Ansaru terrorist organisations.
Lives and properties have been lost and destroyed as a result of violence, ostensibly
spurred by religious differences (Dowd 2014). Prior to Boko Haram emergence,
hundreds were killed during Maitatsine crisis in the 1980s in Kano State. A group
whose leader, Mohammed Marwa was shown to have allied the political elite in
northwest Nigeria (Kasfelt 1989 and Danjibo 2009). In addition, cyclical clashes




             
            
             
          
            
             
            
       
 
         
 
              
           
          
           
            
              
             
              
            
      
               
             
             
            
             
             
             
             
             
             
               
               
deaths of thousands. A report was released by the federal government in 2004
recorded the deaths of 54,000 people between the years 1999-2004 (Dowd 2014).
Inter-religious violence is not based merely on intolerance of other faiths, but rooted
in political interests and the struggle for political supremacy between competing 
groups. The presidential election in April 2011 was followed by intense religious
fighting in the northern region (Onapajo 2012). Likewise, the results of a local
government election in Jos 2008 resulted in violent inter-religious clashes leading to
the death of several hundreds of people.
3.2.3 Social Movements and Ethnic Violent Activities in Nigeria
The end of military rule in 1999 encouraged the formation of social movement groups
whose goals were targeted towards change in governance outcomes, specifically the
incapacity of federal and state governments to ensure satisfactory public services. 
These social movements were usually constructed on ethnic lines. Again, ethnic
conflict is less about ethnic hatred than political rivalry. Competing ethnic groups
resort to violence to ensure political leverage as an avenue for access to resources.
Ethnic identity in Nigeria is stronger than loyalty to the State. Inter-ethnic violence
can flare rapidly as can the mobilisation of the youth. An example of this
phenomenon is the formation of the Oodua Congress (OPC) ethnic militia.
The OPC was formed to ensure
(Akinyele 2001). The formation of this group was a result of the annulment of the
1993 presidential elections after a Yoruba candidate was declared the winner. On the
heels of the formation of this group followed violent activities ranging from kidnap,
riots, political assassinations, electoral violence, and clashes with the Hausa and Ijaw
ethnic groups. In response to the creation of OPC, the Arewa Congress
(APC) was formed with the objective for the protection and self-defence for the
Muslim Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups. Violent clashes between the OPC and APC
were recorded in Kano, Lagos and Ibadan (Olaniyan 2009). Likewise, the Igbo ethnic
group also formed an association called the Igbo Congress (IPC) which later
evolved into the movement for the actualisation of the sovereign state of Biafra
(MASSOB) in 1999. Prior to the formation of OPC, APC and IPC, the Ogoni ethnic




            
    
              
             
              
            
   
 
               
          
             
            
           
         
 
            
                
          
           
            
           
            
            
   
 
            
 
            
           
         
             
              
people (MOSOP). Although MOSOP was not solely focused on political relevance in
-economic emancipation was expressed
in violent operations leading to what was later called the Ogoni genocide in 1993.
Other ethnic inspired movements emerged from the Niger Delta region such as the
Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) and Egbesu Boys of the Niger Delta. Just like MOSOP
they were interested in control and allocation of natural resource revenues, notably
crude oil.
It is important to note that inter-ethnic conflicts were not limited to the formation of
ethnic social movements. History records violent clashes between ethnic groups
across Nigeria. Examples include the Itsekiri and Ijaw conflict which lasted for seven
years and clashes between the Tiv and Hausa-Fulani. Intra-Ethnic conflicts were also
recorded. Examples include Ife-Modakeke conflict in the west, Tiv-Jukun conflict in
the middle belt and Aguleri-Umuleri conflict in the east.
Social movement groups in Nigeria are another avenue for organised political violent
activities in the polity as a result of alliances with the political elite and failure to
achieve stated goals through non-violent means. Social movements that transformed
Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND), and Bakassi Boys. The factors that enabled the transition of non-violent
social movement groups to organised political violent groups are discussed in
succeeding chapters. The most compelling evidence regarding the emergence of these
groups and their transformation to organised political violent entities is the consistent
variable of
3.3 Reviewing the Discourse on Root Cause of Organised Violence
Various arguments and theories have been presented to explain the emergence and
sustenance of organised political violent groups in Nigeria. Elkaim (2012), Forest
(2012) and Harnischfeger (2014) have identified corruption, poverty, unemployment
and illiteracy as the causative factors of organised violence in Nigeria. Although Boko




              
           
           
  
 
                 
                    
                
       
 
              
            
        
 
              
               
    
 
         
              
           
           
           
              
     
           
recruit (see Chapter Six), it is noteworthy that Boko Haram rhetoric was not initially
grounded on socio-economic challenges or the prevalence of corrupt practices, but
rather on religious expansion. Omotola for example, contends that poverty and socio-
religious ideology:
The reality of the matter is that there is poverty everywhere, in the south, west and east,
you can argue that it is higher in the north, but they are people in the north who are poor
and have not fallen for Boko Haram strategies, we should be critical of this assertion, I
radicalism is at (Interview, Omotola 2013).
emergence to a long standing the aspiration amongst a pious northern population for a
greater role for Islam in political life demonstrated by the widespread implementation
expert on religious conflict in Nigeria argues that:
Boko Haram emergence was purely initially a religious movement; it had nothing to do
it large following attracted the interference of northern political elite in the guise of Ali
(Interview, Danjibo 2013).
supported by Abimbola (2011) and Cook (2011) whose
findings indicates the early emergence of Boko Haram to be grounded on the public
findings of Onuoha (2012) underscore the relationship between Boko Haram and
north-eastern political elites between late 1990s and mid-2000s. This thesis argues
groups. Furthermore, Perous de Montclos (2014:2) identified Boko Haram as an
significant that the incursion of Islamic religion into the political sphere was at the
13 and Alao 2013). Islamic




            
               
               
          
             
              
             
           
            
              
           
 
                  
                
  
      
 
              
          
          
          
            
             
             
           
            
            
           
      
  
the Constitution (further discussed in Chapter Five). Alao (2013) emphasises that this
strain of political Islam runs deep in religious and political life in northern Nigeria and
that it was these demands for the incorporation of Islamic law and practice into the
constitution and local state governance procedure that encouraged Boko Haram
demand for an Islamic theocratic State (see Chapter Five). These demands are argued
to be as a result of political elites agendas regarding their political interests. This
consistent and deliberate action by the political elite impacted on shaping an elite
political culture that encourages the deliberate manipulation and use of religion
Islam to further political interest. Wole Soyinka commenting on the manipulation of
religion for political ends cites the case of former governor of Zamfara state Sani
Ahmed Yerima, whose gubernatorial political campaign was known for Sharia law.
secular dispensation. He said and I dare him to deny it, that it was the only weapon he
had to snatch power. He said that the PDP was so strong that he needed something
(Soyinka
2012; cited in Sahara Reporters).
Sani Ahmed Yerima. In addition, Alao (2013) and Hill (2010) stressed the use of
Sharia law by north-eastern politicians for political campaigns. Such religious
demands from self-interested political elite have consistently turned to violent
expressions following the breakdown of short-lived alliances between the political
exploitation of religion for political gain is illustrated by the 1999 gubernatorial
political campaign in Zamfara state. Here the aspirant governor used calls for Sharia
law to secure his electoral victory. This ultimately led to violent clashes between
competing religious groups, competing Islamic sects and between Islamic sects and
the police. Wole Soyinka links the current resurgence of organised political violence
Sharia law in northern Nigeria in exchange for northern electoral support (Sahara
Reporters 2012; The Guardian 2014). Furthermore, a security officer from the anti-




               
            
 
 
             
             
              
              
      
 
           
             
      
 
              
             
            
             
              
           
             
               
             
              
             
              
            
              
           
 
elite who were looking for political mercenaries, it is a classic case of greed combined
with political violence, using religion as a cover (Interview, Security Officer 3
2013).
Ulph (2013) widens the religious motivation for the rise of organised violent groups
is backed by Tande (2012), who maintains that Boko Haram emergence is a
consequence of the violent dynamics in the wider Islamic world of the Middle East
and North Africa. A commander of the Nigerian joint task force fighting Boko Haram
stresses the influence of global jihad:
Salafist movement, the people who believe they need to re-invent civilization,
something in line with what Samuel Huntington wrote about the clash of civilization,
(Interview, Commander Joint Task Force 2013).
This view is further supported by Danjibo (2009) who argues about the similarities in
Boko Haram ideologies and other Islamic movements in the Middle East and North
Africa, evidenced by Boko Haram leadership reference to AQ and AQIM ideological
goals. Notwithstanding, this thesis argues that militant Islam is not new to Nigeria.
Since the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio in 1804, there have been sporadic violent
uprisings in northern Nigeria motivated by extreme interpretations of Islam including,
more recently, Maitatsine, Kala Kato and Izala. Militant Islam has always been a
strand of Islam in northern Nigeria and as such interactions with Muslim sects in Arab
countries cannot be primarily implicated for the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria. It
is true that funding, training, and innovations in the use of media and communication
emanating from the wider Islamic world add a new dimension. Perhaps the most
chilling innovation is the use of suicide terrorism, a tactic previously not employed in
Nigeria. These technical and tactical borrowings can be expected in a globalized
world. Downplaying the role of religion as a motivator of violence, Ubi Efem, a




                  




       
            
               
         
              
     
 
                   
          
 
       
              
               
               
             
            
              
            
            
            
              
      
               
          
            
You can divorce religion from it, why I am saying this is because, when you look at the
history of Boko Haram it is political, that is their alliance with northern political elite,
(Interview,
Efem 2013).
e research findings regarding the emergence of
Boko Haram and its transition to organised violent activities, this assertion is
examined in chapter 6. In the same vein, Miss V from the Centre for Law
Enforcement Education (CLEEN) maintains that the emergence of organised
violence, and specifically Boko Haram, is not founded on religion but a function of
the political crisis in Nigeria:
crisis, and most violent activities, what we have tended to do is to try to fit in religion to
has taken the shape of religion (Interview, Miss V 2013).
y Boko Haram association with the north-eastern
political elites (Onuoha 2012 and Alao 2013) .The goal of radicalised Islam in Nigeria
by these groups is the adoption of Islamic practices in the governance processes of the
modern State. This goal is an integral aspect of the identity politics instigated by the
political elite, which has become a part of elite political culture specifically for
political campaigns. This is facilitated by the rivalry between religious or ethnic
groups in Nigeria vying for political influence or relevance at the national level. This
phenomenon has served as an opportunity for political mobilization hinged on identity
politics. The significance of this is the politicization of Islamic movements and
religious conflicts as a means to discredit opposition and validate leadership. An
-
sunnah and Izala Islamic sects in Kano state (see Chapter Five). Walker (2012) refers
to this phenomenon as a consequence o 
giving an example of the north-south divide and the subtle exploitation of religion as a
campaign tool during the 2011 presidential and gubernatorial election. Likewise,




             
            
       
            
 
                
              
            
   
 
                
               
              
            
            
          
          
            
    
 
            
              
            
           
         
             
             
 
                
             
       
 
             
the encroachment of Islam in the political sphere, instigated by the political elite.
Simeon Alozieuwa, from the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, agrees with
ion of religion by the political elite
encourages the interference of groups such as Boko Haram in political campaigns.
Boko Haram was a religious movement, but along the line they played a role in the
political system, they were used by some politicians to get power, they had certain
understanding, at a point the political actors could not keep to the agreement 
(Interview, Alozieuwa 2013)
Alao (2013), Boas (2012) and Chalk (2004) argue that Islamic belief as the key to a
utopian State is the root cause of terrorism in Nigeria. The members and supporters of
Boko Haram believe that a secular State cannot adapt or be reconciled to their
interpretation of Islam. They argue that federal and state government failure to
observe Islamic precepts undermines the expansion and practice of pure Islam in
Nigeria. Hence, the many socio-economic policy failings of successive governments
in areas such as corruption, unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, and inadequate
infrastructure are coopted as examples not only of particular governments, but of
secular government in general.
Ayodeji Ogunrotifa (2013) argues that the manifest inequality in wealth and living
standards between the rich and the poor creates a conducive and enabling climate for
political violence. This alienation of sections of the population faced with deep
underlying inequality has been also validated by the International Crisis Group
(2014). Conversely, whilst Onuoha (2013) establishes socio-economic factors as
enablers of political violence, and specifically the emergence of Boko Haram, he does
not specifically link this to an elite culture. That said, he states that:
The emergence of Boko Haram is rooted in the nature and character of politics and the
economics in Nigeria, particularly in terms of the distribution of resources, how it
creates marginalization and deprivation (Interview, Onuoha 2013).




             
          
              
             
             
            
            
   
 
               
      
 
            
             
              
          
 
             
          
         
              
       
               
            
              
        
 
             
             
on the creation of enabling environment for the emergence of social movement groups
targeted towards socio-economic emancipation. Recall this thesis argument that the
actions of the political elites ensures the creation of social movement groups, who in
turn form alliances with the political elite, leading to the transformation of these
groups to violent groups (Further examined in chapter 4 and 5). Zenn (2012c)
attributes the emergence of Boko Haram to poverty and unemployment in northern
Nigeria, aided by porous borders and terrorism activities in the Middle East.
However, Efem argues:
It goes beyond poverty; it is a complex mix of factors, which includes poverty, politics
and socio-cultural issues... (Interview, Efem 2013).
northern political elite and President Goodluck Jonathan and his supporters. From this
viewpoint, Boko Haram is a product of a political environment defined by the
political ambitions of the elite and sustained by continued inequality and the failure of
government to address persistent poverty and related societal ills.
Public service in Nigeria is largely driven by pecuniary interest, manifested in the
execution of violent and corrupt activities towards securing coveted political
appointments. This necessarily impedes good governance. Animashaun and Saka
(2013), for example, contend that the political elite perceive power only in terms of
driven by the urge to appropriate the
desperation to secure public office given the access to wealth and power that it offers,
and given the very limited alternatives outside of office, often encourages electoral
and political violence. During such contests for political power there is a demand for
Chapter Four). As Miss V from CLEEN reports:
Members of these groups were used directly or indirectly to facilitate re-elections and




               
    
  
            
         
            
           
 
           
             
               
               
   
               
         
 
           
      
            
 
           
            
             
 
              
              
either as political thugs and after the elections you do not keep to the terms
(Interview, Miss V 2013)
2003 and 2004) regarding political and electoral violence, specifically the link to
organised violent groups is further examined in Chapter Four.
Examples include the Bakassi Boys in eastern Nigeria, Boko Haram in northern
Nigeria and the Niger Delta Vigilante group in southern Nigeria.
Campbell (2013c:132), a former US Ambassador to Nigeria, identifies terrorism as
governance is intertwined with the values of the political elite regarding the purpose
of public office. Cook (2011) argues that as long as the political elite perceive public
office as a means to access and misappropriate public funds for personal use, so the
violence in
Nigeria . A statement by Usman Sani, the leader of Boko Haram immediately after the
death of Mohammed Yusuf justifies the use of violence:
corrupt, irresponsible, criminal, murderous political leadership and join the struggle for
an Islamic society that and
there will be peace (Cited in Vanguard, 14th August, Sanni 2009)
Sani was careful to underscore well-worn structural challenges associated by the
populace with the political elite to seek legitimisation and justification for Boko
with politics and economic injustice, but rather focused on issues of dogma and
liturgical interpreta 
political elite (see Chapters Five and Six) that ensured its transition to an organised




      
   
 
        
 
             
           
           
           
              
            
            
           
            
             
             
               
 
      
 
              
              
            
              
             
             
              
            
             
              
             
                 
            
governance of the political elite, which Sa 
use of violence.
3.4 Clarifying Key Theories of Organised Violence Applied
The complexity of organised violence makes it difficult to examine the occurrence of
organised political violence activities within a single theory or framework. An
integrated approach of different theories covering the selected aspect of organised
political violence in Nigeria is needed. This approach has been implemented
successfully by scholars in the field of organised violence such as Mary Kaldor, Marc
Sageman and Bruce Hoffman. Kaldor applies a combination of just war theory,
globalisation theory, rational choice theory and Clausewitz trinity model of war to
explain her new war theory. Furthermore, Marc Sageman employs social networking
theory, rational choice theory, theories of radicalisation and religion as a political
philosophy of terrorism amidst other theories to examine the evolution of global jihadi
movement. This thesis will draw upon elements of four different theories, which will
be outlined and synthesised in order to analyse the data gathered as part of this study. 
3.4.1 Global Surveillance Mode of Warfare
Martin Shaw proposed this theory as a framework for all kinds of violence, focusing
on the changes in warfare as well as the change in relationship between organised
violence and social power. Shaw maintains that organised violence is dependent on
changes in the national and global political environment as well as the relevant social
institutions. Hence, the advent of organised violent events in the State is made
possible by the corporation between the actors involved and the benefits or rewards
attached to a particular event. As such, this theory aids in identifying the actors
involved as well as the dynamics between the actors involved (alliances between
political elites and organised violent groups), there by identifying who they are and
how they operate. This aids in drawing attention to their motivations, which gives an
insight into political elite values. These events could range from electoral events or
the passage of a bill. In direct relation to Nigeria as will be discussed in chapters four,




            
             
               
              
             
             
          
             
              
             
          
            
               
             
               
          
              
              
              
           
            
            
             
            
            
              
           
           
               
             
                
             
of elections and political debates centred on government appointments and passage of
legislative bills. This implies that violent activities were implemented as a strategy to
secure political interests. It is pertinent to highlight that the decision to use violence as
a strategy by the political elite contributes to shaping an elite culture that adopts
violence as a political campaign strategy. Recall the thesis proposition that elite
political culture is centred on violence and that the outcome of the governing
authority attitude towards governance encourages the creation of an environment
conducive for the emergence and sustenance of organised violent groups in the State.
Therefore the choice to launch an attack or embark on organised violent activities is
conditioned on or enabled by the presence of certain factors. These factors, identified
by this theory include electoral events, international political surveillance, legal
surveillance and by extension key actors in socio-political networks. Furthermore the
need for a mass army or direct mass mobilisation is not necessary in embarking on
this form of violence. This assertion is supported by Kaldor (1999) and Kalyvas
(2001) they identify this form of violence or warfare as a new war contingent on
guerrilla warfare, attacks on non-combatant and identity conflicts amongst other
factors. This theory is reflected in the current insecurity threat in Nigeria. While Boko
Haram in terms of its religious underpinnings is not new, however the transition to
tactics is new. Furthermore the timing of its attacks and hate statements against the
incumbent president, Jonathan Goodluck is suspect. Hence the application of this
theory in subsequent analysis ensures that, changes in state and federal level socio-
political policies are examined to determine the implications of these changes as
triggers of organised political violent outbursts in the State, chapter five examined the
link between religious policy changes and violent events. In particular these violent
events were examined in relation to political elite complicity. Shaw (2009) indicates
the event of elections as a possible catalyst for the launching of organised political
violent activities. This highlights pertinent changes in the political environment as
well as underscores the implication of the deliberate politicisation of socio-political
issues or conflicts in the State by the political elite and the resulting outcome of
violence (further examined in chapter 4 and 5). Likewise the relevance of mass
and crucial to this study. Yet recall the core of this thesis, which is premised on




             
            
             
      
 
              
            
          
           
             
                
             
            
             
             
          
               
              
             
              
              
            
             
            
            
            
              
              
             
             
            
enabling political environment in Nigeria created by the agenda of the political elite
encourages the violent onslaught of organised violent groups like Boko Haram. This
violence by the State, increase in private militias and the employment of organised
violence for the pursuance of politics.
Recall that Shaw identified the presence of other social powers that limits or control
the activities of organised violent groups. These social institutions or social actors
range from the media, politicians and top government officials, international
community; religious and ethnic groups (see chapter four network analysis for
further examination). The influence of these social groups on the events of organised
violent activities is interpreted by Shaw to be limited to the decision on the timing of
events, the co-opt of these social groups grievances against the State and the
acceptance of the organised violent group mandate by these social powers amongst
or adoption of these grievances for their political interests with emphasis on the
timing. As such these grievances has always been in existence (Niger Delta mandates,
religious competition and ethnic groups political relevance in national politics),
however the decision to ally with these groups and adopt their mandate is subject to
the occurrence of certain events such as elections. Although this theory does not fully
indicate how an alliance between the political elite and social movement groups leads
to violence. However it draws attention to the events leading to an alliance between
the actors, thereby indicating a consistent pattern of political elite behaviour as well as
indicates the link between key events, political elites and the groups involved.
Therefore it is argued that Boko Haram mandates (Sharia law debates and political
Islam in national politics), which has been in existence since independence albeit
spearheaded by other similar less violence groups was co-opted by the north-eastern
political elite for political campaign purposes. This assertion is premised on its
religious ideological underpinnings and the call for a Caliphate polity, as well as the
Sharia law political campaign in 1999 see chapter 5 for further analysis. As such
activities carried out and statements released by Boko Haram as well as the north-
eastern politicians during electoral campaigns are justified and adjusted to fit both the
mandates of the group and political elite political interests or campaigns (further
77
examine in chapter 5and 6). In addition, evidence of di 
operational activities and involvement with certain political elite support this theory. 
 
operational activities in relation 
to the timing of violent events and the impact of the influence of internal and external 
-
political elite complicity. However this theory fails to expand on the motivation as 
relation to the political and social environment without necessarily illustrating how 
this phenomenon occurs. Nonetheless, as earlier indicated other theories will be 
 political 
elite involvement in organised violent events  alliances between these actors, 
however elements of this theory fails to indicate the link between these social powers 
and the emergence of these groups. 
 
3.4.2 Rational Choice Theory 
 
Rational choice theory examines how individuals make decisions and the motivation 
as well as variables involved in arriving at these decisions. In other words individuals 
or groups will embark on an action after calculating the costs and rewards involved 
(Scott 2000 and Lindauer 2012). Crenshaw (1998:11) maintains that the decision to 
make a choice is also triggered by occurrences which directly or indirectly affect an 
popular in the field of economics, however its usefulness in political violence studies 
is debateable. Ghandi (2005) highlights the ineffectiveness of this theory in explaining 
questions relating to political behaviour by emphasizing the free rider problem. In 
e 
that the benefits of collective participation are psychological as a solution to the free 





             
             
               
              
            
            
              
               
      
 
           
             
               
              
      
             
             
               
                
             
                
      
 
             
             
              
               
            
when the group internalises the problem, that is the proponents of desired change
makes it personal, closer to home. A specific example is Boko Haram messages
insisting that there is an attack on Islam and appealing to the religious sentiments of
the Muslims, in addition to linking governance issues to the limited influence of Islam
theory on religion and belief being adequate motivations for rational decisions. In
addition Bray maintains that rational choice theory might limit research on individual
behaviour or the choice to use violence, however rational choice theory is accurate for
group decision. This is relevant as this research is focused on the organisation and not
individuals of organised violent groups.
Lindauer (2012) proposes rational choice theory as a credible framework for
examining why groups of people, that is an organisation become involved in violent
strategy to achieve a goal indicates a certainty of success as well as the precedent
belief that the application of violent acts is a more effective method (Scott 2007).
Nigeria. The rationale behind the regular u 
the politicians is interpreted as a successful strategy for political electoral victory; in
addition this theory also highlights the logic behind an alliance between the political
elite and social movement groups. As such an application of this theory will not only
decisions, but also aid in the analysis of political elite choice of an alliance with the
violent or social movement groups. This will draw attention to political elite actions
that shapes an elite political culture that thrives on violence as a strategy for access to
State power in Nigeria.
In addition to Scott (2000) and Lindauer (2012) assertion of success being an
expected outcome, the implication of a process, which is a strategy, is reflected
therefore enforcing the presence of rationale in the decision to employ violent acts.
This was evident in the July 2004 Madrid bombing, where the motivation was to oust




            
 
             
            
        
 
             
              
             
             
                
                
             
           
             
             
           
            
              
             
 
     
               
    
                  
                 
            
               
   
 
are political maximizes; people use terrorism when the expected political gains minus
the expecte 
Therefore, there are other alternatives to violence or terrorism however the decision to
use terrorism is premised on a positive expected outcome for the terrorist
organisation, which outweighs or justifies the cost.
Conversely, the use of selective violent tactics by the Niger Delta militants ensured
that amnesty and financial settlement was given to them. In essence the decision to
implement violence to achieve stated goals or impress on a certain belief is
understood to be a rational plan. Clausewitz asserts that the application of organised
violence to threaten and kill in other to achieve certain objectives is not so much an
indication of chaos and disorder but rather a kind of law, where in the character and
composition of the social body turns into decision by arms (Howes 2009). Actors
involved in organised violence take into cognizance social situations which the
relative cost of violence is smaller than the relative cost of non-violence. Therefore,
actors will engage in the organisation of violence, an activity that takes premeditated
preparation and investment (Zurcher and Koehler 2001). Bryan (2012) indicated three
elements that hangs on the rationale for using violence; achievable objectives, timing
for maximum effect and result. Hence the decision to employ terror tactics is a
process termed to be rational and hinged on the slightest possibility of success.
of the postulates of
lines of actions and that they choose the line of action with the most favourable
of violence, the
group will have to be seen or assumed as a body of rational beings whose belief in a
goal and an effective plan to see it through is beneficial to them and the society they
represent (see chapter 4:4.3 and six).The rational choice theory expounds on the





              
            
             
               
              
         
 
   
 
              
           
            
            
           
          
   
           
             
            
            
           
             
            
        
 
            
             
              
             
             
need for revenge for the death of their leader Yusuf amidst other enabling factors,
which Bray (2009) discusses as a reason why groups participation in organised
violence served as a breeding ground for frustrated youths ready for violent exertions;
with little or no hardship on the part of the organisers of violence. Furthermore, the
rationale behind the use of violence implies a precedent of successful use of violence
as examined in chapters four, five and eight.
3.4.3 Network Theory
The application of network theory in the study of political violence aids in the
identification of network actors and the examination of the relationship dynamics
between actors in relation to its operational activities. Perliger and Pedahzur (2010)
affirm that the application of network analysis in studying organised violent groups
indicates alliances between actors and pin points the transformation of non-violent
movements to political violent groups. Furthermore network analysis highlights the
actors in the
network. This observation was supported by identifying and examining the links
between actors within the context of this research whose ties varies from religious,
finance, mobilisation, military, political, sympathisers to mention but a few. It is
hypothesized that the application of network theory aids in the analysis and
interdependence of actors and stakeholders in political violence by highlighting the
examples include the 9/11 and July 2007 terrorist attacks. Hence by highlighting the
process involved in forming alliances, the motivating factor behind alliances and the
resulting implications of said alliances is extracted.
Although Wellman (2006) maintains that this theory ignores the question of why
individuals resort to terror acts and focuses on the patterns and linkages between
interest groups. However the application of this theory in this study is focused on
examining the relationship and alliance between interest groups such as the political




                
              
              
             
           
             
              
             
              
              
            
               
            
             
         
 
           
               
            
            
           
           
              
             
             
              
            
            
         
           
         
           
           
on the sustenance of organised violence in Nigeria (see chapter 4, 5 and 7). A direct
application of network theory, aided in examining the impact of actors involved in the
alliance and the outcome of violence. For example the case of the alliance between
the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force and the Niger Delta Vigilante and PDP
governor aspirant Peter Odili was examined using Network analysis. It was
to perpetrate violent acts. Significantly, network theory as applied in this research was
not limited to the identification of actors within a network but rather highlighted and
stressed the re-occurring presence and actions of political elite in events of organised
violence. The implication of this observation is the actions of the political elite serves
as catalyst for the creation of an enabling environment for the emergence of organised
political violent groups in Nigeria. Furthermore, network theory applied in chapter 7
aided in the exploration and analysis of political elite use of print media in justifying
its relationship with social movement groups, in condoning the violent actions of
these groups with impunity and finally its dissociation with these groups and the
outcome of violence (further examined in chapter 7).
In order to understand the relationship dynamics between social movement groups,
political elite and print media, it is important to focus on the key reasons for
identifying network relations between both parties. Maoz et al (2003), maintains that
network theory offers a framework for describing relations between different social or
political levels. This theoretical framework ensures an examination of consistent or
inconsistent actions of agents who define, enable and constrain other agents (Hafner-
Burton, Kahler and Montgomery 2009). This is done in an attempt to capture the
processes by which actors; in particular the political elite further their interests by
capitalising on relations forged with other agents. Historically, there has been a
relationship between the media and the political elite. Print media was used as a
platform to further the cause of independence. Key newspapers used by Obafemi
Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe were the West African Pilot, Daily Times and
Nigerian Tribune (Okwuchukwu 2014). Shortly after independence, political elite
from each geographical region depended on newspapers to propagate their political
ideologies, mostly ethno-religious supremacy. The western region created and
influenced the publications of Nigerian Tribune and Irorun Yoruba, the eastern




            
               
             
             
              
            
            
      
 
              
              
             
           
   
              
             
           
              
             
              
           
            
             
           
              
           
     
 
             
          
           
            
            
and Gaskiya Tafi Kwobo (Chukwuma, Ekwe and Ngwu 2013). These papers were
used to protect the interest of the political elite in these regions and propagate their
ethno-
source of information for the public underscores its relevance to actors keen on
mobilising socio-political support (see chapter 1 for justification on the use of print
media as a tool for dissemination of information). Hence the content of messages and
the manner in which these messages are published are targeted towards influencing
the perception and understanding of the political workings in the State (Ekeanyanwu
n.d, Okoro and Odomelam 2013).
It is noteworthy that a large portion of media companies, notably print media are
owned by the political elites, and as such can influence messages relayed to the
public. The ownership of print newspapers by members of the political elites
influences the content of information published in these papers, most importantly
issues relating to politica 
indicated that 25% of print newspapers are owned by the state government and 71.2%
are owned by private individuals, which Ifeduba identified as largely belonging to the
political and business elites. Information dissemination is influenced by the political
views of the government and the political elite. This makes it difficult for opposing
political parties at the state level. Example includes the complaint of the opposition
party in Benue state APP against the PDP state government for limited coverage of
campaign adverts in the state owned print newspaper (Jibo and Okoosi-Simbine
2003). Examples of political elites who own newspapers or large percentages of
shares of these papers include the former governor of Lagos state Bola Tinubu and 
Former governor of Ogun state Otunba Gbenga Daniel. Though ownership of
newspapers in Nigeria is shrouded in secrecy, the underlying issue is the influence of
newspaper owned by political elites in shaping and publishing information involving
political conflicts and electoral campaigns.
There have been recorded cases of print media being used to promote political
propaganda. Examples include the use of The Nation and Nigerian Tribune 
newspapers as political weapons between two opposing top politicians; Chief Lamide
Adedibu and Senator Rashidi Ladoja in Ibadan shortly after the 2003 gubernatorial




              
              
            
            
          
            
           
             
                
            
              
              
            
            
           
               
                
               
 
           
               
               
                 
            
           
                
            
            
      
 
he became governor of Ibadan, a battle of wills between Governor Rashidi and Chief
Adedibu his political godfather was reported by the print media. It was reported that
Chief Adedibu had control of Nigerian Tribune (ownership status) as such articles
published were targeted towards negative reports of Governor Rashidi and vice versa
with The Nation supported by Governor Rahidi (Ojebuyi and Ekennia
2013).Therefore the ownership factor and the political network of print media ensures
the vulnerability of newspapers to manipulation by the political elite. Network
relations between the Nigerian government and the media as everywhere else in the
world could be described as a case of the media being driven by the political elite
agenda. This cuts across different political parties and geographical regions in Nigeria
and most importantly the current insecurity crisis. It is argued that media discourses as
will be examined in chapter 7, were drafted towards shaping the perception of Boko
Haram in line with the political elite self-interests. This was demonstrated in
newspaper articles depicting Boko Haram as non-violent by the political elite despite
opposing intelligence reports for the purpose of political mobilisation (Daily Trust
July 31st 2009:5 and Forest 2012). This resulted in an alliance with the political elite
between Boko Haram and the political elite led to the decision by the political elite to
use violence, it became imperative that the group be depicted by the media as violent.
Cranmer, Desmarais and Kirkland (n.d) observed that the application of network
theory aids in identifying what the implication of actors action on the alliances as well
as the behaviour of other actors in the network. This was implemented in chapters 4,
5, 6 and 7 to examine the implication of the actions of the political elite and the
governing authority on the transformation of social movement and interest groups to
organised violent groups. Likewise network theory analyses and identifies the traits
needed in actors for alliances and the flow of power (see chapter 4 and 5); thereby
focusing on the argument that the Nigerian political elite perception or understanding
of governance shaped an elite political culture that ensures the emergence and





   
 
             
            
             
              
             
            
              
             
            
              
           
           
               
             
               
              
         
            
            
             
           
             
         
 
             
            
             
              
3.4.4 Elite Theory
The development of elite theory can be attributed to a response to Marxism;
accordingly, elite theory maintains that a society will always be politically controlled
by a minority, contrasting Marxist view of a classless society. Hence a society
according to elite theory is divided into two distinct groups, the ruling authority and
the ruled (Mosca and Pareto cited in Zukerman 1977). Therefore, the implication of
this observation identifies the elite as individuals who have political and governance
authority. Higley and Burton (1989:19) maintains that the elite affect and to a large
thesis as political violence. Lopez (2013) argues that elite theory aids in examining
the connection between elite behaviour and political outcomes. This was analysed in
this thesis, evident by political elite actions in relation to the manipulation of religion,
ethnicity and socio-economic issues for political interests, which influenced an elite
political culture that creates and sustains organised violence, further explored in
chapter 4 and 8. Higley and Pakulski (2012) asserts that elite theory examines elite
development of networks with representatives of social groups as well as analyses the
impact of elite policies or actions on these social groups. This is indicative of the
political elite in Nigeria, where notable members of the political elite were allied with
social movement groups, examples includes the alliance between successive
Governors of Anambra State, Chinwole Mbadinuju and Chris Ngige and the Bakassi
boys. The resulting political outcome was these governors political victory and the
increased use of violence by the Bakassi boys with impunity. Elite theory assesses
elite political behaviour and their interaction with other actors thereby emphasising
the implication of political elite behaviour or decision on the development of social
movement groups and their transition to organised violent groups.
concentrates on the impact of political elite decision in State affairs; specifically its
link to political violent activities. However Cammack (1990) contends that this theory
does not fully examine the link between elite influence and political violence stressing
that there is no clear conceptual definition of elite disunity which Higley and Burton
85
(1989) identified as the reason for political violence. There is empirical evidence 
that elite do influence and manipulate political institutions and electoral outcomes 
regardless of political systems practiced through control of military and police force. 
Furthermore, as will be shown in succeeding chapters, evidence linking alliances 
between political elite and representatives of key political and social institutions 
ensure constant and unchallenged interference in governance operations.  
 
of the elite, as such gives insight into elite political culture. In addition Higley and 
-it-
-political and economic 
challenges in Nigeria as a result of the presence of political elite whose ascent to State 
power is premised on pecuniary rewards as such show little concern or contribute to 
socio-economic challenges in Nigeria.  
 
Walker critiques an elite theory that assumes that citizens have little or no influence 
participation in politics is dependent on the political system practiced. That is 
democratic States encourage the participation of their citizens in political processes. 
nominally democratic. Chukwudi (2014) emphasises the limitation of citizen 
manipulation of the masses by the political elite. Wright Mills (1970:28-29) argues 
ally and politically exploited, because they are 
disorganised, the masses are far removed from the democratic public in which 
political elite build networks or form alliances with representatives of social 
movement groups in exchange for social or political benefits for these groups. In the 
same vein, and in the context of mid-twentieth century American politics, right Mills 





              
              
 
 
   
 
 
             
             
             
               
               
               
           
            
           
               
              
              
            
  
            










necessarily representatives of the masses or have effect on the elite, as the elite
ensures no serious challenge to its authority. His theory is a reflection of the
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter explores the idea of organised violence, and notably the types of
organised violence found in Nigeria. The notion of organised violence, its causes and
dynamics are the subject of academic debate with some scholars arguing that the
rationales for a resort to violence have changed in the last several decades with State
actors no longer having a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, but rather other
sub-
resort to violence in the face of State failure to provide human security for citizens.
The chapter also examines the nexus between political violence and terrorism.
independence and has been marked by clashes between sections of the population,
ostensibly impelled by religious or ethnic intolerance. However, the chapter argues
that the cause of this violence has always been fundamentally political and linked to a
political elite culture predicated on the targeted use of violence to achieve office and
access to unearned financial rewards. The recent shift to extreme terror tactics is also
explored and the difficulties of defining terrorism recognised. By these lights, Boko
-option by
the elite of previous organised political movements/groups. The key difference is the





          
  
 
   
 
              
           
            
              
           
   
 
             
              
            
 
           
               
            
          
 
              
                
              
              
          
             
             
          
             
           
     
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE MAKING OF AN ELITE CULTURE THAT ACCEPTS THE USE
OF VIOLENCE
4.0 Introduction
This chapter offers an over view of the historical background of the development of
political environment, and its underpinning by various phases of politically
motivated violence. It builds on the proposition that the emergence of organised
violent groups in Nigeria is a manifestation of the elite political culture and their
approach to governance manifested in the emergence and alliance with social
movement groups.
The last two chapters concentrated on contextualising key concepts as well as an
examination of the theoretical background of this thesis in addition to a brief analysis
of the diverse manifestations of organised violent activities in Nigeria. This enquiry
vironment
and its implications regarding organised political violent activities. This thesis argues
that, this line of enquiry will not only support the proposition, but also achieve the
objective of ascertaining what is elite political culture, their practice of governance
and their complicity in the prevalence of organised violent activities.
This chapter is divided into two parts, part one focuses on the political development
of the Nigerian State. The intention is not to give a descriptive history of the political
environment of Nigeria, but to draw attention to the changing trends within the State
and how these changes in connection with elite political culture enabled or created an
environment conducive for the emergence and sustenance of organised political
violent groups. Part two concentrates on that aspect of governance and elite political
culture that fostered the development of alliances between the political elite and social
movement groups, and the latt subsequent adoption of violence. The concentration
on the dynamics of these alliances, aids in clarifying the connection between the
political elite practice of governance and the development and sustenance of





      
 
            
         
          
             
              
           
           
              
           
 
            
              
          
           
            
             
            
             
             
            
             
             
             
        
 
              
            
              
              
           
4.1 The Nigerian Political Environment
The political development of the Nigerian State pre-dates her independence in 1960.
The political activities and socio-economic agitations leading to the S 
independence have been extensively researched and recorded by various scholars
(Falola 1998, 1999, 2009; Aborisade and Mundt 2002; Graf 1988; Hills 2012; Lewis
1994.; Paden 1973; and Panter-Brick 1970). Hence the focus of this section is on
post-colonial era during which its political foundations were built on
constitutional policies made by the British administrators. These policies became the
foundation upon which regional, ethnic and religious lines were drawn as a basis for
political affiliation and attainment of political office by the political elite.
This thesis views the S ent and the elite political culture that is
fostered by zero sum politics as the driving force for the propagation of organised
violence by individuals and groups. Studies by Mbaya (2013), Akude (2007), 
Aniekwe and Kushie (2011), Brown (2013), Geddes (2010), and Abdullahi (2013)
argue that the S ronment is defined by a culture of violence, hence
its sustained presence. This view considers the political elite as the driving force
behind the emergence of organised violent groups, therefore portrays these groups as
tools in the hands of the political elite. Several analysts, (examined in chapter 3) 
suggest that there are also other factors that sustained political violence in Nigeria
(Isichei 1983:471 and Wright 1998:95). However this thesis insists that elite political
culture is the principal cause. As already mentioned, the negative outcome of bad
governance by the political elite, such as socio-economic challenges gave rise to the
development of social movement groups. It was these that the political elite formed
alliances and transformed into organised political violent groups.
A democratic or electoral political system was introduced in 1999 and has since been
the system of governance. Between 1966-1979 and 1983-1999 the State was under
military regimes. The advent of an electoral system failed to meet the expectations of
the electorate. It prompted calls for reforms in the political system that would better




           
           
 
 
               
             
 
 
         
           
            
              
         
           
             
            
             
    
          
   
 
            
           
           
            
          
          
          
           
             
     
 
divergent agendas. Commenting on this situation, Doctor Shola Omotola, a researcher
and senior lecturer in politics and governance from the Redeemers University
observed:
We were thinking that being a democracy as we call it, the situation would have
attention of the government, what they do is resort to violence (Interview, Omotola
2013).
ed in the mandates and statements of non-violent and
violent social movement groups, both of whom emerged to tackle perceived socio-
economic injustice. Furthermore, the successes of labour strikes attest to the positive
results in the view of the perpetrators of these activities. In addition Muzan (2014)
indifference to the plight of the Niger Delta
region, until the emergence of violent expressions of social movement groups seeking 
socio-economic welfare. Again, it was perceived as an example of the effectiveness of
violence. As such, the employment of violence by social movement groups is
considered by them as a reaction to the seeming indifference of the government
towards their demands.
4.1.1 Political Elite Manipulation of Marginalisation Caused By Specific
Federal System Adapted
An analysis of identified trends or significant changes within the political system
assists in explaining elite political culture in Nigeria. At independence, a presidential-
parliamentary system of governance was adopted, with the three regions administered
by premiers representing the major ethnic groups Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo.
Nevertheless, the euphoria over self-governance was not accompanied by a
corresponding growth in nationalism. Rather, long-standing ethnic and tribal alliances
rapidly undermined nation building (Isichei 1983: 468 and Geddes 2010).
Commenting on these historic fracture lines, Doctor Simeon Alozieuwa, from the





                
               
            
      
 
            
               
             
               
             
            
                
            
             
            
           
           
           
             
             
               
             
             
           
              
   
 
           
              
             
            
    
 
The problem that we have today is about the competition that has been there prior to
independence, that politics, which led to Awolowo trying to break into the middle belt to
destabilise the northern people congress, it is about the competition among Nigerian
social ethnic groups (Interview, Alozieuwa 2013).
ethnic groups and how this competition has fuelled the consolidation of regional
power and how the emphasis was placed on the defence of ethnicity. By May 1962,
the distrust between the three regions was manifested in violent uprisings. This thesis
argues that the absence or the lack of political will for negotiation as an alternative
was shelved as a result of the internal dynamics of ethno-regional politics. This
included the long-standing rivalry between the North and South for political power
and the tacit consent of violence as a means to achieve political goals by the Federal
government. Nnoli cites the absence of enquiry and prosecution during and after
ethnic clashes representing key political parties divided by ethnic and regional lines in
1962 and 1964 as an example (Nnoli 1980:196). Furthermore, the mass recruitment
and employment of individuals based on ethnicity in government ministries was
embarked upon to consolidate political control in national and regional politics
(Wright 1998: 70 and Geddes 2010). Thereby fostering resentment amongst ethnic
groups and used as fodder for political campaigns and riots. Likewise, the aftermath
of the 1962 census lead to violent clashes between the Southerners and the
Northerners, which affected the 1964 elections. This was as a result of the claim by
the Southern political elites that the Northern political elites falsified the results in
favour of the Northern region, resulting in an increase of Federal seats representing
the Northerners in the national assembly. Therefore ensuring the Northern political
elites had more political authority at the Federal level than the Western and Southern
political elites.
In like manner, Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, former Nigerian military governor of eastern
region of Nigeria and leader of the breakaway republic of Biafra, links the structural
challenges of Nigeria to elite political behaviour. He speaks of primordial forces; that





    
         
 
            
   
 
             
             
             
               
              
                
          
                 
              
           
         
           
             
            
 
 
       
        
 
                 
    
 
Politicians are stirring up et 
reliance on primordial forces (Ojukwu; cited in Maier 2000:287).
order is a development of your ethnic sovereignty (Ojukwu; cited in Maier
2000:286).
ethnic mobilisation, specifically its ability to overlook the less than noble intentions of
these leaders. Focus is shifted to the importance of ethnic supremacy in national
politics, as opposed to the qualification or suitability of the political elite. Therefore,
by May 1962, the distrust between the three regions was manifested in uprisings of a
politically violent nature. This thesis argues that the absence of negotiation or the lack
of political will for negotiation as an alternative was shelved as a result of the internal
dynamics of ethno-regional politics. This included the long-standing rivalry between
the north and south for political power and the tacit consent of violence as a means to
affected. Likewise, when the political elite realise that access to State power could be
achieved by inflaming ethnic competition, then political campaigns are grounded on
ethnic supremacy. Specific cases include political propaganda by Chukwuemeka
Ojukwu, Frederick Fasheun, and Muhammad Buhari amongst others which led to
organised political violence in Nigeria. The same point is made by General Ibrahim
Babaginda former military president, in his explanation of the timing of military
coups:
You see we are very smart people [referr 
(Babaginda; cited in Maier 2000:59)
There is a lot that was going on in our favour. So we seized the moment (Babaginda;




             
              
             
              
           
           
             
             
          
              
  
            
             
            
             
 
 
                
                 
               
   
 
           
           
            
            
            
 
 
                 
                
         
The comments of General Babaginda, a key player in national and northern region
politics in Nigeria gives an insight into the thinking and behaviour of the political
elite.It shows the willingness to manipulate existing problems and dissent in the State
for political benefits. It is noteworthy that these problems could be traced to the
negative outcome of the political elite governance. Okwudiba Nnoli notes the
significant absence of enquiry and prosecution during and after ethnic clashes
representing key political parties divided by ethnic and regional lines in 1962 and
1964 (Nnoli 1980:196). On the contrary, Pareto cited in Higley and Pakulski (2012:3)
assert that the political elite might not hold meetings to
decisions are to an extent influenced by current events. Mills (1970) speaks of the
thno-regional dissent
in Nigeria. Hence, the politicisation of ethno-regional dissent shifts the discussion of
based on ethnic and regional affiliations fostered by a political system dependent on
ethno-political alliance. This assertion is validated by a comment given by Sir
Ahmadu Bello, the first premier of northern Nigeria, Sardauna of Sokoto and leader
We must ruthlessly prevent a change of power. We must use the minorities in the north
as willing tools and the south as a conquered territory and never allow them to rule over
us and never allow them to have control over their future (Bello 1960; cited in
Thisday 2015).
The mass recruitment and employment of individuals based on ethnicity in
government ministries was embarked upon to consolidate political control in national
and regional politics and in particular to create patronage networks (Wright 1998:70
and Geddes 2010). This, of course, fostered resentment amongst ethnic groups and
was used as fodder for political campaigns. Correspondingly, Sir Ahmadu Bello in
The policy is a northerner first. If you cannot get a northerner then you get an expatriate
and if we cannot get that, then we will employ another Nigerian from the south on





              
            
             
           
             
              
         
 
               
             
  
               
                
       
 
             
             
          
              
              
          
          
            
           
            
  
 
          
         
           
              
The political tension between the three regions and the violent fallout of the 1964
elections indicated the character of a political system entrenched in patronage politics,
with the primal drive of fostering ethnic or personal interests, rather than national
consolidation. The employment of violence is considered an expected progression due
to the increased tension between ethnic groups. The Statement made below by Major
Gideon Orka who staged a short lived violent coup in 1990 against General Ibrahim
Babaginda is an example of regional resentments and tensions:
We wish to emphasize that this is not just another coup, but a well-conceived and
executed revolution for the marginalised and oppressed people of the middle belt and
few. Those
who think it is their birth right to dominate till eternity the political and economic
privileges of this great country to the exclusion of the middle belt and the south (Major
Gideon Orka 1990, cited in Hunwick 1992:11).
According to Kifordu (2011:73), the nature of federalism in Nigeria was such that
representation of all regions was relegated to the three largest ethnic groups, hence
sustaining the perception of marginalisation within other ethnic groups. Likewise,
State as the source and sustenance of political violence in the polity. However Ani
(2015) and Arowolo (2011), maintain that political violence in Nigeria was not as a
encourages dependence on oil revenues and unfair allocation of resources.
Nevertheless, while Ani and Arowolo observation underscores an important element,
their observation also raises the question of governance practices in relation to
resource allocation. The case of Niger Delta demonstrated political complicity
in management of resource allocation. As such, unfair allocation of resources is
concerning the imbalance of federalism is reflected in different
federal government balkanise the regions into district status. This was
ostensibly aimed at solving issues arising from cases of marginalisation either




                 
    
       
 
             
             
             
        
            
         
          
           
         
            
                  
                
               
          
              
              
    
 
           
            
           
      
             
               
             
            
 
              
           
problem due to the disagreement on the number of states to be created. As a result this
when political
negotiations proved ineffective (Falola 2009:182).
Aside from this predicament, the resultant federalism as opposed to the theory, which
concerns the decentralisation of power, in fact ensured the concentration of power at
the Federal or executive level of government (Ozoigbo n.d). This ensured control of
cash crops and crude oil by the
political elite (Muhammad 2007). Sub-states were denied autonomy and relied on the
Federal government for income generation (national allocation), cabinet appointments
and judicial process. This discouraged state level economic development and
specifically accountability of state governors towards their constituents. It fed the
perception of socio-economic marginalisation and fostered patronage politics. The
sustained perception of marginalisation over time served as a catalyst and induced
clashes in 1960 and 1964, the 12 day revolution in the Niger Delta in 1966, the call
for secession in the east by the Movement for the survival of the Sovereign state of
Biafra (MASSOB) which led to the civil war in 1967; Maitatsine uprisings in late
1970s to 1980 (Aghedo and Osumah 2012) and the
(OPC) formation in 1995 as a result of the annulment of presidential elections in
1993, acknowledged to have been won by Moshood Abiola from the west, to mention
but a few.
Marginalisation often but not always leads to resentment, anger and violence.
However the development of political parties divided along ethnic and regional lines
manipulated the perception of marginalisation (Geddes 2010). This was reflected in
e Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) party
representing the north and Hausa-Fulani tribe and the National Council of Nigeria and
the Cameroon (NCNC) representing the south and the Igbo tribe as well as the Action
Group (AG) representing the west and the Yoruba tribe. Doctor Freedom Onuoha, a
researcher and lecturer in the National War Defence College Abuja, insisted that:
The nature and character of politics and economies in Nigeria, particularly in terms of




             
   
 
           
    
             
             
           
            
           
           
            
    
 
              
             
     
 
    
              
            
               
              
          
           
 
                  
                
                  
             
  
 
for extremist tendencies and the promotion of do or die politics [zero sum politics] 
(Interview, Onuoha 2013).
This assertion is supported by Osinakachukwu, Jawan and Redzuan (2011), whose
findings correlate the nature
human rights violation, corrupt practices and negligence of the rule of law. However
the challenges within federalism in Nigeria have also been severally blamed on the
prolonged military elite involvement in political leadership. The military foray into
desire to stop ineffective civilian regimes and the pervasive perception of corruption
(Ejioju 2011:169 and Graff 1988).The first military government under Major General
Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi was largely and positively received, regardless of the
subsequent ill-motive ascribed to the same. Major Ironsi released a statement to
justify the coup thus:
Neither myself nor any other lads was in the least interested in governing the
proven honesty and efficiency who would be thoroughly handpicked to do all the
governing (Cited in Geddes 2010).
-Brick (1970:6), Aborisade and
Mundt (2002:15) underscore the implication of ethnicity as a driving force for the first
military coup audibly touted by the northern political elite and their supporters.
Emphasis was placed on the Igbo ethnic origin of the coup plotters and the execution
of military and political leaders of northern origin by the coup plotters notably Sir
Ahmadu Bello and Tafawa Belewa. Notwithstanding, General Ibrahim Babaginda and
Olusegun Obasanjo contends that, the first coup was not ethnic oriented:
Not an Igbo based thing as far as I could imagine, but the execution of the coup was
poorly done and made people to think that it was one sided. I could recall Nzeogwu
saying that some chaps in the south had let him down because they had not been able to





                 
            
 
 
             
              
            
             
          
               
              
             
              
             
     
 
   
  
            
             
            
             
              
             
             
              
           
           
    
 
            
 
in the army and with Igbo politicians and academics to lead a coup for the purpose of
ensuring the political leadership of Nigeria by Igbo (Obasanjo cited in Siollun
2009:142).
As such, northern political elite capitalised on the population of southerners Igbo
among the coup plotters as an opportunity to manipulate existing ethnic rivalry as a
justification for a counter-coup. Furthermore, a few months after the coup, the
of governance and co-option of individuals of Igbo ethnicity into key governance and
military positions. This perception thrived on longstanding rivalry between the Hausa-
Fulani and the Igbo ethnic groups, and secured the plan of a counter coup which
produced Yakubu Gowon a northerner as head of State. This was manifested in a
series of violent clashes and execution of Igbo military officers and Igbo civilians
from July 28th 1966- 1st August 1966. This research identifies the underlying issue as
the incursion of elite political culture in relation to ethno-regional politics into the
military and State governance.
patronage networks
of
marginalisation within the political system, through the addition of twelve states. The
implication of this decision was the diffusion of executive power of the central
government and distrust from the southern region. The Igbos felt that the
balkanization of the southern region was a strategic move to weaken the bonds
between the ethnic groups. This move in addition to the northerners attack on Igbo
military officers and civilians eventually led to the civil war. Subsequent coups were
recorded and though civilian rule was briefly implemented in the year, 1979-1983 this
was again terminated by the military. Yet the seed of destruction sowed by political
alliances along ethnic and regional divisions thrived and was perceived as
marginalisation by representatives of ethnic groups, specifically in the allocation of
resources and government appointments.





                
            
           
             
            
              
       
 
            
              
              
              
         
 
             
             
           
    
 
               
  
            
            
           
            
              
             
              
for the sake of personal gain. The elite became desensitized to the use of violence to
attain political power and achieve socio-political change rather than use negotiation or
other democratic methods. The various military regimes were recorded to have
violated human rights and adopted violence as a means to protect political interests
and the enforcement of laws and decisions, without due process. This included
structura 
few. Falola (2009:181) opines that violence became a political tool, not limited to the
military regime, but adopted by civilian regimes.
Further examination of electoral violence, shortly after the military era, illustrates the
system. The advent of civilian leadership did not bring an end to military influence,
but rather made politicians out of soldiers. Hence the continuation of a culture of
political violence and the furtherance of personal interests at the expense of the State
continued. Former vice president Atiku Abubakar validates this observation:
Nigeria has experienced decades of military and authoritarian rule which has left deep
imprints in our political culture. Consequently our political culture has become used to
the concentration and personalisation of political power (Abubakar 2005, cited in
Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006:30).
A key aspect of this transformation was the refinement of elite political culture by the
political elite
poli 
membership of political parties and alliance with the political elite. This phenomenon
applies to different countries and research indicates that this creates stable political
environments (Okonofua 2013; James 2005; Johnson and Libecap 1994; Dixon 2002
and Huntington 1968:70). However, this thesis contends that the practice of patronage
Nigeria. This is evident in the occurrence of organised violent activities on the heels
of elections and government appointments with politics being such a zero sum affair.




   
           
            
                
              
            
             
           
             
         
            
             
             
    
 
               
                
                 
    
 
             
            
          
             
 
              
              
           
             
             
     
 
achieve the desired
empirical findings demonstrated that patronage politics ensures a longer term of
political appointment and absence of political violence. Arriola maintains that the use
of State resources to buy off key political elite and the inclusion of key political elite
in cabinet positions eliminates the possibility of violence as a result of disaffection of
resource allocation or access to State power. However this research analysis asserts
that it promotes violence, a view shared by Diamond and Plattner (1999). They
likewise strongly suggest that this patronage system incites rebellion from competing
network of military and retired military men made up the political elite, they
controlled resource allocation, civil service and political appointments (Campbell
2011: 27-28). As a result their personal interests preceded the socio-economic welfare
of the populace, hence the violent conflicts within the Niger Delta region. Likewise,
Doctor Simeon Alozieuwa a senior research fellow at the institute for peace and
conflict resolution maintained that:
The political elite competition is about having an access, seeing politics as a means of
providing for yourself and your clients. People must get to the public office at all costs.
This is why some of us, believe that the problem that we have today is about the
competition. (Interview, Alozieuwa 2013).
For Alozieuwa, the underlying factor is the motivation behind State power, namely an
opportunity to gain pecuniary rewards at the expense of the necessary processes
needed for nation building. Furthermore, Olusegun Obasanjo former president of
Nigeria, in response to zero sum elite competition and patronage politics stated that:
The enormous powers of the executive presidency are the only real bone of contention
in national politics. Through the control which the head of State exercises in releasing
or withholding statutory allocations, in awarding military and petroleum contracts, in
making key appointments and in giving special grants, the president of the Federal





              
            
             
           
           
              
           
   
            
             
             
      
 
                 
             
              
                 
             
              
           
             
              
                
 
 
               
      
 
The same debate is replicated at state and local level government. Van De Walle
(2006: 55-67) suggested that the prevailing elite political culture of patronage politics
have been the case during the tenures of Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha
(Campbell 2011:28-30). This thesis believes as Adegbami (2013) and Ikeji (2011)
between different regions. It also promoted violent outbursts from social movement
groups with the support of local and state level politicians (see section 4.2). The
allocation of resources and government appointments to selected individuals based on
alliances and patronage net 
competition but it does not necessarily impact positively on long term governance
outcomes. It is when these long term outcomes are negative that social movement
groups are formed only to be subsequently manipulated by the competing elite for
political benefits, using if necessary violence.
That a distinct culture can arise among the elite of Nigeria is not novel. In their study
of the US, Higley and Burton (1989), Zukerman (1977), and Mills (1956) formulated
a power elite theory that identified the decision makers and rulers of the State
belonging to a small group of the population and refer to them as the power elite. (See
chapter 3). In contrast Dahl (1958) contends that elite influence on political decisions
is suspect. He maintains that there is no empirical evidence indicating the influence of
elite in the political environment. Notwithstanding, Dahl proposes the hypothesis that
the elite have political influence if their preferences counter those of any regular
group and in most cases these preferences prevail. In essence, Dahl while skeptical of
since it can be demonstrated that in that country their preferences do run to counter to
They may be the minority but they believe that are rightly endowed to rule the




                
             
             
              
            
    
           
              
           
             
          
             
              
  
 
             
             
              
             
              
               
               
   
 
              
           
 
                
             
            
            
             
           
In Mills analysis, the political elite of the US are nominated and usually bound by the
constitution of the State. However, the selection of leaders or the propagation of
policies in Nigeria is driven by religious and ethnic alliances. They are demonstrated
in the Hausa-Fulani hegemon which is not limited to the northern region of the
country but cuts across the different constituencies of the State (Azeez 2009 and 
Osinakachukwu, Jawan and Redzuan 201 
shaping political decisions regardless of the rightness or wrongness of such decisions 
in exclusion of the masses. Yet, Walker (1966) maintains that Mills assertion is not
indicative of a democratic political system, that electorates are equipped with
constitutional power to override unwanted policies of the elite. Although this may be
true theoretically in some countries, Nigeria demonstrates otherwise, for example, the 
decision to execute Ken Saro Wiwa (Maier 2000:109). In addition, the proposed oil
subsidy bill and the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections, these all
s.
encompass the military and economic sectors. In the same vein; the military in
Nigeria, contrary to the US system subverts the electoral process and naturally takes
power by force. The practice of elections has not diminished the military power, but
rather created an avenue for top military officers to hold influential political positions.
In the economic sector, 83% of oil wells are owned and controlled by Hausa-Fulani
political elite (Josiah 2013 and Utuk 2013). Bola Ige a former governor in Nigeria and
former minister of steel and power and Federal minister of justice in response to who
controls Nigeria, answered:
There are not more than 200 Fulani families and they are connected with the
conservative emirates and the military (Ige; cited in Maier 2000:155).
In fact, members of the political elite at the national level are not limited to the Hausa-
Fulani ethnic group (Odubajo and Alabi 2014). The elite group within the economic
sector is founded on an agreement between foreign syndicates and interested political
elite, who serve as capitalist managers of these foreign economic interests (Campbell
and Harwood 2013). This makes accountability and transparency of the use of State




           
           
            
  
 
              
               
            
 
 
               
            
           
 
             
          
    
 
              
            
      
 
                
             
      
 
              
             
          
           
        
            
         
violence. Given the convergence of military and politicians interests, the competition
for political power is aggressive. The characteristics of these approaches are
governance, and their rationalization for actions already taken or intended to remedy
perceived ills:
The aim of the revolutionary council is to establish a strong united and prosperous
nation, free from corruption and internal strife; we promise that, you will no more be
ashamed to say you are a Nigerian Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu (1966), Italics
added.
The government has not been able to fulfil the legitimate expectations of our people, the
affairs of the State became characterised by lack of consultation, indecision, indiscipline
and even neglect Brigadier Murtala Ramat Muhammed (1975), Italics added.
We recognise the bitterness created by the irresponsible excesses of the politicians, the
war against indiscipline will continue Major General Ibrahim Babangida (1985),
Italics added.
The impact of official corruption is rampant, corruption will be tackled, we must change
the ways of governance, ensure progress, justice and rekindle confidence amongst our
people Olusegun Obasanjo (1999), Italics added.
To deepen democracy and the rule of law, zero tolerance for corruption, in all its forms
and restructure the staff and government to ensure efficiency and good governance. I
commit myself to these tasks
The excerpts of these speeches made by past Heads of State underpin the persistent
promise to tackle corruption which is seen as a pivotal challenge. Specifically, these
excerpts underline the on-going unsatisfactory outcome of governance, which is
underscored by the activities of the political elite (italicized above).However, this
anti-corruption zeal has not ameliorated corrupt practices in government. 
Paradoxically, these same personalities as members of the political elite still exert




              
           
              
             
           
             
              
           
            
              
    
 
              
             
           
            
         
              
            
            
              
              
               
              
               
            
          
            
       
 
          
             
            
Bellentine and Nitzschke (2005) identify as a case of a combination of grievance and
greed.Notwithstanding the greater space for political participation and dissent, this has
not resulted in weakening the control of the political elite over State governance. It
has been recorded on various occasions that the then ruling party, Peoples Democratic
Party (PDP) has been adept in order to quell or
eliminate the issue of rigged electoral ballot boxes (Omotola 2010 and Azeez 2009).
Regarding the freedom of dissent, this has thrived but has taken an unexpected turn
with some social movement groups morphing into violent organisations driven by
. Examples include the Bakassi Vigilante movement as well as the various
social pressure groups in the Niger Delta. This phenomenon is examined in the second
part of this chapter.
The change from military to civilian regime has had little positive effect on the
difficulties related to the political elite approach to governance (Van de Walle 2009;
Osinakachukwu, Jawan and Redzuan 2011; Brown 2013 and Bach 2004). However,
the role of non-state actors in governance and political activities is increasingly
unflattering view of these associations as a threat
to the hegemony of themselves and the political elite. The first, second and third
republic recorded bans on civil societies, political parties and associations that could
undermine the interest and activities of the political elite. This was vividly
demonstrated in the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa in 1995 (a human rights activist
from the Niger Delta), as well as restrictions on news reports and programmes aired
by the media. Yet the advent of democracy has brought non-state actors into the lime
light, such as the mobilisation of the populace by the Nigerian Labour Congress and
other related civil societies to resist the January 1st 2013 oil subsidy reform and the
frequent strikes of Academic staff in universities for better facilities and higher
wages. Various non-government organisations are given free rein to critique
government handling of educational and human rights challenges in the State, which
was suppressed before the adoption of democracy.
Furthermore, violent non-state actors transcend security issues to encompass public
concerns. A case in point are the OPC (Oodua Peoples Cngress), Bakassi Boys,




         
           
           
              
            
             
               
 
               
               
             
             
             
      
 
                  
              
         
 
   
 
             
         
 
            
            
              
               
             
                
       
 
Association, and ess (APC) amongst others in the political,
social, economic and policing sector. The emergence of these groups occurred when 
the political elite left a wide service security gap. However, they subsequently 
resorted to violent acts which are usually detrimental to the security of the populace
(Oguyemi, Tella and Venditto 2005 and Tersakian 2004:73). Intrinsically, the role of
non-state actors within the political environment is dynamic in nature and has served
as a valuable tool to be wielded by the political elite (examined in section 4.2).
Changes in the political system of governance may not be a direct cause of political
violence, but they are a platform for the promotion of violence to attain political and
individual interests. As Falola (2009) shows, history has recorded the use of violence
as a form of communication between the colonial rulers and the Nigerian populace,
between the Nigerian government and it citizens and finally between the citizens and
the Nigerian government. Alozieuwa maintains that:
Violence has been used over time, it is a ready tool, once there is any argument at the
political level, the next thing is to incite these boys [social movement groups], and
overtime it has become a culture (Interview, Alozieuwa 2013).
Likewise, Doctor Omotola, ion, 
The government hardly listens to people who are using peaceful methods in advancing
their interests until they turn violent (Interview, Omotola 2013).
Alozieuwa and Omotola assertions are evidenced cases of post electoral violence and
the Amensty programme granted to the Niger Delta militants after the implementation
of violence. In summary, violence is a characteristic of elite political culture. It is
accepted by the political elite as an alternative and effective method of access to State
power. Through mobilising the violence of social movement groups, elite seek to gain
the attention of the State. Finally, violence is seen by the elite as a tool for




         
   
 
            
                
          
           
              
             
               
            
           
             
            
           
            
             
             
                 
           
           
            
               
        
 
               
                 
              
 
 
            
          
 
4.1.2 Elite Manipulation of Long-Standing Ethno-Religious Rivalry for
Resources and Supremacy
The pre-colonial era, recorded the geographical regions of Nigeria ruled by religious
leaders in the case of the northern region and tribal or ethnic monarchs in the western
and eastern region. In addit socio-cultural background indicated a strong
affinity for religious belief and ethnic identity (Isichei 1983:10,182,212; Wright 1998:
35; Guichaoua 2006 and Huber 2013). This has found expression in the political and
daily activities of the populace. Fearon (2009) affirms that ethnic groups are political
in nature owing to a formidable belief of ethnic supremacy within a society. This view
is reflected in the Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo crisis which lasted
intermittently for seven years (1997-2003) in the Niger Delta region. Various
accounts traced this crisis to political tensions related to senatorial primaries and local
government headquarters location. The general consensus was, a large part of this
violence was inflamed by the political representatives of these ethnic groups,
capitalising on the history of competition between these three groups (Human Rights
Watch 2003; 2004, Ukiwo 2006, Leaton 2006, Ibeanu 2006 and Guichaoua n.d). This
assertion is validated by reports of attacks on political campaign offices during the
heat of the crisis and the killing of local politicians as well as the timing of violent
outburst during and after elections (International Crisis Group 2006). As indicated
earlier, shortly after independence, the political terrain was characterised by ethnic
tensions resulting from ethnic competition for political relevance. Thus the battle line
was set for ethnic and religious tussles for control with violence being co-opted as a
tool. Commenting on this trait Chinua Achebe affirmed:
Nigeria was called a mere geographical expression not only by the British who had an
interest in keeping it so, but even by our nationalists when it suited them to retreat into
tribe to check their more successful rivals from other parts of the country (Achebe
1984:5).
Furthermore, Orji Uzo Kalu a former governor of Abia state and presidential




              
             
                  
              
 
 
              
           
           
           
               
           
              
      
              
            
            
            
           




             
            
             
              
           
            
              
          
            
             
              
All those who are hustling to be campaign manager and running mate to Hausa-Fulani
and Yoruba presidential candidates should forget the idea. Do not make any mistake
about it, if the Igbo fail to produce the president in 2003, then we will be sentenced to
political wilderness for the next 20 years (Kalu 2002, cited in Ojukwu and Nwaorgu
2013:113).
Ethnic dissent was not limited to intolerance but was manipulated as a tool for
political mobilisation. Gunther and Diamond (2003) studies on political parties and
ethno-regional politics stressed the importance of ethnicity in pursing the interests of 
the political elite. It was discovered that ethno-regional alliances were only
instrumental as long as political interests of the elite were met. This thesis stresses the
of Federalism that involves the allocation of resources to the
different regions. Hence, the struggle for what each region or ethnic group terms as
competition was not limited to
economic gains but cuts across the different sectors of the State, in particular the
political arena. This is significant, given the general belief that political or
government appointments provide access to financial benefits such as the control of
crude oil revenue. Consequently, interest groups such as the Arewa Peoples Congress
(APC), Igbo Peoples Congress (IPC), OPC, Christian association of Nigeria (CAN),
Ansar-ud-deen association of Nigeria, amongst others were created. Although their
litical
Historically, the formation of political parties in Nigeria was rooted in opposition to
colonial rule with emphasis placed on nationalism (Paden 1973 and Falola 1998).
However, the division of the State into three regions reinforced the awareness of
ethnic differences. The Igbos created NCNC, AG was created for the Yoruba and the
NPC represented northern interests. This subsequently became the trend for party
formation and political alliances in Nigeria (Ngele 2012 and Human Rights Watch
2003). However, in other to maintain a semblance of nationalism or unity within the
political terrain, careful consideration in the selection of political candidates (pre-
determined winners) is given to the religious and regional affiliations of these
individuals. As a result the custom is now established that the president and vice-




             
        
 
           
         
           
            
           
           
        
 
              
            
            
               
            
        
 
               
           
              
            
              
            
            
          
              
           
        
 
               
                
                
arrangement is so that sectarian tensions will be minimised as demonstrated in the
then ruling party, PDP informal zoning agreement.
By adopting religious and ethnic considerations as criteria for political party
formation, candidate selection and political campaigns, unhealthy rivalry between
ethnic and religious groups develops. In addition a crisis of marginalisation
necessarily ensues, when the winner is from an ethnic group, which predominately
practices a particular religion (Gambari 1987; Akinyele 2001 and, Campbell 2010).
This was demonstrated in the 2011 presidential elections. Both candidates Jonathan
Goodluck and Muhammad Buhari, represented the south/Christians and
o-religious
affiliations during the electoral campaign. As a result the focus was not on the
qualifications and the mandates of these individuals as future presidents, but on ethno-
religious sentiments. The consequence of this was the flagrant use of coercion,
intimidation and violence by the political elite to ensure victory. A fall out of this
contention of ethno-religious sentiments was the violent riots and protests in Kano
and Kaduna states, after the 2011 presidential elections.
Ethnicity is not only a form of identity, but essentially a mobilisation tool for the
promotion of political interests (Huber 2013). Hence utilisation of movements along
ethnic lines by the political elite was embarked upon to secure and advance economic
and political interests (Fearon 2004). The largest ethnic militia group, OPC was
formed as a response to the northern (Hausa-Fulani) decision to hold on to State
power. In 1979 Obafemi Awolowo was denied the presidency, in 1993 Moshood
Abiola was also denied the Presidency. Likewise other Yoruba politicians during the
Abacha regime were assassinated or incarcerated (Akinyele 2001 and Guichaoua
2006). Thus ensuring that the Yoruba tribe had a presence in the political arena
became a mandate. This consideration was supported by Fredrick Fasehun, the
founder of the OPC who stated that:
The richest Yoruba highest politician could not claim his mandate, so I thought it was
maybe we were not moving like the northern elite, I mean they had both political and




                
            
 
               
              
             
             
           
    
 
              
              
              
             
             
         
 
                 
                   
             
           
 
 
            
           
              
            
           
are quite able to flex their muscles because, if it was what is required, why not?
(Fasehun; cited in Guichaoua 2006).
the Yoruba ethnic group or rivalry with the Hausa-Fulani, but was a response to the
perception that the resort or application of violence was the only means to secure
political power for the Yoruba political elite. Furthermore, the call for justice, peace
governance. The market for youths willing to engage in violence is another example
encouraged by political elite manipulation of ethnicity and religion, is deemed
-Fulani 
for political power.
In the same vein, religious affiliations and doctrines served as a platform for the
advancement of political interests. An example was the clamour for sharia law in the
northern region of Nigeria. Although the agitation for sharia law is not a novel
development, the 1999 gubernatorial elections in Zamfara state brought it to the fore,
when Ahmed Yerima, a gubernatorial candidate made it the cardinal aim of his
campaign. Wole Soyinka commenting on this phenomenon stated:
When he was asked why he decided to turn Zamfara into a theocratic state in a secular
dispensation. He said and I dare him to deny it, that it was the only weapon he had to
snatch power. He needed something which would appeal to raw emotions, to mobilise
and get the governorship (Excerpt from Interview transcript with Sahara reporters
2012).
Ahmed Yerima and other gubernatorial aspirants in selected northern states in Nigeria
during the 1999 elections. Furthermore the dissatisfaction of the electorates who
supported this policy with the brand of sharia law implemented attests to the hidden
agenda behind the identification with the need for sharia law (Kendhammer 2013).




            
         
           
             
              
          
             
 
              
 
                 
             
       
        
            
            
         
         
 
              
            
              
              
              
            
            
            
               
               
              
opportunities for movements such as Hisbah with similar views to propagate their
beliefs, sometimes adopting violence (Tersakian 2004:74). Subsequently, with the
increased tensions between Christians and Muslims, riots broke out over contentious
issues bordering on social and religious practices such as the proposed Miss World
Pageant leading to the death of 250 people in Kaduna. Empirical findings from the
Human Rights Watch (2004:38) identified this occurrence as political violence
his erstwhile supporters who believed he was selling them out to southern and
4.2 A Case of Elite Political Culture Premised on Violence as an Alternative
monopolise the use of violence. This is as a result of the employment of violence as a
tool for electoral campaigns by different non-state actors that have a vested interest,
either for profit, politics or idealistic goals. Th 
political environment records occurrences of politically driven violent activities 
played out in different forms. Akinyele (2001) and Lewis (2002) describes political
violence in the State as dynamic and exhibited in different dimensions including
ethnic clashes, sectarian conflicts, ethno-religious clashes, and violence targeted
against the government, international companies and criminal violence.
The inception of civilian rule from 1999 till present recorded a significant number of
politically related violent activities across different regions of the polity. The 2003
and 2004 elections were distinctive for the high level of violence across the Federal,
state and local government levels. More than a 100 people were killed. Members of
the PDP and their supporters were reported to be behind this violence (Human Rights
Watch 2003:1). The 2007 general elections were no different, reporting violent acts
perpetrated by thugs hired by the political elite. Likewise the 2011 elections were 
characterised by pre and post electoral violence. The sustenance of electoral violence
in Nigeria underscores the fact that violence is deemed as a necessary tool for access
to State power by the political elite. This implies that the employment of violence for




        
             
 
                    
       
  
 
                 
         
 
          
 
 
             
              
             
             
            
              
              
             
        
 
 
               
            
             
             
                
       
 
Human Rights Watch 2008). In addition, excerpts of
statements made by members of the political elite give credence to this assertion.
It is going to be rig and roast, we are prepared, not to go to court but to drive you
(Bola Ige 2014, cited in Tell
Magazine).
Those who want to take power through the back door will die. They will die! And the
PDP will continue (Godswill Akpabio 2014, cited in Thisday).
4.2.1 Alliance between Political Elite and Social Movement Groups-Network
Analysis
fits into the Nigerian political terrain, where political appointments are depicted as the
apex of power and a source of financial and resource control (Lewis 2006 and
Omotola 2010). As such, coalitions are formed with the attainment of political power
as the objective. Alliances between the political elite and social movement groups are
not unusual. This is illustrated in networks ties between political parties, ethnic
groups, the media, religious affiliations to mention but a few (Noel 2012 and Ward,
Stovel and Sacks 2011). Alliances are based on common interests and ties are formed
to ensure the exchange of services. These coalitions could be formal or informal
depending on the nature of alliance (Noel 2012).
sue
is the response or changes in behaviour of actors in the network bordering on the
perpetration of violence. Actors are identified as the political elite and social
movement groups. The proposition is, the political elite ensure access to resources and
and access to political office. Wellman (1983) observes that an alliance between
these parties will only occur if there is something to gain and is usually fuelled by




              
           
   
            
              
             
            
             
 
       
   
 
              
             
            
                
This form of alliance emerges out of an environment that is conducive for the
development of social movement groups susceptible to the machinations of the
dependent stance from
the political elite, nevertheless, as Mincheva and Gurr (2006) and Castells (2011)
maintain, the mandates or strategies of the political elite are shaped to reflect the
objectives of these groups. Hence opportunities are created for the advancement of the
actors goals. Networks are developed to ensure the cooperation of other relational
actors and a structure is built to fulfil the interests of both actors.
Figure 9: A Model for Illustration purposes
Source: Author (2014)
The diagram above serves as a loose replication of alliances between the political elite
and social movement groups. This thesis maintains that ties are forged with the
intention of structuring linkages between the actors and other relational actors which




            
              
           
            
              
             
           
    
 
            
 
            
             
           
               
     
 
           
  
             
            
            
            
             
             
 
           
          
 
          
            
               
           
elite are identified as the media, judicial and policing institutions and government
parastatals that are sympathetic to or in the pockets of the political elite. The relational 
actors for social movement groups include trade unions, youth associations, and
religious groups. The key actors employ the connections and authority of these
relational actors to forge the necessary ties as well as implement strategies needed to
achieve stated goals. An examination of the establishment of such alliances and the
transformation of social movement groups into politically violent groups will be
embarked upon next.
4.2.2 Cases of Alliance between the Political Elite and Social Movement Groups 
Two cases are examined to validate the argument that, political violence perpetuated
within the polity is deeply rooted on alliances between the political elite and
interested social movement groups. This is made possible by an environment
conducive for such practices as a result of elite political culture and in particular its
influence on governance processes.
An examination of these cases will highlight the similarities between these
nisation (further
examined in chapter six and seven). The cases underline the assertion that the
transformation of these groups into violent organisations is rooted in elite political
culture. It is noteworthy that there were difficulties in assessing the necessary
information, needed for this analysis. Electoral violent acts and alliances between the
political elite and these groups are not properly documented and available for public
consumption; due to the clandestine nature of these alliances and the actors involved.
A) Rivers State: Alliance between Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF),
Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and PDP Governor Aspirant- Peter Odili.
During the 1998-1999 nationwide elections, incidents of organised violent activities
with political underpinnings were recorded in Rivers state (Vanguard 2012 and Watts,
Okonta and Kemedi 2004). The NDPVF and NDV belong to a large pool of social




          
            
               
              
            
            
             
              
            
            
        
          
             
            
             
 
 
             
             
             
           
 
 
             
              
           
             
             
             
             
             
              
              
          
development, non-state policing to cultural rejuvenation (Okonta and Kemedi 2004).
Currently these groups are grouped under the umbrella of MEND (Hanson 2007).
Prior to the 1999 elections, the NDPVF and NDV were operating on a small scale,
with little or no weapons in their arsenal and criminal activities primarily consisted of
small scale oil bunkering, robberies and clashes with other social movement groups.
Kemedi (2006) maintains that the emergence and criminal activities of these groups
were the result of the shortcomings of the government and political elite interference
in governance. This is evident by the structural challenges faced in the Niger Delta
region, such as high rates of unemployment, unchecked crude oil spillage impacting
negatively on the populace source of livelihood and unfair allocation of resources by 
government officials that affects infrastructural development. Nevertheless, the
gubernatorial electoral contest resulted in these groups being equipped with
sophisticated weapons by interested political elite in the region and the wherewithal to
launch large scale violent operations. Commenting on this occurrence a senior State
security service official, who was posted to Rivers state during that period observed
that:
These groups and more were already in existence, however their association with the
political elite [referring to Peter Odili and his opponents], ensured they were adequately
armed and created a violent outlet for their perceived grievances against the government
[State] and the international oil companies (Interview, senior security official 1
2014).
Security official 1 assertion is backed by empirical findings from Ukiwo (2007) and
Oluwaniyi (2010), they argued that the emergence of these groups were a response to
misgovernance and their subsequent alliance with interested political elite ensured the
employment of violence by these groups with impunity. In addition, the existence of
these groups was proven by cases of oil bunkering and pipeline vandalism. However
the increase in attacks and arms proliferation in this region became prominent during
and after the 1999 political elections. The alliances between these groups and the
interested political elite served as the catalyst for the development and sustenance of
the violent tendencies of these groups. The political campaigns in 1999 and 2003 in
Rivers state (of the Niger Delta area), pitted the two leading political candidates, Peter





             
             
            
               
             
             
            
          
              
    
 
                
           
           
  
           
            
            
  
       
 
               
            
            
            
          
            
           
  
    
 
The prevalent elite political culture (zero sum politics) ensured that the NDPVF and
NDV caught the attention of the political aspirants. Omeiza (n.d), records an alliance
between the NDPVF and political aspirants leading to violent clashes with the
opposition. The NDPVF was then led by Asari Dokunbo and the NDV was led by
Ateke Tom. The activities of these groups fuelled political violence within the Niger
Delta region. Empirical findings from the Human Rights Watch in 2008 supports this
assertion. Ateke Tom acknowledged an alliance with Peter Odili, insisting that an
alliance with Peter Odili guaranteed employment opportunities and monetary rewards.
who was involved in the investigation and containment of the violent activities of the
NDV in Rivers state:
Peter Odili with the aid of the NDV led by Ateke Tom and Soboma George ensured
electoral votes were gathered for the presidential elections supporting Obasanjo in 2003. 
Coercion and violence was adopted (Interview, State security officer 2 2014).
Governor Peter Odili was never prosecuted for electoral rigging and political
violence. However the immunity granted to the NDV, despite evidence of violence
perpetrated by these groups, gives credibility to this statement. In addition the
implication of t 
validates the proposition of this thesis.
The NDPVF was recorded as having aided in securing the coronation of the King of
Kalabari, (a kingdom in Rivers state) after violent clashes with other groups
sponsored by political opponents (Peterside 2007). The aftermath of the 1999 political
elections, ensured the militarisation of these groups, in terms of weapons and
immunity from judicial prosecution (Peterside 2007; Human Rights Watch 2008:12;
Onwudiwe and Dart 2010). Human Rights Watch (2007) recorded the falling out






           
 
             
               
            
            
            
              
           
              
            
        
 
            
           
             
          
           
                
               
               
            
             
             
      
 
               
           
              
                 
             
             
            
 
B) Anambra State: Alliance between PDP Governor Aspirant and the Bakassi Boys 
Anambra state is notorious for pre and post electoral violence since the re-emergence
of civilian form of governance in 1999. The 2003 and 2007 elections at all levels
within Anambra state was characterised by the employment of armed political militias
(Onwudiwe and Dart 2010). The Bakassi Boys vigilante group was formed in
neighbouring Abia state 1998, primarily targeted at curbing the increased level of
armed robberies and other related criminal activities. This was as a result of the
ineffectiveness of state policing.They proved effective and were invited to Anambra
state to collaborate with the local police in fighting crime and served as security
outfits for private organisations. Their success and activities secured the approval of
citizens in the eastern part of the country.
Research by Smith (2004) and Oyeniyi (2010) established an alliance between the
Bakassi boys and two successive Governors of Anambra State, Chinwole Mbadinuju
and Chris Ngige. This indicated that, in exchange for political thuggery services, the
Anambra state government provided funding, vehicles and political cover. This
assertion is supported by the political assassination of Chief Ezeodumegwu Okonkwo
who was a member of the opposing party APP, and the torture of Ifeanyi Ibejbu, also
a member of the APP by the Bakassi (CLEEN 2001, Human Rights Watch 2002 and
Amnesty 2002). In order to curb the rising public complaints as a result of this
alliance, the Bakassi Boys, were renamed the Anambra Vigilante Services (AVS) and
they had an office in the state government house. However politically related violent
events were reported in relation to the group (Smith 2004, CLEEN 2001, Meaghar
2006, Oyeniyi 2010 and Amnesty 2002).
The AVS like earlier case studies became more violent and difficult to control. In as
much as their emergence was induced by insecurity concerns, their subsequent
alliance with the political elite promoted and ensured the constant recourse to terror or
violence. In the case of the AVS or Bakassi, it is suggested that their method of justice
before the alliance bordered on human rights abuse and barbaric. However, reports of
political violence and the possession of sophisticated weapons in relation to this group






            
  
 
             
            
           
           
           
               
            
              
             
               
           
          
            
              
               
                
            
            
             
            
             
       
 
4.3 A Theoretical Framework of Alliance between Political Elite and Social
Movement Groups
The emergence of social movement groups is usually ascribed to issues bordering on
corruption, absence of basic amenities, cases of marginalisation as well as political
discontent (Obadare 1999, Dejesus 2011, Ayelabola 2013 and Alao 2013). Popular
support for these groups by different constituencies creates an opportunity for
political mobilisation, in effect leading to alliances between these groups and
interested political elite. This is what is to be expected by rational choice theory (see
chapter 3), namely the logical decision of an alliance between social movement
groups and the political elite to ensure a profitable outcome as interpreted by both
parties. However, this theory is not sufficient to explain the intricacies of this
symbiotic alliance such as, current events within the polity as well as the presence of
social actors which directly or indirectly influenced the development of this
relationship. For that reason - global surveillance mode of
warfare has been grafted onto rational choice theory to demonstrate the relationship
between these armed groups and other social actors. In light of this framework, the
decision to form an alliance by both parties is subject to certain events within the
political and social environment of the State. These events serve as a launch pad or a
platform for the application of violence, thereby ensuring a possible measure of
success. Figure 10 below is generated from empirical findings which expound on
issues related to the development of a relationship between the political elite and
organised violent groups such as Boko Haram. Variables such as the micro
environment are used to represent the social actors or social powers which influence




           
  








           
             
            
             
              
              
            
            
             
             
             
             
            
              
              
             
              
               
              
               
 
              
             
            
 
 
             
                
             
             
   
 
This framework is based on empirical findings from semi-structured interviews built
on the foundation of rational choice theory and global surveillance mode of warfare
framework. Integrating these two theories ensures that the conventional belief that all
organised violent groups in Nigeria were created for the sole purpose of attaining
political goals by the political elite is avoided. And emphasis is placed on the
proposition that the transition of Boko Haram to a terrorist organisation is centred on
an alliance between the political elite and Boko Haram. Nonetheless, the integration
of both theories underlined the earlier assertion that the development of social
movement groups is as a result of the re-occurring structural challenges in Nigeria
rooted in the political elite interference in governance. This assertion is backed by
Hazen (2009) and Orji (2011), they argue that the emergence of social movement
groups such as NDPVF and Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) is attributed to elite
patronage politics and unfair allocation of resources. Hazen (2009) maintains that at
the core of federal and state level governance is elite patronage politics with the
implication of control of the distribution of power and resources. This view is also
supported by Ojakorotu (2006) who stressed the link between the eruption of violence
in the Niger Delta and political elite complicity in allocation of resources. Hence, this
thesis mantains that the agenda of the political elite regarding access to State power as
a means of pecuniary rewards ensured the creatrion of an elite political culture that
leveraged on patronage politics and zero sum politics for political benefits.
attributed to the alliance between the political elite in Borno state and Boko Haram.
He affirmed during the interview with the researcher that the imminent 2003 general
elections prompted top politicians in Maiduguri to exploit Boko Haram for political
mobilisation:
There was an informal agreement between Mohammed Yusuf and Ali Modu Sherif, who
was a candidate for the Borno state seat of governance, he did win the election and
Yusuf and his members were compensated with offices within the state government, the





             
              
            
          
             
  
              
          
   
    
 
             
                
               
        
 
            
               
 
 
               
        
 
         
 
              
       
 
            
                
Although, Ali Modu Sherif and other notable politicians denied dealings of such with
as the employment of Boko Haram members in Borno state government attested to an
arrangement between both parties (Agbiboa 2013 and Babalola 2014). In addition, the
constant release of Boko Haram members including Mohammed Yusuf from jail 
friends (Alao n.d). Recall that one of the benefits of network alliances indicated
support of
support for sharia law (further examined in chapter five and six) which Boko Haram
advocated points towards an alliance (Abimbola 2010). Likewise, Doctor Nathaniel
Danjibo an expert o 
interest with Boko Haram:
When Ali Modu Sherif wanted to wrestle power from Mala Kachala, the presiding
governor of Borno state as at that time, he actually used Boko Haram as his support base 
and promised to give the Boko Haram members what they wanted, which was the proper
implementation of sharia law (Interview, Danjibo 2014).
Joshua Bolarinwa, a research fellow with the Nigerian Institute of international affairs
backed this assertion by alluding to the case of a senator representing Borno state who
There was also a serving senator, senator Zanna who liaised with the Boko Haram to
attain his political goals (Interview, Bolarinwa 2013).
Furthermore, another respondent who chose to remain anonymous stated:
The movement has also been utilised by the political class to achieve their goals 
(Interview, political commentator and Journalist 2014).
These statements lend credence to the contention that Boko Haram transition to




             
                
              
            
            
 
 
                
                 
             
           
          
 
    
             
             
              
           
            
           
               
             
               
             
 
 
          
              
             
             
            
        
            
alliance between interested political elite and an existing religious group or sect. The
agreement between both parties is based on the benefits to be derived. In the case of
the followers of Mohammed Yusuf, a proper implementation of sharia law and all its
implications was at the forefront. Doctor Onuoha recalls a conversation with a
security agent, Hussein Mongono, on the alliance between Yusuf and Ali Modu
Sherif:
I am going to make sure that, part of your demand, which is strict implementation of
sharia law, would hold sway in my administration, I am also going to create an office for
commissioner of religious affairs, and I am going to compensate your organisation with
that post, he also promised to give them 50 motorcycles
(Interview, Statement revealed by Hussein Mongono to Doctor Onuoha Freedom).
earlier statements recording
dissatisfaction with the way sharia law was implemented in Borno state, in particular
the negative outcomes of governance (Cook 2011). In addition, the creation of a
ministry for religious affairs in Borno state and the approval of an Islamic religious
police (Hisbah) in which the Boko Haram members were extensively involved
motorcycles during and after the elections is suspect. Reports identify motorcycles as
Boko Haram preferred mode of transportation for its operational activities, both
violent and non-violent (Agbedo 2012 and Bagagi et al 2012). Ali Modu Sherif did
not limit his campaign to religious and material incentives. He insisted that, his
contender Mala Kachala did not introduce the right sharia, if he got their support and
became the Governor of Borno State he would support Mohammed Yusuf and his
followers.
With promises like this made by interested political elite in Maiduguri 
followers became interested in an alliance. They were not only sure of their objectives
been achieved, they were guaranteed sponsorship, immunity from the law as well as
an awareness for their religious beliefs. This was demonstrated when the followers of
Mohammed Yusuf served as campaigners, enforcers and political thugs for Ali Modu
Sherif during the gubernatorial elections, consequently ensuring his victory 




              
             
          
            
                 
              
    
       
 
          
             
            
                
               
             
              
             
           
            
           
            
          
             
 
              
            
             
               
                 
             
             
            
            
   
with the political elite, there is a strong possibility that an alliance would have been 
sought with other groups by the political elite. Borno state and other neighbouring
states are characterised by increasing presence of religious movements each
competing for patronage and supremacy, they include Ecomog in Borno, Yankalare
in Gombe, Yan Daba in Kano, Sara-suka in Bauchi, to mention but a few. In the case
of Boko Haram, an alliance with other groups sharing similar ideologies is a high
probability, which is ments
and operations in chapter five and six.
As indicated earlier, the combination of rational choice theory and Marti 
framework suggests that the absence of certain events limits or makes it impossible
for an alliance between the interested political elite and these social movement
groups. A specific case is the electoral event or the sharia law debates in Nigeria, each
of which led to the outbreak of violence or riots targeted towards a particular interest.
Taking into consideration the prevalence of violent activities in Nigeria, the focus is
on political elite actions and its impact in shaping an elite culture that contributes to 
the creation of an environment conducive for political violence. This not only made
the emergence of social movement groups necessary but also encouraged the
development of alliances between these groups and interested political elite. This led
ultimately to the evolution of such groups into organised political violent
organisations. Employing the attributes of rational choice theory, such as cost and
reward, elite-social movement alliances demonstrate that in exchange for electorate
mobilisation, a social movement group will have its demands or objectives met. This
was refl 
the ministry of religious affairs as well as continuous implementation of sharia law in
Borno state. Expanding on this interpretation, the global surveillance mode of warfare
framework focuses on events which an alliance between the group and the interested
political elite are subject to. In essence, for political violence to be instigated by the
political elite there has to be a group willing to be involved, but also the occurrence of
certain events which will trigger the timing and serve as constraints towards the
confrontation. In the case of Boko Haram, this event (elections, sharia law, populace
socio-economic discontent, and public approval of Boko Haram before its adoption of






              
               
           
               
     
           
 
            
      
 
       
   
            
            
               
             
            
           
       
        
 
             
            
    
 
               
            
              
              
               
                
              
For an alliance with Boko Haram to be proposed by interested political elite, certain
factors have to be put in place, amongst which is the right platform or political
atmosphere. The first official foray of Boko Haram into political violence was 
heralded by the 2003 elections. Ali Modu Sherif, as indicated earlier, was able to take
advantage of th f the then
presiding governor. In addition Doctor Simeon Aloziuewa has pointed out:
Socio-economic terrain of Borno state was becoming a focal point of dissatisfaction
among the populace (Interview, Aloziuewa 2013).
by findings from research scholars who attribute
-economic challenges in
Borno state, such as unemployment and illiteracy (Danjibo 2010, Aloa n.d and
Abimbola 2010). Likewise tensions within the PDP members and other parties such
as the AD and ANPP served as the perfect platform for interested political elite to
capitalise on these issues for an alliance. Moreover the year 2011 recorded increased
tensions between northern political elite and southern political elite. Doctor Efem, a
research fellow with the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs reflects on
statements made by certain political elite s
intention to run for the Presidency in 2011:
Some elite in the north said they would make Nigeria ungovernable; people are
attributing the current Boko Haram crisis to the violence within the political
environment (Interview, Efem 2013).
The rhetoric of the south taking political power from the north as well as the
implication of a Christian government inadvertently served as an event fuelling the
fire of religious and political crisis. The prevailing political tension in Nigeria can be
liken to the events Shaw (2009) indicated - an occurrence within a particular time
period, that would serve as a catalyst leading to armed conflict. Boko Haram was a
ticking time bomb waiting to be detonated. It was a matter of time and locating the




                
         
 
    
 
          
              
           
  
           
             
           
            
              
          
 
             
     
           
             













the build-up of an event that would further their cause, an act made possible by the
prevailing constraints governing the political setting of the State.
4.4 Conclusion
The transition of non-violent social movement groups to organised political violent 
groups or terrorist organisations is a product of elite political culture in Nigeria. This
empirical findings from the field and historical evidence examined support the
d an
enabling environment for the emergence of social movement groups and their
transformation to organised violent groups. The transition took place in a context of
reg 
alternative method of accessing State power. In this environment there arose
discontented social movement groups who allied with the political elite. The alliances
between these parties were discovered in most cases to lead to violence and the
transition of these groups to organised political violent groups.
The findings of this chapter demonstrate the influence of the prevailing elite political
culture on political campaigns and
ultimately resulted to the development of social movement groups. These groups






         
 
             
               
          
 
 
   
 
            
              
             
                
      
  
     
    
             
              
           
             
              
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
ELITE USE OF RELIGION AS A TOOL OF POLITICS
If religious considerations are not appropriately balanced with secular ones in matters of
coercion, there is a special problem: a clash of gods vying for social control. Such
uncompromising absolutes easily lead to destruction and death Robert Audi
(2000:103).
5.0 Introduction
The preceding chapter demonstrated how the political elite have used ethnicity to
mobilise support and gain power, as such this chapter will establish their use of
religion, particularly Islam. Similarly, as the promotion of ethnic divisions has led to
violence to secure the resources of political position, so the same is found to be true
with the promotion of religious divisions.
governance operations and the political
environment. Prior to the S 
selection process of would be leaders and the formulation and implementation of State
or community laws. This phenomenon was largely depicted in what is now known as
the northern and western region of Nigeria. Examples include the Sokoto caliphate 
and Kanem-Borno Empire in the north, Benin Kingdom in the south and Oyo






         
    
 
          
             
           
           
           
          
     
 
           
            
                
             
             
             
           
             
Image 4: Map of the Sokoto Caliphate 19th Century
Source: Lovejoy n.d
independence and its constitutional identification as a secular entity,
the influence of institutional religion is prevalent across the different levels of the
State governance structure. As such Federal and state government policies are
subjected to religious concerns. In particular, sharia debates targeted towards the
inclusion of Islamic laws in the coun , the selections of elected
political leaders based on religious affiliation and Nigeria in the
organisation of Islamic conference.
Due to violent clashes between the major religious groups (Christianity and Islam) 
within the polity, successive governments have acted cautiously in dealing with the
demands or spill over effects from both groups. This raises the issue of religion in the
political sphere and how elite political culture adjusts to this phenomenon. Recall that
ch 
culture. It was discovered that the political ambitions of the elite shaped and
influenced governance practices as well as aided in the transition of non-violent social
movements to violent organisations. This thesis contends that the exploitation of




          
                
             
    
     
            
         
 
             
   
            
             
             
         
            
             
       
           
          
           
     
 
         
 
            
             
              
             
             
             
          
           
relationship with the identified major religions; most importantly the Islamic religion, 
before and when it is perceived as a political threat. Emphasis is also placed on the
impact of the Federal and state government response and the emergence of violent
religious movemen response to religion
and the development and
sustenance of violent extremist religious groups. In order to achieve these objectives,
this chapter will be divided into two sections.
The first section focuses on establishing the dynamics between the State and religion.
It examines the
and differences and its impacts on the formulation and implementation of policies,
within the timeframe of independence - October 1960 to October 2014. Analysis will
be limited to events connected to political campaigns and the sharia debates. The
choices of these events are their relevance to the po 
as discovered in chapter four, political campaigns and elections are intertwined with
organised violent activities in the State. In addition data analysed in chapter four,
demonstrated a link between these events, which
with selected religious groups and the development and sustenance of violent
activities. Section two will examine the link between the Islamic radicalisation 
process and the relationship between the political elite and representative movements
in particular Islam movements.
5.1 The Nigerian Political Environment and Religion
and religious affiliations. Extensive research has been focused on the battle for
supremacy between the institutional religions - Christianity and Islam, as well as the
use of religion as a tool for political advancement. However, there remains a limited
research on the tenuous position faced by the Nigerian government when dealing with
the demands of both religions and its impact both on governance and organised
violent activities. The extensive discourse on sharia debates gives a clear insight on
the State constitutional identity as a secular entity. Yet events,




        
               
            
         
 
          
 
         
 
           
             
          
           
               
          
              
  
 
                 
                 
              
                 
    
  
 
             
   
and at the Federal level of governance. Samuel Huntin 
as a key player in State politics as opposed to secularization theorists is affirmed in
legitimacy. Commenting on the implementation of religion as a tool for political
legitimacy, a top Nigerian State security official insisted that:
People have always appropriated religious sentiments to further their political
herents
weapon for violence in Nigeria (Interview, Mr S 2013).
This assertion is evidenced by reports of northern states gubernatorial political
campaigns where Sharia law was used a tool for political propaganda, significantly in
Zamfara state (Kendhammer 2013 and Badamasiuy and Okene 2011). This
observation highlights the influence of religion in political affairs. Electorates are
faced with a constant battle, instigated by the political elite to ensure the supremacy of
their religion through political campaigns. Furthermore, Alhaji Balaraba Musa, the
former governor of Kaduna state in response to Islamic religion as a political tool
maintained that:
In the face of the new political programme, the ruling class had no foothold or any solid
base for political competition as a block with the rest of the country. In view of this
political bankruptcy, it became clear that Islam would offer the only alternative for the
protec 
clear that to seek to defend it [Islam] would enhance their position. So they held on to
(Musa; Cited in
Sampson 2014:335).





              
  
 
               
              
             
 
 
             
            
            
              
               
             
             
 
 
            
   
 
of Sokoto and Leader of the Islamic community in Nigeria, commenting on this issue
insisted that:
Anyone saying Nigeria is a secular nation does not understand the meaning of the word
secular. There is nothing secular about the Nigerian nation since whatever we do will
always put Islam and Christianity in the forefront (Abubakar 2011, cited in Sampson
2014:325).
By implicitly incorporating religion as a key element of political legitimacy at the
Federal and state level, the government is inadvertently laying the foundation for
religious interference in governance operations. The success of religion as a political
tool is undeniable evidenced in its constant use by the governing authority and the
political elite. However the adverse effect of its use is the danger of promoting violent
uprising. This was reflected in the aftermath of the 2007 and 2011 presidential
elections as well as state level elections in Kano and Plateau state.





           
           
            
           
                
           
            
             
            
            
 
        
             
       
 
            
               
               
              
              
   
             
             
          
 
                
    
  
 
              
           
            
             
Gill (2001) maintains that political legitimacy and mobilisation has been the
motivation behind relations between politics and religion. Though Kumar (2014) and
Bhargava (2006) contend that there is a separation between religion and politics,
basing their argument on secularization theory, Smith (1996) and recently Peter
Berger stress the influence of religion in the political sphere. They note that it is not
limited to developing countries, but present in developed countries. Specific examples
cited include, Christian or Zionist movements in Northern America, Judaism in Israel
and Islam in United Arab Emirates, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Regarding the Nigerian
political environment, a joint task force commander in northern Nigeria attributes this
to heavy reliance on religion as a political campaign tool. He said:
ropriate platform for people to gain dominance and
independence we have always had leaders who appealed to certain religious or ethnic
groups (Interview, Joint Task Force Commander 2013).
Although the joint task force commander assertion is valid, the transition from
military to civilian rule ushered in a system of democracy which offers an avenue for
access to State power based on the electorate approval. The attraction of religion as a
tool for access to political power stems from the possibilities of its manipulation for
the pursuance of political interests. Note that this manipulation is due to the political
ng religion and
ethnicity, elite political culture has left little room for other platforms. In addition,
former vice president Namadi Sambo at the height of the 2015 presidential election
political campaign declared in a statement targeted at Muslims that:
Buhari has selected a pastor as his running mate; do you know how many churches he
(Sambo cited in
Abubakar 2015:1).
Likewise, Fox (1999) argues that religion in the political sphere is driven by the
identification of religion as a tool for political legitimacy and socio-political
mobilisation. As such, according to Habermas (2006), these functions of religion are




     
          
    
             
             
             
           
 
            
                 
       
 
              
             
              
           
            
             
         
 
              
         
 
           
              
             
          
              
            
            
             
            
effectiveness of religion as a socio-
political campaigns and governance operations. Ayelabola (2013) points out the
prevalent culture of ethno- -colonial,
military and civilian politics. He asserts that politics in Nigeria and by extension
governance is influenced by the insertion of religion by the political elite. Wole
Soyinka a political activist and Nobel Prize winner, commenting on the political elite
and their relations with representatives of religious groups, insists that:
Religion became an issue because some power-seeking politicians recognised that just as
they used ethnicity to rise to power, religion is also a very obliging tool for ascension to
power (Soyinka, cited in New African 2012).
the cases of political parties and political campaigns dating from the 1960s till date
influenced by religion. Furthermore they argue that the incursion of religion in the
political sphere in Nigeria was at the behest of the political elite.This declaration gives
credence to the previous observation portraying relations between the political elite
and religious representatives in political terms. This contention is further supported by
a staff of CLEEN foundation in Abuja, commenting on the relationship between the
Borno state government and the Boko Haram Islamic sect:
For elections, members of the group [Boko Haram] were used directly and indirectly to
facilitate re-elections of the governor (Interview, CLEEN Foundation 2013)
Based on the above statements and historical record, relations between the
government and religion is restricted to a political nature and has little bearing on
spirituality. In addition, the influence of religious ethics is seen in legislative attitudes
towards women, educational curriculum and the public behaviour of individuals
corruption, electoral fraud and the use of violence. In other words, religion in the
Nigerian society serves as a conscience for individual behaviour and propagates the
tenets of honesty and morality. However the presence of religion in the
constitution and policies in relation to the social behaviour of citizens can be




               
            
              
              
                 
           
             
               
                
            
                
  
           
           
          
            
           
              
            
           
            
              
     
 
              
         
     
             
          
             
            
            
example is the sharia law debates (to be examined in section 5.1.1), the miss world
All these events subsequently led to violent clashes between Christians and Muslims,
leading to loss of lives and destruction of properties. It is considered that the
permission or inclusion of certain policies that benefits one religion over the other in
the State by the governing officials is linked to the use of religion as a tool for
political legitimacy or support. This is reflected in the aforementioned alliance
between the Borno state political elite and Boko Haram (examined in chapters four
and six). Hence, when one religion feels slighted or excluded from the benefits of the
State such as the freedom to hold a religious event and invite a foreign religious
personality, this discontent is eventually expressed in violence. An example is the
violent crisis in Kano, 1991, which was compared to the Maitatsine riots as a result of
- Christian
event. The Muslims in Kano accused the Kano state government of preferential 
treatment towards Christians, citing the visa application rejection of an African
American Muslim cleric the previous year. Government relations with institutional
religions are reflected in the numerous religious conflicts and the emergence of
opposing religious associations. An example is the creation of the Christian
Association of Nigeria (CAN) in response to the creation of the Supreme Council of
Islamic Affairs (SCIA) (Adogame 2010 and Edward and Abel 2012). Likewise, the
foreign policies of previous Muslim presidents focused on establishing good relations
organisation of Islamic conference and the severed relationship with Israel in 1973
due to the war between Israel and a number of Arab countries (Onapajo 2012,
Hunwick 1992 and Adamolekun 2013).
In the last 55 years of military and civilian regime the country has experienced
changes in the relationship between the State and religion. F 
tinctive stages; the assertion of
being a nation without a State religion and the appearance of objectivity towards
religion. The promotion of these policies entailed s impartiality towards
religion. Thus the State is constitutionally bound to avoid support or endorsement of
any religious demands opposed to other religions (Onapajo 2012). However this does




            
           
            
               
             
            
            
   
     
 
                 
                
         
 
               
           
 
          
          
            
            
              
           
     
 
             
                
          
 
         
           
               
             
            
of impartiality has promoted an upsurge of fundamental and radical demands of
religious practices within the social and political environment. Religious leaders keen
on promoting and preserving their religious beliefs insisted on its relevance to
political events. Noteworthy is the action of the Chief Imam of the central mosque in
Sokoto, in response to Jonathan Goodluck decision to run for the presidency in
2011. In response to his displeasure with the religious, regional and ethnic
background of Jonathan Goodluck, the Chief Imam and his followers were arrested
for acts of
quoted to have said:
I am not regretting my action at all. I think I have succeeded in passing my message
because what I did was to make Nigerians and the world know that we are not
supporting his candidature (Chief Imam, cited in Rufai 2011:183).
The aim of this movement is calling for the establishment of an Islamic system and
State, no more, no less (Ibrahim Zakzaky cited in Hassan 2015:25).
The statements above were cross-referenced with print media report (Sunday Trust 
2011) and Denzer (2015). Nevertheless complete neutrality of the government
regarding religious groups proved difficult, due to the historical foundation of heavy
reliance on religious beliefs and the potential benefits of religious mobilisation. Imam
Abubakar Ikara, the deputy national chairman of the Izala, an Islamic sect in Nigeria,
observed the difficulties in maintaining a distant and objective relationship between
the government and religious associations:
Our governors, traditional rulers as well as the religious leaders themselves are all
sympathetic towards a particular sect or the other and therefore may not be able to deal
fairly without any bias (Ikara cited in Daily Trust 2009:5).
, evidenced in previous political campaigns linked with religious
associations highlights the dynamics between the political elite and religious groups
or sects they are partial to. These elite-religious group links parallel the links with
social movements and ethnic groups noted in chapter four, recall the analysis on




             
              
     
            
            
            
              
            
            
               
              
            
             
              
            
             
              
  
 
              
             
              
                
          
 
        
       
             
           
         
            
           
this thesis maintains that the benefits of an alliance between the political elite and 
selected social movement groups, in this case a religious sect or association entails the
over others not in the
network. Hence, relations between the government and religious groups are tied with
sentiments and incentives, making it almost impossible to ignore demands by these
groups, contrary to the constitution. Gasda (2015) asserts that the interaction between
between State and religion is often blurred in relation to political operations. Yet, Potz
(2013) argues that religion in the political sphere limits cases of violence,
recommending elimination of alternative religious goods and firm control of the use
of force by the government. While there appears to be precedent for Potz analysis in
North America and some parts of Europe, the reality in Nigeria points to different
religions competing agressively for relevance in the social and political sphere. An
example is the imposition of sharia law in northern states where Christians and
animists reside and the rivalry between the Izala sect and Ahl as-sunnah, the latter
under the patronage of the Kano state governor. The statement below exemplify
perceived slight received by the Izala from the Kano state government, stated by
Mallam Ali, the secretary of Mallam Abdullahi Pakistan the leader of an Izala faction
in Kano:
Those of our members in government are very ineffective. For example, one of our
members is the deputy commissioner of Hisbah [Islam religious police], but you know
that Hisbah is proscribed by ex-president Obasanjo. And even if the Hisbah remained, he
is not the head and cannot attend council meetings of the state. So where is the
influence? (Ali 2008:41, cited in Nolte, Danjibo and Oladeji 2009:42).
Another issue of relevance stems from the Islam basic
distinction b This ideology was reflected in
political Islam debates by Abubakar Gumi and other Islamic clerics whose vision or
ideology is limited to an Islamised Nigerian State. Successive governments developed
techniques through legislative, administrative and oftentimes radical measures to
curtail religious groups from gaining and maintaining political positions in the public




   
     
 
            
              
             
              
              
           
              
           
           
           
              
              
             
        
 
            
            
             
   
 
               
            
   
 
  
            
emphasis on the Sta 
during the military regime.
Inherently, political parties as well as key government positions were expected to
reflect the cultural diversity of the State in order to avoid ethnic or religious
mobilisation along partisan lines (Suberu 2009 and Obe 2009). The inclusion of this
in the Nigerian constitution served as a platform for an informal agreement of power
rotation between religion and ethnicity at the national level. However the same is not
reflected at the local level. Electoral victories or government appointments were
earned on the basis of majority religious or ethnic presence within a community or
municipality. Likewise, the presidential elections in 2011 and the subsequent outburst
of religious violence contradict the constitution, with ethnicity and most importantly
religion serving as a political mobilisation force. Although the required presidential
electoral vote of one quarter in two-thirds of states across the country were recorded
as having been met (International Crisis Group 2011 and INEC 2011), there was still
an outburst of religious violence in the country (Campbell 2012 and Human Rights
as a deciding factor in candidate selection.
The scramble for supremacy by the major religions encouraged the recourse to
violence and the formation of political alliances by religious associations in accessing
the dividends of political power (Ayayi 2000). This is made possible by the
peculiarity insists that:
At the federal, state and local government level you see them sponsor people to holy
doing so; they have now turned religion into an avenue for patronage politics 
(Interview, Omotola 2013).
government
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of pilgrimages, reports indicate that these events are used as an avenue to reward
relational actors in their political networks. Hence non-members of these networks
manipulation of religion to suit political interests. Another example of this is the
electoral campaign of Governor Alao Akala of Oyo state, during which he announced
that there will be an increase in those selected for pilgrimage to Jerusalem and Mecca if
they voted for his party (Cited in Nguvugher 2011:8). The statement below was cross
refrenced with media reports recording cases of Kano state and Oyo state
governments use of pilgrimage sponsorship for political campaigns from Sahara
Reporters (2014), The SouthSouth International (2014) and The Nation (2012).
If these 1500 and another 1500 that will be going to Jerusalem bring along 10 each to
vote for us, then we will be here again next year to do this kind of program for another
set (Governor Alao Akala 2010).
Similarly, former president Jonathan Goodluck in response to his decision to lead
30,000 Christians on holy pilgrimage (International Crisis Group 2014) as well as the
decision to attend different churches in Abuja every last Sunday of the month,
maintained that he did this:
To show appreciation to Christians for their prayers (Goodluck; cited in The Punch,
2014:1)
churches boast a large percentage of Christians in Nigeria (International Crisis Group
2014).
Religion in the State is closely associated with ethnic and geographic alliance. As a
result the northern region is recognised as the home of Islam and the south as the
home of Christians (Nolte, Danjibo and Oladeji 2009, Adogame 2010, Suberu 2009
and Obe 2011). The dominant presence of Christianity in the south encouraged the




           
               
            
               
             
            
              
              
       
             
     
             
            
             
             
             
              
             
             
             
                
              
          
 
            
               
              
southern and western Nigeria was exposed and amendable to western education
earlier resulting in higher literacy level than the northern region. The role of Islam in
secular constitution, which was seen as conflicting with sharia law, in northern
Nigeria. Hence the public outcry in 1978, 1988 and 1999 for the inclusion of sharia
move towards the creation of an Islamic State. Despite the perceived difference in
literacy level amongst adherents of both religions, a large portion of government
positions both at state and federal level were allocated to the northern Muslims (recall
Sir Ahmadu Bello northernisation policy in chapter four). This was as a result of
n addition to actors in the political
patronage network whose affiliation was to Islam. As shown in chapter four, political
ompetition for State governance positions is 
reflected as a religious and ethnic contest. However the bargaining power of religious
example, the Kano state government has a preference for Islamic personnel and
organisations. Government policies in Kano are tailored to meet the needs of the
favoured religion, which has been a source of conflict not limited to religious
adversaries but extends to religious organisations of the same faith. An example was
the conflict between the Izala Muslim organisation and the Emir of Kano. The Emir
had used his religious influence (Islam) to ensure the electoral victory of Governor
Shekarau. The disagreement between the Emir and the Izala spilled over into the
Kano state government, when the Kano state government gave its support for the
Emir in a land dispute between the Emir and the Izala. The consequence of this action
was violent conflicts between the Izala, supporters of the Emir and the Kano state
police (Daily Trust 2007:1 and Nolte, Danjibo and Oladeji 2009).
Moreover, Islamic organisations situated in Kano are exempted from taxes and are
subsidises. The same cannot be said for Christian organisations in Kano, this is as a




            
        
 
                
           
 
               
            
              
            
 
             
              
               
      
 
                
              
              
           
             
                
            
              
             
             
             
         
 
           
and Oladeji 2009). Wole Soyinka expounding on this issue asserts the strong
influence of the Mullahs on their followers:
They have only one line of command: their Mullah. If the Mullah says go, they go;
come, they come; kill, they kill; beg, they beg. (Soyinka 2012).
Soyinka explains that a large population of the youths in northern Nigeria are part of
the Almajiri system (street children and youths).They feel no loyalty towards the
government and society. Their beliefs and needs are within a limited and often time
prejudiced understanding of the Koran, interpreted by the Mullahs attached to these
These almajiri are successfully indoctrinated by some Mallams who have looked at the
Koran and taken out paragraphs which calls for hate, which call for incitement and
manipulate these verses in such a way that there is no room for compromise but
these youths (Interview, Mr K 2013).
In addition Mr K insists that the ease at which these Mallams are able to indoctrinate
welfare of these youths. Furthermore, he asserts that the lack of access to State
facilities, such as education and employment, makes it easy for these youths to turn
against the State. Hoffmann (2014) records 71.5% of northern Nigeria population
living in poverty and unemployment at 40% as well as increased polarization between
the rich and poor. This is another example of the outcome of the ruling elite poor
governance. Therefore the distance between the government (at the federal and local
level) and her citizens in this case the almajiri, coupled with alliances with these
Mallams, has created an enabling environment for violence. Where power is given to
a select few to stir up violence with impunity, religious manipulation and subsequent
violence can be expected, the kalu kato crisis and the Maitasine crisis, mostly
occurring during periods of elections are examples of this.





               
          
            
            
               
           
             
             
               
            
          
 
 
      
   
 
             
              
             
              
            
            
               
              
              
          
      
 
  




acceptance of sharia law within the judicial system is widely believed to be tied to
political considerations (Alao 2013, Hunwick 1992, Badamasiuy and Okene 2011,
Kendhammer 2012, Odeh 2010, Obe 2011 and Laitin 1982). This was widely
publicised during the 1999 gubernatorial elections in Zamfara state. Despite what is
written in the constitution, in reality Nigeria is not a secular State but a bipolar
religious State. By adopting two religions it encourages competition for dominance.
This entails lobbying and propaganda, and serves as the building block for organised
religious violent activities. Recall the examples of the outcome of sharia law debates,
in the late 1970s, where the State refused to include sharia law in the constitution,
leading to protest which quickly deteriorated to violent clashes between the Muslims
led by the Muslim Students Society and Christians (Agi 1998:158).
5.1.1 Politicisation of Religion, Pathways
to Violence
As indicated earlier, relations between the political elite and the majority religions are
dependent on benefits to both parties. In the case of Christianity, the provision of
public goods such as schools and hospitals by the Catholic, Anglican and Baptist
churches across different regions in the country most especially in the south, east and
west were welcomed by the State. The Muslim community also contributed by
sponsoring Islamic studies and the creation of NGOs targeted towards job creation
and welfare of the less privileged. This they did in exchange for the maintenance of
religious affluence and access to benefits that only the government can provide tax
relief and subsidised land . This quid pro quo relationship varies across the different
presiding state governor. Wole Soyinka explains why relations between these
religious groups and political elite exist:
It is profi 





        
 
              
              
           
     
  
          
   
             
    
 
              
               
             
           
            
           
           
                
             
              
        
 
 
               
              
                
           
            
Likewise another commentator in support of Soyinka asserts:
There are various Islamic sects in the north all vying for sponsorship and financial
groups who have a large following are deemed attractive or beneficial for the political
needs of interested political elite in exchange for religious or political services 
(Interview, Miss T 2014).
reflected in military engagements and constitutional debates geared towards limiting
religious influence to soci 
political and economic associations as well as coercive forces for political benefits is
indicative of Nigeria.
On the other hand, advocates for organised political Islam are involved in debates for
the inclusion of sharia law in the constitution, as well as the inclusion of Koranic
studies, Muslim teachers and Islamic prayers in schools run and owned by Catholic
acceptance of western culture (Hunwick 1992), although Danjibo (2010) argues that
these demands are rooted in the competition between Christianity and Islam for
religious supremacy in Nigeria encouraged by the interested political elite. Haynes
(1998:17) interprets these demands as secularisation by prominent Muslim clerics in
Nigeria and believes that it has served as a form of alienation of a people whose
identity was linked with religious and traditional values. As a result, amongst other
factors, there is an increased call for the inclusion of religion- Islam in political
activities as a means for inclusion and participation.
Jurgen Habermas 
relevance of religion as long as it satisfies strict conditions, even when the State is
secular. In essence the time of exclusion or separation of religion in the world from 
the State is giving way to one where religion is an institution in the formulation and
implementation of governance policies (Berger 1997). Example of such policies in




              
               
             
            
          
             
           
            
             
             
            
 
              
              
            
             
            
              
             
          
 
vaccination in Kano state in 2003 as the instigation of some Islamic sects. Religion
has always been a part of Nigerian life and therefore of the political terrain. However,
the State has been careful to exclude religion in political and governance affairs
especially during the military regime, when sharia law debates were banned in 1989 
and strict monitoring of religious associations were undertaken (Badamasiuy and
Okene 2011 and Hunwick 1992). This move by the Armed forces ruling council,
effectively inflamed the distrust and competition between the southern Christians and
northern Muslims. Furthermore an open and legal avenue for the propagation of
sharia law was closed to the proponents. This ensured the development of increased
radical religious views geared towards the creation of a theocratic State and marked
the beginning of the encroachment of Islamic interference in national politics.
The sharia debates were premised on the inclusion of sharia law in the constitution
and the creation of a federal sharia court of appeal. Naturally this development was
opposed by Christians and government officials alike. The inability to reach a
decision acceptable by the proponents of sharia law prompted riots across the northern
region against the Christians and government parastatals. This was further fuelled by
the State membership in the Organisation of Islamic conference (OIC) in 1986. In
addition the Iranian revolution in 1979 emboldened the proponents of sharia law and




           
   
 
              
            
               
          
   
              
           
             
            
            
                
              
              
           
            
              
Image 5: IMN promotion of Islamic Revolution in Kaduna State, Nigeria
Source: Tande (2012)
The demand for the implementation of sharia law across the country was fronted by
Alhaji Abubakar Gumi, who served as pilgrimage relations officer for the Nigerian
State and Saudi Arabia and had close relations with Sir Ahmadu Bello the premier of
northern Nigeria (Badamasiuy and Okene 2011, Hunwick 1992, and Lubeck,
aided in the e 
Islam). The development of this group, paved the way for the formation of other
Muslim groups, whose activities bordered on violent conflicts with other Muslim
sects, Christians and the government. This was as a result of disagreements over
ideologies, low tolerance level and competition between these sects and religions in
accessing new members. The prevalent issue of alliances with the political elite
served as an avenue for the unification of the northern region in order to secure the
position of this region at the Federal level. These alliances between the political elite
and these Muslim sects were not for the purpose of fulfilling divine instruction, but
politically motivated. As for Abubakar Gumi, his religious motivation was geared
towards the interpretation of his Wahhabi doctrine and ultimately the insertion of




             
             
   
 
               
             
             
            
             
               
               
             
            
            
             
              
            
              
 
 
             
            
              
             
         
           
           
           
             
              
             
           
organised religious violent groups, such as the Izala sect amongst others, when it
became obvious that the State intended to remain secular despite its relationship with
these groups.
linked to sharia law is the 1999 gubernatorial elections in the northern region of the
country. The transition to democracy in 1999 ensured the presidential victory of a
southern Christian president, which, as earlier indicated in chapter four, was as a
result of political campaign concentrated on religious and ethnic lines. Members of
the opposition party, All Peoples Party (APP), mostly from the northern region, felt
threaten due to a shift in power from the north to the south (Kendhammer 2013).
Ahmed Sani Yerima, with the aid of other northern politicians, in a bid to secure
political power promoted the sharia law campaign. He sought to mobilise a religious
alliance and lend religious legitimacy to its political ambitions (Alao 2013, Brinkel
and Ait-Hilda 2012 and Olaniyi n.d,). This proved successful. Yerima and other
politicians secured their positions and ensured re-election for the next term. The
process involved in the promotion of sharia law was not void of violent protests
(Kendhammer 2013 and Odeh 2010). There were reports of violent clashes between
Muslims and Christians in the northern region of the country during and after the
The promotion of sharia law as a political campaign tool, therefore, involved securing
relationship with selected Islamic sects in the northern region spilled into local
governance, such as the provision of security in the guise of the Hisbah, educational
policies promoting Islamic studies in the curriculum of schools and the creation of
operational sharia criminal courts (Lubeck 2011). Furthermore, the government
ensured the sponsorship of Muslim related activities, the appointment of Muslim
officials in government offices and provision of state subsidized materials in
exchange for political legitimacy (Adogame 2010, Nolte, Danjibo and Oladeji 2009
and Olaniyi n.d,). This increased the influence of Islam religion on governance affairs
as well as aggravated relations between followers of opposing religions in the State.
For example, the violent clashes between Muslims and Christians in Kaduna over the




           
              
                
            
              
         
 
               
               
              
            
  
 
         
           
            
               
               
             
          
           
               
          
           
            
            
        
 
          
             
       
               
             
different northern state governments and selected Islamic sects was short lived.
Citizens and various Muslim sects who had supported the sharia law and the political
elite were disillusioned. This was as a result of the inability of the sharia law practiced
to eradicate the identified challenges of governance in the State. Doctor Danjibo,
explains the success of the sharia campaign by pointing out the reasons behind the
abuse of sharia law in administrative and governance operations:
A lot of Muslims thought that by accepting sharia, sharia was going to bring a
transformation in the society, where the gap between the poor and rich will be breached,
where there will be good governance, where there will be equal or equitable distribution
of resources, After a while they discovered that they were deceived (Interview,
Danjibo 2013).
, supported by Maren and Osheowo (2015) emphasized the
ineffectiveness of sharia law in fulfilling the expectations of the electorates.
Corruption and crime was still rampant, unemployment and poverty still existed and
those in power seemed to pay lip service to the tenets of sharia law. Furthermore,
clashes between the police force and Hisbah continued in Kano as a result of the
Federal government and the 12 sharia states conflict of interest on the proper
implementation of sharia law (Badamasiuy and Okene 2011). This unexpected
development propelled extremist views amongst Muslim sects, such as advocating a
stricter version of sharia law and the transition to theocracy in so doing ensuring the
sustenance of violence within the northern region. Islamic associations and
dissatisfied Muslims who had supported and granted political legitimacy to the
northern political elite became violent in their protest. For example, the Muslim
Brother Association, also known as the Islamic Movement of Nigeria led by El-
Zakzaky, consistently clashed with the Kano state police.
History records the successful implementation of religious propagandas in political
campaigns. Political Islam in post - colonial Nigeria was fuelled by Sheikh Abubakar
-creating the old northern empire (Sokoto Caliphate).
The Sokoto Caliphate was once the home of the great Usman Dan Fodio dynasty and




             
               
            
              
             
            
            
            
              
            
        
             
            
             
           
          
 
           
           
             
              
            
             
            
            
              
            
               
colonisation, the empire encompassed what is now known as Burkina Faso in the
West to Cameroon in the East (see image 4). It was a theocratic State, whose
constitution, social and political practices was firmly entrenched in sharia law. The
historical record speaks of the strong influence of Islam on every aspect of the
caliphate activities, including the lives of its citizens and most importantly on political
campaigns in the northern region, which impacted the national elections. It was
Gum 
desire for Muslim candidates only was heralded across the northern region (Adelabola
2013). Although the northern region of Nigeria is not exclusively populated by
Muslims, yet the preference for Muslims by the Muslim population as part of the
governing authority was crucial. Due to the overwhelming influence of religion in
nd political campaigns, the political terrain became divided
along religious lines. The northern political elite saw religion as an opportunity for
elite manipulate and influence changes in social, economic and political sectors for
personal advantage. As such, in the case of northern Nigeria, violence became the
common language between the opposition forces and the NPP, thereby inciting
religious and ethnic clashes in the northern and eastern region.
However relations between Sheikh Gumi, the Izala and the federal government (Ex-
Presidents Shehu Shagari and Ibrahim Babaginda) were questioned by the populace,
due to the low quality of public services and the resultant socio-economic challenges.
In reaction to what was interpreted as the ineffectiveness of religion in securing good
governance, the Ahl al-Sunna sect and the Yan tatsine movement emerged. Their
objective, ostensibly, was to apply the right form of Islamic doctrine in the
management of State affairs. However, studies indicated that there was a relationship
between Yan tatsine leader and northern political elite, particularly in Kano state
(Danjibo 2009, Hiskett 1987 and Kasfelt 1989). The Yan Tatsine movement just like
of religious movements. Before the decision to eliminate the Yan Tatsine movement




             
          
              
          
           
            
   
 
             
               
             
              
            
             
             
           
 
         
          
              
             
              
           
              
            
          
 
 
refusal of military aid in the elimination of the group when they became
uncontrollable (Fwatshak n.d and McGregor 2012d). Likewise the arrests and
subsequent release of Mohammed Marwa, the leader of Yan Tatsine sect by the local
authorities, suggests relations with influential individuals. This is attributed to
and influence on the young population, whose dislike for the
government was made public (Hiskett 1987, Isichei 1987, Kasfelt 1989, Lubeck 1985
and Ojo 1985).
Another important event reflecting the influence of religion in the political sphere and
resulti 
As indicated earlier, sharia law was used by certain northern governors as a means to
access and retain political power. Ali Modu Sherif, the former governor of Borno
state, was not an exception. Yusuf advocated the implementation of a strict form of
sharia law. He was a compelling preacher and successfully gathered members from
different social circles. Naturally the political and religious elite were interested in his
movement and alliances were made (see chapter six for further analysis). The salient
subsequent electoral victory, hence validating the assertion of an alliance.
nt decision to involve Islam in political campaigns and
governance, without any consideration to limitations only promoted employment of
violence by religious groups. The lack of clarity in the implementation of sharia law
and the double standards practiced by the political elite aggravated the religious sects
(example Boko Haram) who had aided in the political campaign. As a result Boko
Haram transformed into a full-fledged terrorist organisation. In addition the clash
between Hisbah and both the state police and non-Muslims, is also an indication of
religion influencing governance. The diagram below is a brief illustration of the




           
   
 
             
     
 
            
           
                
              
               
             
   
 
             
              
Figure 11: Frame work of Islam in Northern Nigeria Political Sphere
Source: Author (2015)
5.2 When Religious Groups becomes a political Threat; A Link to Islamic
Radicalisation and Political Elite Response
As indicated in the previous sub-section, relations between the political elite and
religious associations are founded on mutual benefits between both actors. However
the perception of shift in power by both parties often leads to a struggle for supremacy
which is frequently reflected in violent operations. This raises the question of at what
point do the political elite perceive religious groups as a political threat and how does
their response to this perceived threat impact on the emergence and sustenance of
extremist groups?
Wole Soyinka gives an important insight to this question. He argues that religious




            
            
             
            
      
 
               
            
    
 
             
               
     
 
    
 
           
          
               
            
              
            
          
    
                
      
 
              
           
              
           
               
interested northern politicians. Furthermore he insisted that the loss of political power
to the south instigated a dangerous discontent amongst northern political elite. In
addition to the dissatisfaction of political power reverting to the south, the implication
of a Christian president instigated religious discontent and was further reflected in
violent clashes in the northern region.
That is when they activated the extreme, murderous strain of religion. That is why they
began to identify political enemies as religious enemies (Soyinka, cited in Sahara
Reporters February 6th 2012).
highlighting the importance of religion as a tool to access and consolidate political
power. Recall the case of sharia law as a political campaign tool and the government
sponsorship of pilgrimage to mecca.
5.2.1 Threat Perception
An examination of the historical relationship between the State and religion,
particularly Islam, affirms a symbiotic relationship between religious power and
political legitimacy. This is true for both the military and civilian era. There is a
political power base centred within the northern Islamic leaders and the northern
political elite. The interaction between the State and religion, lies in the over reliance
of political campaign and participation on religion. For example, the 2011 presidential
electoral campaign relied on religious affiliation amongst other factors. Furthermore
rimages and the long
standing sharia debates are all a function of the deep rooted influence of religion and a
manifestation of elite political culture.
It is usually argued that, a key element of democratic politics is negotiation and
compromise, yet Islamic tenets leaves little room for compromise. This unwillingness
to compromise is exhibited in the emergence of Islamic sects such as the Nigerian
Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban and Islamic Movement in Nigeria all directed




                
           
             
            
            
            
              
           
         
 
             
 
           
      
 
      
           
            
             
              
           
 
           
            
 
  
           
             
             
              
state and national level, ought to serve as an answer to the goals of these movements.
Nonetheless, as recent events indicate, the presence of these Muslim leaders
functioned as a restraining factor to extreme expressions by these Islamic sects. The
increasing emergence of these movements and the sustenance of their objectives tilted
the balance of religious and political power towards these movements. It became
imperative that these movements and the percentage of the constituency which made
up ardent followers and supporters of these groups were controlled by and allied with
interested political elite. Doctor Onuoha attributes this occurrence to the events
leading up to Boko Haram violent uprising. He asserts:
When Mohammed Yusuf became the leader of the sect, he started his charismatic
2003 general elections, the top politicians in Maiduguri, particularly Ali Modu
She 
Boko Haram revolution (Interview, Onuoha 2013).
tracted the northeastern political elite to
highlight the attraction of these popular movements which fostered political elite
relations with the Islamic traditional leaders and clerics, and ensured that major
religious association liaised with the political elite in order to secure incentives and
consolidate a power base. However the inability to control these groups led to clashes
between the government and the groups. Doctor Danjibo supports this assertion:
When Mohammed Yusuf started critiquing the government of Bala Kachala, the
governor started using the police to harass the group (Interview, Danjibo 2013).
ollowers of
Mohammed Yusuf and Borno state police. Furthermore these clashes occurred during
culminated in the fight for supremacy between the state level government and these
religious bodies. In the case of Borno state government, Yusuf and his followers




             
              
                
               
             
            
             
    
 
        
               
            
  
 
           
           
         
 
relinquish. Likewise Hisbah vigilante group in Kano and the sharia court officials
across the northern region demanded a more visible and active role in security and
sponsorship of the Miss World pageant in 2002, which led to the deaths of over 100
people, is a clear example of the clash of interests between the government and the
Islamic religious bodies. However the underlying issue lies in the salient struggle for
authority between the Nigerian government and Islam, most especially at the state
government level. The statement below is an example of the dissention between the
State and Islamic organisations.
recognise the authority of the Federal government, state
is the Koran and Sunna and we execute them under the leadership of mallam Ibrahim El-
Zakzarky (Yakubu Yahaya, a Faction leader of the Muslim brothers cited in
Mbamalu 2012:6).
The statement above is an excerpt from various statements with similar ideologies 
released by the Muslim Brother Association. This statement demonstrates the power





           
    
   
 
        
 
             
          
             
           
           
            
 
             
              
             
             
      
Figure 12: Illustrating the Dynamics of Threat Perception of Islamic Religious
Associations and the State
Source: Author (2015)
5.2.2 Islamic Radicalisation and Political Elite Complicity
The sustained campaign for a political Islamic State is a peculiarity of Islamic
radicalisation in northern Nigeria. This suggests the existence of well-defined
processes, which are understood and acted upon by agents of this phenomenon. These
processes discussed earlier, are founded on Islamic beliefs such as nation-wide
implementation of sharia law, Muslim governing officials and most importantly the
debates for the transition of the Federation to a theocratic State.
It is pertinent to establish an understanding of the term radicalisation within the
context of this chapter. Alex. P. Schmid, maintains that the notion of radicalisation is
too complex, hence the absence of a universally acceptable definition. For the propose
of this section, two definitions will be adopted, the US department of homeland




            
              
                 
       
           
            
            
               
             
    
 
             
                 
            
            
           
            
              
             
           
            
          
            
            
            
            
              
             
   
adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or
definition are (a) the assumption that violence was and is the only action considered
by the radicals and (b) the proposition that a return to the teachings of the prophet is
teaching using violence as a tool are terme 
away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or
extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an
alternative focal point of mobilisation outside the dominant political order as the
This alludes to the adoption of violence in response to failure of other less or non-
violent options and highlights access to political power as a motivation for the
adoption of religious radicalisation.
The declining influence of Islam in political and social related activities in northern
Nigeria can be traced back to the colonial era. The result of this was the limitation of
sharia law, the breakdown of emirates and subsequent integration of different regions,
and the introduction of the Western educational system leading to the unattractiveness
of Islamic system of education. Nevertheless, the Islamic leaders (Emirs, Sultan,
Sheikhs and Imams) capitalised on the alleged larger population of the northern
region and the religious beliefs of the Umma to consolidate their power base in
addition to the earlier thriving agricultural industry in the northern region. This move
ensured close relations with government officials at state and national level,
guaranteeing the steady presence and influence of Islam in governance affairs. The
emergence of Islamic radicalisation in northern Nigeria has been extensively
researched by various scholars and analysts (Alao 2013, Agi 1998, Danjibo 2009,
Dickson 2005, Falola 1998, Falola 1998, Fwatshak n.d, Hill 2010, Hunwick 1992,
Loimeier 1997, MucGregor 2012, Onuoha 2014, Paden 1973, and Tande 2012). These
dissent by political elite, exposure to Islamic interpretations from Arab nations and
the implementation of sharia law in 12 northern states. However studies such as this






         
              
            
           
        
             
            
             
            
              
  
      
 
             
                
    
         
 
            
          
  
              
           
              
           
              
            
             
             
              
Recall the aforementioned findings indicating the politicisation of Islamic
radicalisation as a cause. The late 1970s and early 1980s recorded the violent uprising
of the Yan Tasine movement. The early development of this movement excluded
violent operations. However messages or doctrines propagated by the leader, Marwa
appealed to the social and economic discontent masses.
made him acceptable to religious and political leaders in Kano, despite his large
following and critical messages towards the political elite. Yet his movement was
recorded to have carried out violent operations against the state police and civilians
(Danjibo 2009, Hiskett 1987 and Ojo 1985). Wole Soyinka underscores an important
to form an alliance with these groups in order to further political interests and
paigns and
thuggery (further analysis in chapter seven).
Governors courted the sponsorship of Maitatsine. I remember a former governor in Kano
admitted that at the beginning, he used to go to maitatsine, when elections came close to
get support, but he sa 
organisation (Soyinka, cited in Sahara Reporters February 6th 2012).
nt is validated by the consistent release of Marwa and his followers
from prison despite evidence of criminal activities (Hiskett 1987). Furthermore,
nce or
aid from the government or the political opposition. The relevant fact of this historical
discourse was the recognition and subsequent utilisation of Islamic radicalisation by
northern Nigerian political elite. It is important to note that northern cities affected by
violent activities of Yan Tatsine movement were described as politically unstable
(Ojo 1985). The political climate was such that the National Party of Nigeria (NPN)
whose core members were key northern Nigerians had majority political control of
states in northern Nigeria with the objective of expanding to other northern states.
Evidence from historical records indicates that attacks carried out by the Yan Tatsine




              
       
      
             
        
 
                
             
            
        
 
               
    
                
            
 
      
            
            
              
             
           
             
               
             
            
             
              
         
             
               
              
sect was patronised by the rich and affluent members of the political and religious
rship and influence on the masses (Ayelabola
2013 and Liebowitz and Ibrahim 2013).
relationship with Islam is limited to the level of cooperation between both parties
where there is a convergence of interests.
Though it is true that there is limited evidence to directly link the political elite with
that period indicated key shared interests. In addition it highlighted the case of
politicisation of Islamic radicalisation. In the same vein, the Boko Haram crisis
reflected same. As the senior security officer said:
At the beginning of the crisis, the political leaders appeared to be ambivalent, and some
of them attempted to appr 
may have been convenient for them to use this to argue for more political consensus for
the north in terms of national leadership (Interview, Mr S 2013).
aforementioned analysis of elite manipulation of
religious agendas for political benefits.This line of argument claims that the political
elite perceived Boko Haram early movement as a relevant tool for political
campaigning. This was characterised by the north south divide and the PDP and APC
electoral campaigns. As long as there were violent activities carried out by Boko
Haram, opposing political parties had fodder (blame game) for political campaigns.
Nevertheless the inability to curtail the excesses of Boko Haram and the resulting
reaction of the masses was interpreted by the political elite as a threat to their
consolidation of political power. This in turn influenced the response process of the
Federal government. The blasé response of the governments at regional and national
level to the initial violent activities of Boko Haram showed the perceived usefulness
of religion as a means to consolidate political power in the northern region. In
addition, the response of then governor of Kano state, Mohamme 
activities prompted violence and was interpreted as a lack of political will (Danjibo
to lose its Islamic religious constituency, as a slight against the sect could have an




           
           
             
   
 
       
              
  
 
             
                
        
 
               
            
                 
 
   
 
          
            
   
 
 
            
          
            
     
 
previous method of dealing with undesirables, such as unlawful imprisonment and
extrajudicial killings were becoming unpopular at the national and international level.
The uncertainty and slow response served as a catalyst for the gradual radicalisation
2005:105).
h as the Yan Tatsine is not
necessarily motivated by the belief in Islam as a tool for spiritual and social
itical elite.
counter a fusion of a credo in northernism and at the same time
go the full length of Islam because it pays them politically [referring to sharia law as
(Soyinka, cited in Sahara Reporters February 6th 2012).
Hence the presence of Boko Haram and it religious goals served as an instrument for
northern political elite to further their political interests. However the cooperation of
both parties in time degenerated to discord and the use of violence by both parties.
5.3 Conclusion
The relationship between the political elite and major institutional religions
(Christianity and Islam) insured the continued influence of religion in the political
sects or
objectives as political propaganda. This aided in gaining political legitimacy as well
as political mobilisation. Inherently, this policy facilitated the development and
competition of Islamic sects with different ideologies and the subsequent transition of




     
             
              
              
              
               
     
 
             
           
   
          
             





















with religious associations or
sects is centred on political interests, hence excluding the moral and spiritual aspects.
The absence of clarity of Islam in the political sphere (example in the implementation
of sharia law) led to discontent among the Muslim sects and the Muslim electorate
who had clamoured for and voted for the implementation of sharia law. It was
sects triggered by the perception of threat to its authority, lead first to alliances and
then, escalated to violence.
An examination of historical religious clashes revealed that, there is a link between
these clashes and political campaigns or electoral periods. The alliances between
political elite and Islam 
prompted the transformation of these groups to organised political violent
organisations. This was illustrated by the emergence of Yan Tasine and its activities







   
 
 
       
   
 
             
              
               
             
            
                  
            
 
                
               





Image 6: Abubakar Shekau flanked by members
Source: BBC (2014)
This chapter focuses on analysing the emergence and the threat of Boko Haram.
Chapters four and five examined the role of the elite in subverting ethnicity, social
movements and religion for their own ends. This chapter tests to what degree this very
same process lies behind the emergence of Boko Haram, its transformation to a
terrorist organisation, the nature of its structure and administration. Just as political
violence was the product of the elite seeking power at all costs, so in the case of Boko
Haram political violence was the product of its alliance with the elite.
The argument of this chapter then is that elite interference for their own ends played a
significant part in the development of Boko Haram and its turn to terrorism. It was






             
               
              
             
 
       
 
     
        
               
       
          
            
            
               
          
          
             
              
       
 
              
              
            
              
            
An in-
indicates that the group was enabled by an elite culture that sacrifices good
governance for political gain. It is a culture that has been prepared to exploit social
and economic grievances and religion in the north even to the point of promoting
violence. There would be no Boko Haram but for this prevalent elite culture.
6.1 Emergence, Ideology and Philosophy
The exact date of Boko Ha 
f birth is constrained by the significance of
assumption as head of Boko Haram) and the advent of violent tendencies as a basis
n. However, within the context of this
Director of Defence information Colonel Mohammed Yerima is accepted. This
assessment is evidenced by the presence of student Islamic associations in the
University of Maiduguri at that period, amongst which Abubakar Lawan was recorded
to have been the founder, a faculty representative or supervisor of one of these groups.
Furthermore empirical evidence provided by Onuoha (2010) and Cook (2011)
indicated relations between Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Lawan. In addition,
early members of Boko Haram were students or drop-outs from the University of
Maiduguri at the time when records of students drop out from this University were
high (Omotola 2013 and Abimbola 2010).
It is pertinent to highlight the popularity of Islamic associations in universities in the
patronage of such groups. Recall in chapters four and five, the analysis of alliances
between Islamic religious groups and the resultant influence of Islam in the socio-
political sphere, notably in Kano and Borno states, with the offer of violence with




            
           
                
                
           
            
           
           
 
            
           
 
             
       
 
             
             
        
           
               
               
                
                
     
               
               
              
              
associations and interested political elite are encouraged for the purpose of achieving
mutual benefits. Lechner (1991) argues that religious associations or institutions have
limited or no influence on political events such as access to State power and control
of State resources as such inclusion in politics is on the basis of secular or democratic
processes. However, findings from this research in chapters four and five
demonstrated the strong influence of religious groups on the success of political
campaigns as evidenced in Zamfara, Kano and Borno states amongst others.
Furthermore, Smith (1996:5) maintains that the influence of religious associations in
to t 
secular State. Doctor Shola Omotola, commenting on relations between political elite
and religious movements such as Boko Haram, stated that:
metamorphosis the power that be in Borno state [political elite] hijacked them, funded
them for political purposes (Interview, Omotola 2013).
findings highlighted the incursion of Islamic religious groups in the political sphere at
the instigation of the political elite; specific cases cited included the maitatsine and
Boko Haram groups. As indicated by Omotola, as
encouraged by a political environment that benefits from alliances between these
groups and the political elite. Boko Haram in its early stages was focused on religious
beliefs. This was exhibited in the early 2000s when members of the group opted to
live apart in a secluded area, choosing to rely on fishing, farming and cattle rearing as
a source of sustenance. At this period the movement was not overt in its stand against
the Federal and state government.
theory on anti-social movements, it could be argued that the decision to live apart and
adhere to an Islamic doctrine, contrary to the status quo of the community and the
State constitution, could be termed as a subtle stand against the State. However, this




             
 
 
            
     
             
             
  
 
                
              
      
 
         
 
               
             
       
 
         
           
      
               
               
            
  
           
              
           
 
garnered little interest from the state and Federal government in relation to national
security.
Noteworthy, is the socio-political environment of the north eastern states in Nigeria
ence. It is suggested that misgovernance 
by the political elite created an enabling environment for the recruitment of young
men into the movement. Likewise, a civil servant working in the National Assembly
insists that:
where certain things are not put in a government that does not care for its
people, not to mention the ever increasing gap between the rich and poor (Interview,
Civil Servant 1, 2013).
Likewise, a Boko Haram member, during interrogation revealed that:
I also used to convince them [recruits] by giving them 5,000 naira, 10,000 naira, which
they use to buy second hand clothes for business; this was strategies for encouragement 
(Cited from police audio interrogation Zangina 2013).
Cook (2014) supports these observations by identifying poverty and
underdevelopment as factors that ensured the successful emergence and sustenance of
the group. Likewise Danjibo (2009) and
same. Yet this thesis identifies poor governance not so much as the root cause of
Boko Haram, but as an outcome of the elite political culture with its poor governance
and interference in ethnic and religious organisations for its own ends (further
analysis
on Islamic religious encroachment in the political sphere and the northernisation
political elite. Though the political elite level of involvement was limited to political




               
           
           
               
             
             
     
 
               
                  
            
            
             
              
             
            
            
              
               
            
           
               
           
              
            
               
    
            
           
             
              
   
The emergence of Boko Haram in 1995 and its transition to a terrorist organisation is
framework. This framework illustrates the descent of social movement groups into
anti-social movement groups who employ violent tactics. This framework is not
focused exclusively on the causes that led to the creation of these movements, but on
the transition process to a terrorist organisation. In essence he argues that organised
political violent groups in Nigeria do not emerge as violent groups, but rather
which fits into Boko H 
The first phase identified by Wieviorka is when the movement is created as a platform
that claims to speak on behalf of a select group of people. In this case the early stage
of Boko Haram, then known as the Muslim Youth Organisation, popularly called
Shabaab, operating in a mosque at Damboa, Maiduguri (Olojo 2013, Onyebuchi and
Chigozie 2013) were depicted as separatists. This was prior to the leadership of
Mohammed Yusuf. They believed in a different doctrine of Islam - an Islam not
tainted by what was perceived by the movement as the negative manifestation of
Western values (corruption and unemployment - outcomes of poor governance as a
result of elite interference in governance). Hence their decision to live separately.
They were not perceived as violent. However the salient point is elite interference in
governance as a reason for their emergence. This new form of doctrine initially had a
negative response from the Muslim community in the north-eastern region of Nigeria
(Danjibo 2013 and Onuoha 2010). Yet this thesis argues that the m 
of separation and practice of its version of Islam which disregards the authority of the
government or constitution, created a platform for religious and political mobilisation
(sharia law and Hisbah). This created a volatile situation in a country known for
religious violence. The gradual growth of this movement expanded into the political
and social terrain of Borno state and other northern states. This thesis argues that this
igion for access to
political positions. The result was the renewed campaign for sharia law, growing
membership of the group, increased radical notions and specifically the manipulation
of the movement by northern political elite (discussed in chapter five) for the






                  
        
         
 
            
           
            
            
  
            
               
           
              
           
             
           
        
             
           
         
 
   
                
              
             
  
 
              
   
 
        
I think it is clear, they saw an opportunity for Islamic propagation in a region that is rife
to use sharia law as a way to re-
invent the government (Interview, Commander Joint Task Force 2013).
The second phase Michel Wieviorka identified is when the movement adapts the un-
defined expectations of individuals, shaping them into oft lauded structural challenges
caused by or neglected by the governing authority. This is reflective of socio-
economic challenges faced in Nigeria, which was examined in preceding chapters as
ent of
a mandate by Boko Haram that falls within their purview, guaranteeing the re-
time the group was known as the Nigerian Taliban and the Yusufiyya sect, in other
words between late 1990s and early 2000s. Mohammed Yusuf was popularly
described as a charismatic leader. His strategy was to emphasize the link between the
absence of Islam in the socio-political environment and shortcomings of the
government. This propaganda echoed the sentiment of a large population, such as the
Almajiris, un-employed youths, low income earners, blue collared individuals and the
political discontents. By combining religious, socio-economic and political
references, Boko Haram re-invented itself and ensured access to a large pool of
sympathisers, consequently prolonging its lifecycle. Supporting this assertion, Mr B, a
journalist in the middle belt region of Nigeria maintains:
and western political structure. 
The belief of the Boko Haram group is that this has not benefitted the region, having
failed to produce the economic and political emancipation of the region. So for that
reason they are advocating an alternative, which is sharia legal system (Interview, Mr
B 2013).
In addition, Mr A, a senior State security service officer in Borno state, describes
Boko Haram emergence:




   
              
    
 
              
           
           
          
 
            
         
 
             
                
              
             
             
       
         
             
 
 
             
                
                   




is treated equally, justice is encouraged. That is the main thrust of this movement
(Interview, Mr A 2013).
From the statements above, it is inferred that the movement was successful in aligning
State power for political interests and corrupt practices in governance, amongst
othe 
in members. In addition, the majority Muslim population in northern Nigeria
northern region. A staff of CLEEN foundation corroborated this observation:
times there are different encounters with the political system that informed other
dimensions at some points (Interview, CLEEN Foundation Staff 1).
The third phase according to Michel Wieviorka is the adoption of violence. This
occurred as a result of the perceived absence of an alternative means by the group and
the impending threat of violence from the Borno state government due to the fallout
between Yusuf and Ali Modu Sherif. This is evident in recorded clashes between
Boko Haram and Borno state police pre-July 2009 uprising. The characteristics of the
ation of Boko Haram into a terrorist
military and police force, combined with the threat of
existence and the extrajudicial killings of its leader and members. However, in line
Regardless of the extrajudicial killings, Boko Haram would have become violent. It is
not enough that the group had disagreements with Ali Modu Sherif; it was just a matter
of time. There is a culture of violence and brutality in Nigeria, it is a way of life, and
(Interview, Adesoji 2013).
162
weapons found in Boko Haram enclave days before the July 2009 uprising (Daily 
Trust 2009). Nonetheless, Wieviorka argues that globalisation is a key element in a 
asserts that the Nigerian government insisted that B 
imported from Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, empirical 
analysis from this research and supported by findings from Danjibo (2009) and 
Loimeier (1999) stresses pre-existence of radical Islamic ideology in the northern 
region of Nigeria pre and post-colonial period. 
solidarity with AQIM and other Jihad groups outside the borders of Nigeria gives 
credence to the Nigerian government  contention, their ideology, albeit more radical, 
is a replica or an echo of the same ideologies of preceding similar Islamic sects in 
northern Nigeria and the Wahhabi teachings propagated in Saudi Arabia (Loimeier 
1999 and Paden 1973). Another example allegedly supporting the Nigerian 
government  assertion and Wieviorka  
US response to the 9/11 AQ 
AQ terrorist activities, although the Nigerian Taliban as it was known then was not 
notoriously violent. Notwithstanding the Nigerian governme 
adoption of terror tactics and its need for global recognition.  
 
such as the Izala a 
security officer in northern Nigeria, links the terroristic development and jihadist 
ideology of Boko Haram to happenings in Afghanistan and Iran. 
 
Recall that in 2002 [referring to Boko Haram] 
word Taliban is not a Nigerian name, it is as a result of what is happening in 
Afghanistan. In other words the developments in Afghanistan one way or the other 






               
  
 
                 
    
              
             
    
 
            
            
              
             
           
             
             
 
 
     
 
             
               
         
             
             
       
              
 
           
             
               
           
In addition to this assertion, Mr S, a senior State security service officer in western
Nigeria insists:
It is very clear that Boko Haram had some links with AQIM and some of them have
in the global jihadist movement. 
They have taken the ideological direction from them and this is evident in Shekau
outbursts which mirror some of the statements made in the past by Osama Bin Laden 
(Interview, Mr S 2013).
The above statements made by the security operatives, is in accordance with
statements released by Boko Haram declaring allegiance and a shared ideology with
AQIM. This is further evident in similar terrorist tools used, such as suicide vest
attacks, the use of IEDs and kidnaps for ransom. As such, the ideological
underpinnings of Boko Haram reflected in northern Nigeria Islamic history, is
manifested in the current violent expressions of this doctrine in the global jihad
members of Boko Haram to look for radical solutions to their poverty and
marginalisation.
6.1.1 Ideology and Philosophy
Snow and Byrd (2007) emphasized the importance of ideology in the emergence and
evolution of a group. The ideology of a group forms the foundation upon which a
the ideology of a group is tailored to
represent the social, political and economic realities of targeted populace as well as
potential recruits. Furthermore, the content of the ideology and events leading up to
the development of that ideology serves as
actions that is contrary to the norms and values of the society at large.
political and economic environment is relevant. Likewise, studies carried out by,
Benford and Snow (2000), Oliver and Johnston (2000) and Snow and Byrd (2007)
illustrate ideology as a combination of process and content. It is not limited to the




             
           
   
 
               
       
 
               
              





of the Sokoto caliphate, but rather viewed as a movement geared towards establishing
population. Doctor Nathaniel Danjibo, an expert on religious violence in Nigeria,
needed development.
Muslims in the north thought that by accepting sharia, sharia was going to bring a
transformation in the society (Interview, Danjibo 2013).
The truth of the above statement is evident in the popular campaign and support for
sharia law during the 1999 elections and subsequent adoption of this law in 12




          
   
 
               
            
             
           
           
           
 
             
                 
              
       
       
Figure 13: Illustrating the Development Process of Boko Haram Ideology
Source Author (2015)
process is set within a frame and characterised by events. The first aspect of the
eological development is the identification of the problem. In the case of
Boko Haram, its early emergence and philosophy was expressed in terms of a
perceived shortfall gap in Islamic practices and the prevalence of socio-economic
problems (Brinkel and Ait-Hilda 2012, Cook 2011, Forest 2012, Idowu 2012,
Loimeier 2012, Malachy 2013, Onuoha 2012, Ogunrotifa 2013, and Ubhenin 2012).
Within
acceptance of western values and the prevalence of elite corruption. The advent of
these phenomena was said to be as a result of the declining power of Islam in the
public sphere. Recall the inclusion of Islam in the political sphere was at the
instigation of the political elite, examined in





            
                
          
 
              
            
 
 
   
    
           
            
      
               
             
               
 
           
            
              
             
            
            
     
 
  
        
  
Everyone knows that democracy and the constitution is paganism and everyone knows
there are some things that Allah has forbidden in the Quran that cannot be counted as
western education (Cited from Boko Haram Youtube Videos, Shekau 2012).
The Quran teaches that we must shun democracy, we must shun western education, and
we must shun the constitution (Cited from Boko Haram Youtube Videos, Shekau
2013).
Shekau draws attention t 
Islam. Employing language such
and instinctively brings to mind the consequences of encouraging what is
blasphemous. Recall that the Nigerian society is highly religious (examined in chapter
ve instinct of Islamic religious minded
people towards their religion. He paints an image of Islam versus evil, where evil is
depicted as democracy and the secularisation of the State, hence the eradication of
evil equals defence of Islam and consequently reward in the guise of a better society.
Noteworthy is the identified challenges in Nigeria, such as unemployment, poverty,
poor governance and the prevailing elite political culture. Collier (1999) in his
assessment of grievance theory identified the use of grievances as a tool for political
and subsequent attachment of their existence to the absence of Islam in the socio-
political environment is a means to legitimise their mandate. Furthermore, Abu Qaqa
application and acceptance of Islamic teachings as interpreted by Boko Haram will
bring about a Utopian State.
we have
been motivated by the stark injustice in the land 




             
 
 
         
            
              
                 
             
                
    
 
    
                 
        
 
      
                
              
                
            
            
      
             
               
           
 
           
             
               
Islam comes, everyone will be happy (Italic by author, Cited in The Guardian, Qaqa 
2012).
which is injustice, corruption and socio-economic problems. Identified challenges
which have become common place amongst the Nigerian populace and outcomes of
acknowledged as a means of taking up the common cause with other Islamic sects,
such as Yan Izala, in the pursuit of a Nigerian Islamic State. The vision or mission of
Boko Haram is clear: the problem has been recognised, the culprits have been
identified and a mandate has been set. Mr E, a senior State security officer in northern
quo. He argues that:
have should be a pu 
that the absence of Islam in the Nigerian society has paved the way for injustice such as
political corruption and poverty (Interview, Mr E 2013).
m statements indicative of its stand
against a secular State and the call for an Islamic theocractic State. The presence of
political elite corruption and poverty served as a platform and a legitimate purpose to
consolidate a support base for its activities. It is a case of adapting to changes within
the socio-political environment to launch its movement. The influence of religion in
the political sphere instigated by the political elite made this phenomenon possible.
This validates the assertion that the
caused by poor governance limits or nullifies the existence of social movement groups
such as Boko Haram. Hence making it difficult for these groups to emerge, access a
support base as well as transform to organised political violent groups.
aforementioned structural challenges identified by Boko Haram. This is achieved by
insisting on definite solutions and methods of attaining set goals. This was exhibited




             
               
            
          
           
            
      
 
             
              
                
   
 
           
      
             
            
               
             
             
          
    
               
            
      
 
         
   
 
              
subsequently the demand for the Islamization of the Nigerian State. Note that as
examined in chapter five, the success of sharia law was achieved with the aid of
northern political elite in exchange for political support. The logic behind Boko
Islamic principles (orthodox Islam or Wahhabi teachings) in the socio-cultural
environment will serve as a deterrent to socio-political injustice and promote
economic development. In line with this assertion, Doctor Onuoha a faculty member
of the Nigerian Defence College says:
His philosophy [Mohammed Yusuf] therefore is, we need to overthrow this unjust and
un-Islamic system and enthrone an Islamic system that is based on the principle of
sharia, and that is the only way they could begin to realise the good ideals of society 
(Interview, Onuoha 2013).
supported by Cook (2011) and Elkaim (2012) analysis of Boko
governance, grounded on political elite misgovernance.
of the socio-economic challenges faced by the State will only be solved by
confronting the absence of sharia law, hence advocating a religious solution. It
follows that a call to arms and the mobilisation of individuals willing to fight for
justice and Islam is ensured. As indicated from figure 23, extreme measures are
expected from would-be members. Although the challenge of the free rider problem is
anticipated (Ghandi 2005 and Weismuller 2012), see chapter three. Nevertheless,
ommitment to the protection
of Islam as well as the provision of welfare for members and society at large.
Likewise Abubakar Shekau focused on the rewards of afterlife and monetary rewards
to ensure stronger commitments of members.
while religious in nature, is couched in socio-economic and
political issues:




   
   
 
            
       
              
           
        
 
        
            
                  
       
 
           
   
             
             
      
 
      
 
              
            
     
 
              




Danjibo assertion is supported by Kano state security service earlier reports on
The structural challenge of the society is
interpreted by Boko Haram as an outcome of the absence of Islamic religious values
in the political sphere. Hence the demand for organised political Islam-Islamized
Nigeria as a solution to identified structural challenges.
in preceding chapters examined the emergence of political
violence and specifically traced its influence (elite political culture) on the emergence
of Boko Haram. Can that influence be traced not just to the use of violence but in the
ideology and philosophy of Boko Haram? Yes.
political culture that encouraged, manipulated and benefited from the incursion of
on political elite
poor governance. Furthermore, there is a precedent (examined in chapter five) for the
use of Islamic religion and Islamic sects for political mobilisation, which in turn
encourages the emergence of such groups.
6.2 Strategic focus and Goals
stance on the current political system, which is reflected in its refusal to negotiate
with the State government, to create a political representative platform and its
stance of the movement:
Absolutely nothing will stop us against waging war on the Nigerian State and its




               
         
 
               
            
            
 
    
 
             
            
             
              
             
             
            
          
       
 
              
       
  
                
     
 
    
       
 
            
            
          
            
The sect will not hesitate to eliminate anyone that chooses to prefer the western culture
over sharia (Cited in AllAfrica November 25th, Qaqa 2011).
The statements above are proven by the attacks carried out by the group, such as
attacks on police stations, secondary and tertiary institutions as well as public
buildings. In addition, the military response by the Nigerian State and the
international com 
Boko Haram.
This trait of violence differentiates Boko Haram from other Islamic sects in Nigeria.
As indicated in chapter four, sub-section 4.2.2, the movement had initially embarked
upon a strategy which entailed working within the current political system and with
the political elite to bring about desired change. This involved an alliance with Borno
State government under the leadership of Ali Modu Sherif. This approach included an
alliance with the secular government, with the plan of establishing an Islamic State,
the establishment of sharia law and appointments of Boko Haram members within
However this strategy evolved from non-violence to extreme violence, further
examined in chapter seven. Doctor Danjibo asserts:
When Ali Modu Sherif wanted to wrestle power from Mala Kachala he actually allied
with Boko Haram fo aram] supported him and
so they
had a say in government. But over a while they starting falling apart and violence was
the result (Interview, Danjibo 2013).
When there was a breakd 
started critiquing the government (Interview, Onuoha 2013).
The statements above were supported by newspaper reports of Ali Modu Sherif
political campaigns and the creation of an Islamic religious commission in Borno
state. Furthermore, Yusuf government appointment shortly after Sherif became the




             
         
             
             
             
            
       
              
   
 
               
          
            
            
             
           
           
          
              
            
 
     
               
   
 
                
                
      
 
  
            
Yusuf fallout with Sherif was indicative of his resignation from the ministry of
Islamic religious affairs and his verbal critisms of Sherif.
assessment, Boko Haram changed its strategy of achieving its goals when the group
realised that an alliance with Borno state government was not yielding desired results.
violent means. The actions of Boko Haram after its rejection of the government
employ and Ali Modu Sherif involved violent campaigns against those seen as
The implication of this strategy change is
premised on the belief that, violent acts will incite support from the populace and
coerce the gover 
due to elite failure but is also attributed to change in leadership and the socio-political
environment. The personalities of Abubakar Lawan, Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar
Shekau are different. Although not much is documented about Abubakar Lawan, the
movement was non-violent under his leadership and evidence indicated that he was
not allied with the political elite. Onuoha (2013) describes Mohammed Yusuf as a
moderate and a charismatic leader, while Abubakar Shekau is termed as
temperamental, aggressive and hard lined in his approach to achieving the
t is argued that the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf
occurred before he adopted terror acts as a means of expressing his views (Abimbola
2010 and Agbiboa 2013). However, the police and the State Security investigations
reported
In addition as earlier mentioned
by Adesoji (2015) and Daily Trust (2009), a commander of a joint task force in
northern Nigeria insisted:
The death of Mohammed Yusuf made no difference, it was time, there was no other way
they can achieve their mission without violence, and without the use of terror that is my
assessment (Interview, Major General A 2013).
The socio-political




               
              
            
  
 
               
              
              
 
          
     
            
   
 
       
             
              
            
     
              
             
 
 
              
     
 
               
               
    
 
exhaustion of other avenues and the attraction of terror tactics as a viable means.
such that there is precedent for the employment of violence as a feasible strategy,
namely the Niger Delta militants. Likewise Mr S, commenting on this phenomenon
asserts that:
Under the military era there was no active involvement of the people. A lot of
governance was done by fiat. There were no debates and where dissent was expressed,
or where opposition was noticed, it was forcefully put down (Interview, Mr S 2013).
Social movement activities were discouraged and ruthlessly suppressed regardless of
religious, ethnic or political affiliations. Likew 
not constrained by democratic checks, such as human rights considerations and the
international community.
propagation (public preaching) of the Wahhabi teachings.
objectives were not clear and deemed to be non-threatening to the community and
State at large. The group was identified as another Islamic religious group by the
government at the regional level. However under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf,
as a result of
the alliance and the interference of Islam religion in the political sphere. Hence the re-
introduction of sharia law in the northern region of Nigeria. Doctor Shola Omotola
Yes Boko Haram has religious undertones but it became the reincarnation of politics by
other means ia (Interview, Omotola 2013).
Boko Haram was a religious movement. Along the line they played a role in the
political system. They were used by some politicians to get power, and they had an




         
    
            
     
        
 
         
   
 
        
               
               
              
               
              
            
The death of Mohammed Yusuf ushered in the expansion
prior objective. This included
deaths, the release of imprisoned members, the Islamization of Nigeria, and verbal
and active support of the globa 
to wage war against the government remained consistent.
Image 7: Map showing Boko Haram geographical violent operations
Source: TRAC (2014)
ions as illustrated in image 7 is an
2011, the group focused its attacks in the north eastern region of the State. However
the suicide bomb attack on the police headquarters in Abuja, June 16th 2011 and the
suicide bomb attack in Lagos June 25th 2014 marked its infiltration into other regions
(FCT) and the employment of suicide bombing is to inflict a high cost on the
security of its citizens. Thereby ensuring a loss of confidence by the populace towards




                
               
        
 
      
   
            
             
             
           
            
          
             
            
             
   
 
              
               
       
 
               
               
               
     
 
             
   
two-edged. While the group by its operations in the FCT has inspired fear and loss of
confidence, it has also led to a large population making a stand against the movement
and its terror tactics.
r regions of State, reports indicates
gerian government in
combating Boko Haram insurgency. Prior to attacks in Cameroon, the border villages
between Nigeria and Cameroon and the Mandara Mountain served as a recruiting pool
and training facility, due to the absence of stringent security monitoring. In addition,
Cameroon shares similar characteristics with Nigeria, such as Christian south and
Muslim north and the prevalence of poverty and economic decline in northern
Cameroon (American Foreign Policy Council 2014). Furthermore the choice to lend 
support (verbal and active-supply of fighters) to Ansar al-din in northern Mali against
movement and Islamic terrorism world. In addition, Boko Haram fighters came back
equipped in combat skills and weaponry to continue Jihad in Nigeria (Pindiga 2013
and Raghavan 2013).
targets. Prior to the July 2009 uprising and resumption of violent activities by the
group in September 2010, the group focused on the police and other agents of security
Nigeria, Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau asserts:
We have proven our resolve by two recent attacks of police stations in Bauchi State
earlier in the week. We may be forced to liberate innocent citizens who are being
detained and alleged to be our members, more attacks on the way! (Cited in Daily
Trust July 25th, Yusuf 2009).






       
            
            
            
          
  
             
            
           
             
 
                
   
     
 
               
     
 
 
      
 
             
            
           
              
              
              
ency which is the attacks on the
State security operatives for the purpose of releasing imprisoned members and the
symbolism of attacking the State. However, attacks carried out by Boko Haram
involving the death of civilians undermine the declaration of protecting and not
Boko Haram, therefore soliciting support from the public. Nonetheless, incessant
eral government.
Still the change by the group to targeting civilians, businesses perceived to be
indecent and educational institutions triggered a heavy handed response by the State
and attracted the attention of the international community. Furthermore, the addition
corrupt practices of the secular State to a religious war against Christians.
We are also giving three days ultimatum to the southerners living in the northern part of
(Cited in The
Vanguard January 2nd, Qaqa 2012).
The war we are fighting is the war against Christians and infidels, (Cited from Boko
Haram Youtube Videos Shekau 2014).
This
(Cited in AllAfrica July 31st, Shekau 2012). 
attacks on churches such as the Christmas day suicide bombings changed the dynamic
establish an Islamic theocratic State the elimination of a competing religion is
relevant. However focusing its attacks on Christians generated increased tension in
the north-south divide debate. Recall Abu Qaqa mention of the president as a leader
of Christians. This allusion was made to create a sense of division amongst the




             
       
 
           
            
 
 
            
            
           
             
             
               
            
 
 
             
               
             
              
    
                 
               
              
          
  
by Nigerian Christians emphasised Islam as the only true religion and ensures support
and sympathies from the Muslim population:
cannibals...even without provocation you slaughtered us and took our wives and
humiliated us! (Shekau 2012, Cited in AllAfrica July 31st and Sahara Reporters
2012).
provocation against Muslims is meant as a catalyst to accelerate violent conflicts
between the two religions, which have volatile relations. A religious war between
Chr 
nation between two camps. However this ploy proved futile, despite grievances
registered by Christians against Boko Haram for churches attacked. There is no record
of mass violent engagements between Christians and Muslims as a result of this
political and the adoption of rhetoric targeted at creating an image of us versus them.
(See chapter seven for further analysis on the government response and discourses
employed).
In addition to the growing collection of indiscriminate targets by Boko Haram, media
houses, mosques, market places, bus stops and the political elite were not left out.
The statements below illustrate the wide range of Boko Haram targets and target
selection trait, which is essentially anyone whom the group identifies as an enemy of
Allah and Boko Haram.
Allah has said that we revenge on anyone that attacks us in the measure as we were
attacked. So as far as we are concerned, persons like Ali Sheriff, Senator Ndume and
Pindar are not in any way different from President Goodluck Jonathan, whom we are





              
            
 
          
             
              
  
 
                 
                   
      
  
 
            
          
 
           
              
 
 
                
            
              
              
            
 
              
           
              
We decided to attack some media houses because that paper was used in dishonouring
them out of existence (Cited in Premium Times May 1st, Shekau 2012)
e of enemies and reasons given implies target strategy based
on indiscrimination. The goal is to discourage dissent against Boko Haram by using
fear as a means of support. A northern female resident validates this assessment, she
insisted that:
Boko Haram has succeeded in creating fear in our minds, none of us will talk about them
or say anything against them, the only reason why I am able to talk to you is because I
am not in the n (Interview,
Anonymous 2014).
This change in target strategy projected an image of invincibility and further
discouraged support from citizens for the security agencies. However indiscriminate
mission des 
Furthermore the inclusion of children and non-combatants as victims of Boko
damage to secure the cooperation of the State in meeting its demands. Abu Qaqa
We have hundreds of members that are willing to sacrifice their lives in this crusade; the
unfortunate incident of Saturday will not discourage us [referring to engagement with
security forces, where Boko Haram death record was higher than the State forces]; if
anything, it will encourage us to strategize and diversify our techniques because we are
not afraid of death (Cited in The Vanguard December 19th, Qaqa 2011)
the years 2011 till date. Furthermore, the assertion that death was welcomed by the
fighters indicated a new level of extremism, signifying prolonged and sustained




              
    
 
       
            
            
               
          
           
          
              
              
               
           
   
 
               
                
         
 
  
             
               
            
            
           
    
 
           
             
disregard to the cost of violence. This is evident on the preference for military
intervention (see chapter seven).
use of young females in carrying out su 
operations was notable for the employment of cutlasses, bows and arrows, sticks,
daggers and guns smuggled or stolen from police stations attacked. The deliberate
emulation of terror tactics employed by groups such as AQ is depicted as a strategic
move towards intimidating the government and other key stakeholders. Furthermore
adoption of these terror tactics ensures national and international publicity or
recognition. Examples incudes suicide bomb attacks in police headquarters Abuja,
Christmas day suicide bomb attacks, and the killing of 69 young male students in
Yobe State. These attacks were staged with the aim of projecting the government as
weak and unable to protect its citizens. The statement below is an excerpt from an
online news website describing the disappointment of the Nigerian populace in
fighting Boko Haram:
Many Nigerians have criticized the government for failing to rescue the girls or put a
stop to the five-year insurgency by Boko Haram, which says it is trying to establish an
Islamic state in northern Nigeria (Voice of Africa 2014).
own in
Borno State, leading to the appeal from the international community in curbing the
include the release of videos and messages AQ and ISIL style and the use of Arabic 
language as opposed to the preferred Hausa language by Shekau. Furthermore Boko
Haram audio and video messages are now posted on international Jihad websites;
these actions are targeted towards portraying an image of sophistication and
development within the group.
Although, this thesis proposition explains the emergence of organised political violent




              
              
               
    
 
     
 
           
            
             
              
          
             
            
            
                
             
    
 
                
     
 
               
            
            
 
                
             
          
 
           
              
             
that elite conduct accounts for all of Boko Haram goals and strategies. Evidence has
been found for its shaping of elements of its ideology. But its anti-State, anti-Christian
stance seems to rely more on other external factors so does its tactics of indiscriminate
killings and suicide bombing.
6.3 Recruitment and Membership
Next, the question of whether elite culture impacted recruitment membership is
examined. The recruitment strategy adopted by the group is targeted towards the
needs or weaknesses of potential members. Key attributes are used as a homing
device in membership selection, such as individuals who are driven by a desire for
socio-economic advancement and the defence of Islam. Potential members are
recruited based on their personal grievances which are capitalised on by the recruiter.
Onyebuchi and Chigozie (2013) argue that individuals are forced to become members
either by birth, familial ties or kidnap. Commenting on the recruitment strategy
adopted by Boko Haram, a commander of a Joint task force in the northern region of
Nigeria insisted that the movement is not above using underhanded methods to recruit
individuals. He revealed that:
They use all kinds of methods to recruit people; they look for people that are disgruntled,
anything 
(Interview, Major General A 2013).
This view is shared by Mr S, a senior State security official, who insisted that
members of Boko Haram who were interrogated by security operatives revealed that,
they were lured by the promise of monthly wages (N5,000.00 = £20).
It was discovered that, these boys were willing to fight the cause of Boko Haram, not
because of the religious ideology or defence of Islam but simply because of financial 
gains and the absence of purpose (Interview, Mr S 2013).
The statements above illustrate the characteristics of Boko Haram members, as
individuals who are not conversant with the ideological goals of the sect but rather




            
            
            
              
    
 
              
            
            
         
           
      
 
                  
          
 
              
              
              
               
             
     
 
           
                
            
      
 
that captured Boko Haram foot soldiers are ignorant of the purpose, operational
activities and knowledge of top leaders or commanders of the movement (Onuoha
2013, Omotola 2013 and Zenn 2013). Recall that Boko Haram members were
recorded to have worked as political thugs for northern political elite in exchange for
monetary and political gains.
A large percentage of Boko Haram members do not necessarily reflect any pattern or
consistencies in terms of social, economic and academic traits. Some are unemployed,
educated (western and Islamic), poor, blue or white collared employees and illiterates.
Examples of members variations includes, Mohammed Abdullahi Zangina a
university drop-out from nursing school, who insisted during a police interrogation
that he joined Boko Haram because:
preaching said that our leaders are not doing the right thing, the way they are ruling us is
bad (Cited from audio recording of Police interrogation, Zangina 2013).
From the statement above and the western tertiary education albeit brief of Zangina, it
is clear that Zangina was conversant with the political terrain and the expectations of
the citizens from the State government which, as implied by the above statement was
absent. In effect, Zangina while not a part of the uneducated class became a member
of Boko Haram for the purpose of spiritual edification and correction of perceived
injustice by the government.
Muhammad Manga, popularly known as the police headquarters suicide bomber, was
a prosperous business man who was married with five children and left a will of 4
income describe an individual who was financially secure, which disproves poverty as





            
    
 
            
             
             
 
 
    
      
 
Image 8: Image of Muhammad Manga hours before his suicide bomb attack
Source: Sahara Reporters (2011)
Kabir Sokoto was the mastermind behind the UN building suicide attack, recruiter
and trainer of members in manufacturing and detonation of IEDs. Sokoto had access
to western education and was a laboratory technician before he joined Boko Haram.
Image 9: Kabir Sokoto




              
              
              
             
            
            
           
            
              
            
          
   
 
                
                 
   
 
           
            
          
 
             
        
 
               
     
 
             
            
            
 
Mamman Nur, was a drop out from a government Islamic theological school in Borno
state. He was the mastermind behind the UN attacks and Mohammed Abul Barra, a
suicide bomber was also a business man. Based on the brief descriptions of the
members above, it is understood that the motivation or the driving force behind
membership is not limited to financial factors. Furthermore membership is not limited
to non-western educated individuals but also to the religious, educated and illiterate
Muslim population in the State. Nonetheless Doctor Abimbola Adesoji insists that
under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf potential members were encouraged to join
through offering shelter, food and a regular source of income. He maintained that the
motivation behind the high turnout of Boko Haram followers is not necessarily
ideologically driven or religious revolution, but rather economically and identity
driven:
There were some mosques in north eastern Nigeria, where young men go to pray and are
given 5000 naira [£20] for doing nothing but pray, it was a way of luring youths who
(Interview, Adesoji 2013).
Doctor Nathaniel Danjibo and Doctor Freedom Onuoha support this assertion. They
affirmed the implication of financial hand-outs given by Mohammed Yusuf towards a
target population of un-employed and shiftless individuals. They confirmed that:
Mohammed Yusuf was feeding people freely, giving people money to get married, was
strengths to join that group (Interview, Danjibo 2013).
them on board and give them start-up funds and they start gradually inculcating you into
the system (Interview, Onuoha 2013).
These views shared by these respondents are supported by comments made by a
captured Boko Haram member, who maintained that recruits are lured or encouraged




               
                  
        
 
             
            
               
   
 
               
             
              
             
               
             
   
              
      
 
     
    
                
                  
            
  
 
          
             
             
I used to convince them by giving them 5,000 naira, 10,000 naira etcetera, which they
use to buy second hand clothes for business, this was the way we get them to join (Cited
from audio recording of police interrogation, Zangina 2013).
Boko Haram offered a means to individual economic development and a sense of
purpose to displaced youths and illegal immigrates from Niger, Chad and Cameroon.
Consequently, the decision to become a part of this movement or swear fealty to Boko
Haram became inevitable.
Another element sourced by recruiters was to tell recruits that the goal of Boko Haram
is achievable and worth fighting and dying for. Traits such as aggressiveness and
fanaticism were developed so that recruits would have a deep aversion to the current
movement. The recruiter emphasises the divine mandate of the movement as a means
of giving direction to the lives of individuals with the promise of great reward in
paradise. It is suggested that audio recordings and written statements made by Yusuf
are provided for
to members and potential recruits, he spoke of difficulties ahead as well as expected
rewards of following the divine cause:
re the trials we are
ay Allah give us
the will to endure. Allah is watching us, victory is certain. What we lack are the
what the prophet says we should stand by, even if we die in the process, this dawah will
continue even after a hundred years (Yusuf 2006; Translated and Cited in
Mohammed 2014:15).
Potential members are sourced from the mosque, educational institutions, government
institutions and street children. Imams are targeted and introduced to the doctrines of




               
            
         
 
             
           
            
             
           
 
         
   
 
           
              
            
              
             
            
      
 
Boko Haram to their followers. In addition, lecturers are targeted as a link to students,
ideology for an Islamic State. The indoctrination or infiltration of security agencies
operations and an avenue for military or combat training.
Members are not limited to males but include females as well, although evidence
illustrating how females are recruited is limited. However various documents (media
members by marriage, familial ties and kidnap. In addition female recruits, most
especially widows who are mothers and spinsters, are lured with the promise of
marriage to male Boko Haram members and financial security (TRAC 2014).
Image 10: Pictures of Arrested Female Boko Haram Members
Source: TRAC (2014)
conscription of members (International Crisis Group 2014 and Daily Times 2012).
This is as a result of heavy handed response and immediate execution of captured
Boko Haram members. Individuals are blackmailed, threatened or paid to carry out
violent attacks. The exact number of Boko Haram members is not known (Cook 2011
and Onuoha 2013); however, 14 years after the emergence of this group, the
movement do not lack members for its operations evident by consistent military




           
            
         
 
 
      
 
             
          
            
             
            
   
 
           
   
             
             
              
               
          
           
        
No evidence has been found of elite political culture and influence
recruitment and membership strategy, except the use of members as political thugs
and mobilisers. However, circumstances that encourage recruitment such as
6.4 Organisational and Operational Activities
The organisational structure of Boko Haram is difficult to illustrate, due to limited
release of limited information (field investigation and secondary sources). However
the operational activities and high profile arrests of Boko Haram members indicates
that, the structure has evolved considerably from a strict linear organisation into a
loose hierarchical group with the consistent feature of having an undisputed leader -
Abubakar Shekau.
across the northern and central regions of Nigeria. Furthermore Abubakar Shekau
e significant changes
from its inception. This transformation is evidenced in its style of engagement with
method of communication with the State and the general public. Although the exact
structure and administrative operations of Boko Haram is not clear, it is possible to
offer analytic speculations as to the reality of the case. This will be achieved by
examining the organisational structure and leadership, training, funding, and modus
operandi of the group. The figure below, illustrates Boko Haram operational





       
















      
 
       
   
 
            
             
        
 
6.4.1 Organisational Structure and Leadership
Image 11: Boko Haram leadership structure
Source: TRAC (2014)
hierarchal consisting of an advisory council (Shura) whose opinions were alleged to
be relevant to decisions made and suggested by the head and followers respectively.
me 




              
          
               
              
            
             
              
            
              
               
              
             
      
 
            
    
              
               
           
     
 
              
             
              
  
           
       
 
       
         
Boko Haram is split into several factions, loosely connected to top leaders and carry
out operations without necessary supervision from top management (Schachtel 2014).
This is validated by the diverse and sporadic attacks carried out by and blamed on
Boko Haram across the northern, eastern and middle belt region of the State. Zenn
(2014) maintains that Kabir Sokoto, the master mind behind the Christmas day
bombings received funding for his operations from a terrorist group based in Algeria.
This supports the assertion that cells or factions of Boko Haram share the same
ideology and enemies, but that operational activities are at their discretion including
source of funding. These factions come together for major attacks such as the kidnap
of 200 girls in Chibok (Zenn 2014). Mr S concedes that they are indeed different
factions of Boko Haram and each has its own agenda, ranging from religious, political
and criminal. He supported this assertion by citing the inconsistencies of killings and
choice of weapons by the group:
nature of the killings and some of the persons killed, retired custom 
officers, district heads, politicians
the group had different targets depending on their objectives and who they perceived to
be their enemies, some were going to primary schools to burn them down, some were
going after law enforcement officers, others targeted market places, some churches,
(Interview, Mr S 2013).
level. He insisted during an interview with Sahara reporters in 2012, that Boko Haram
is divided into factions each with a different agenda. Likewise members of Yusufiyya
sect, who claimed to be a breakaway faction of Boko Haram, claimed disapproval of
an
actual break away. Nonetheless choice of targets and simultaneous violent operations
across the northern region validates this claim.
onal structure is divided into three key




     
    
 
          
         
           
                
              
            
                
             
           
             
              
              
             
 
           
             
          
  
 
           
 
             
  
 
              
            
             
departments managed by trained
personnel with specific duties.
The duties of the administrative department involve management of finances,
procurement of weaponry, management of internal and external communication,
management of public enlightenment and recruitment related activities. Recall that a
visible structure of this department is not in evidence or has not been made known to
the public due to the secretive and evasive nature of Boko Haram. However recent
events, such as confessions of arrested Boko Haram members and violent operations
by the group give credence to this assertion. In the case of finance management and
female recruitment, an example is the arrest of three female Boko Haram members,
Hafsat Usman Bako, Zainab Idris and Aisha Abubakar (Figure 34). Information
elicited from these women indicated that they were responsible for the payment of
salaries and distribution of funds to Boko Haram fighters, in addition to recruitment of
women into the group. Hafsat Usman was given the title of paymaster (Gigova 2014
and TRAC 2014). These women were not involved in combat or religious activities.
rthermore,
management of internal and external communication is attributed to the administrative
department. This is evidenced by statements released on behalf of the group by
spokesman. Recruitment related activities are shared between the administrative and
religious department.
The religious department is charged with the responsibility of propagating the
mams,
the purpose of securing support in the form of human resource, finance and
legitimacy.
In the same vein, the military section, which consists of foot soldiers, spies, assassins
and commanders, are charged with direct engagement with the State security agents,




             
           
 
 
       
     
 
             
  
     
    
 
            
              
              
           
           
           
            
other criminal activities. In addition to the above mentioned duties, members of the
military section are also charged with combat training of the fighters.
Image 12: Image of Boko Haram Military
Source: Daily Nigerian Info (2014)
Abubakar Shekau serves as the spiritual leader and military leader of Boko Haram.
Although, the spre 
structure and elite political culture.
6.4.1 Training
training undergone by the group. Training undertaken by members can be categorised
into two stages: indoctrination and combat. Recruits are taught to accept and have a
firm belief in the teachings professed by Boko Haram, although a timeline for training
is absent from data accessed and analysed. Nevertheless, when trainees become
indoctrinated, those who are suited for combat are trained in weaponry,
assassinations, guerrilla warfare, making of IEDs and other violent criminal activities.




            
          
 
            
             
            
           
             
           
            
             
              
      
 
             
            
             
              
           
  
             
            
            
       
 
                
 
 
             
 
 
               
            
    
intelligence. This was evident when Boko Haram released a document which recorded
personal details of State security service officials (Associated Press 2012).
In addition to combat and religious indoctrination, members are expected to remain
loyal to Boko Haram; actions termed as treasonous are punishable by death. Examples
include the execution of members who advocated and met with the State
representatives for negotiations (International Crisis Group 2014) and the execution of
Abu Qaqa II, the second spokesman of Boko Haram, also known as Mohammed
Anwal Kontagora who denounced Boko Haram (Oftedal 2013). Hence secrecy and
loyalty is top priority of membership training. Furthermore members are trained to
rely on face-to-face contact in passing information. The use of mobile phones and
emails are at a minimum and monitored in order to avoid counter terrorist officials
intercepting messages (Stewart and Wroughton 2014).
The preferred location for combat training is the Sambisa forest and the Mandara
Mountain, located at the north eastern borders of Nigeria. Its topographical features
make it suitable for training without detection from the custom officers and patrol
forces. A report carried out by The Bow Group (2014) indicated that Boko Haram
operatives receive training in AQIM and Al-Shabaab camps. This assertion is
supported by Pindig 
that 200 Boko Haram members trained for 10 months with Malian militants in
Timbuktu, further validated by chief of army staff, Lt-General Azubuike Ihejirika. In
addition, Mr B, a security operative in northern Nigeria, confirmed the external
training of Boko Haram members in Mali:
with a terrorist group in northern Mali as a result of their alliance (Interview, Mr B
2013).
Likewise Mr K, a security operative in northern Nigeria agreed with this assertion:
we discovered that they had a lot of sanctuaries and training centres in Mali which
they took seriously, Boko Haram members were trained in guerrilla warfare, IEDs,





            
             
     
 
 
             
    
 
           
              
             
 
            








This assertion was further supported by a document provided by the respondent
illustrating a loose mapped out route travelled by Boko Haram members to Zubari
training camp, Timbuktu in Mali.
Figure 15: Travel Route from Nigeria to Mali Used by Boko Haram Members
Source: Primary Data (2013)
Recall that Abubakar Shekau and Abu Qaqa released statements confirming alliances
with these groups. Furthermore, in June 2010, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud the emir of
AQIM stated plans to provide Boko Haram fighters with training and support (Feakin
2014). Thi 
increased sophisticated method of fighting and use of IEDs and vehicle borne








       
   
 
             
              
           
   
              
               
          
 
                 
              
               
            




Image 13: Illustrating Boko Haram Resource Support
Source: Davis (2012)
Training and organisational structure might have little link with the political elite but
of an insurgency is capital. The sustenance of Boko Haram campaign is access to
speculation. Cook (2011), Onuoha (2012) and Abimbola (2011) maintain that Boko
daily tax
levies from members and bank robberies. In an interview with the commander of a
Joint Task force in northern Nigeria, he insisted that funding from the group can be
traced to top government officials and influential citizens. He stated:
We know that there are sponsors but none that we can categorically say, as a result of
evidence and other reasons [refused to elaborate], these people are in high places, they
actually buy into those ideologies they are pursuing, but cannot do it openly but simply
by supporting them financially and otherwise, leaving others to do the dirty work 




                
 
 
               
                 
            
 
             
              
  
 
             
                  
           
    
 
 
             
            
             
            
            
           
           
             
         
           
          
     
 
involved, but disputes the reasons behind it. He argues that it is those who make up
by involving the military, because the military guys are making money out of the Boko
Haram crisis and so they will not want it to stop. Where do you think they [Boko Haram] 
get the weapons from? Who sells it to them? (Interview, Danjibo 2013).
However, Mr S strongly asserts that political leaders and influential citizens who were
said to have sponsored Boko Haram, only rendered financial support as a result of
being coerced:
They call political leaders for what they call protection money monthly, people have
been known to pay 2m, 5m, 10m naira on a monthly bases, all of them pay, house of
assembly members, house of national assembly members etcetera, they have been
(Interview, Mr S
2013).
From the statements above, the consistent pattern is one where Boko Haram accesses
funds from influential citizens. Onapajo, Uzodike and Whetho (2012) contend that the
operations, but on donations from charity organisations based in the UK and Saudi
Arabia. Al-Muntada trust fund, a charity organisation whose headquarters is in the
United Kingdom, was stated to have provided financial assistance to the group,
although the organisation denied this allegation (Oftedal 2013 and Agbiboa 2014).
The Premium Times (2012), a Nigerian newspaper, disclosed an unidentified Algerian
organisation donated the sum of $250,000.00 to Boko Haram. It is suggested that
udes all the above. In addition the group has
increased its coffers by ransoming hostages, accessing profits of legitimate and
illegitimate businesses funded by the group, demanding protection money from




                 
             
                 
              
     
 
            
               
            
             
      
 
           
            
             
              
          
                
             
              
            
     
 
            
             
                  
     
              
    
 






In most cases, I would tell you emphatically that most of the robberies are done by the
Boko Haram and not other criminal gangs, based on our security intelligence. For
instance the attack on the bureau de change in Kano 5 months ago, we were able to
arrest one of the masterminds, who was a part of Boko Haram (Interview, State
Security Office Mr KA 2014).
The kidnap and ransom of hostages both nationals and foreigners proved profitable
for the group. The profits from the kidnap of French family in Cameroon amounted to
$3.15 million (Stewart and Wroughton 2014). In addition, Boko Haram secured the
sum of £1million from the tragic kidnap of B Stablini construction employees, Chris
McManus and Franco Lamolinara (Walker 2012).
Based on empirical findings by the International Crisis Group (2014), Aminu Tashen-
Ilimi a top commander in the group had received $275,000.00 from Mohammed
Yusuf before his death to procure arms. However Aminu, after the death of Yusuf, 
used the money to establish a car-dealing business in Kaduna, using the proceeds to
fund Boko Haram operations. Likewise, Mohammed Abdulahi Zangina (2003), a
captured member of Boko Haram, asserts that in a bid to create a steady source of
income for the group, employed individuals were recruited and those who were not
employed were given money to start business and remit the profits to Boko Haram.
Mr E, a security operative respondent in the northern region, corroborated this
contention. He insisted that:
The group created some business fronts, some members are into economic ventures
whose main duty is to get themselves in international trade involving Dubai, China
etcetera, they go as harmless traders, but their main duty is to form a means by which the
d in electronic business and
any other lucrative venture and they have a portion which they give to the sect 
(Interview, Mr E 2013).




     
 
             
              
              
           
      
 
            
              
            
             
           
               
           
 
              
             
            
            
              
              
     
6.4.3 Modus Operandi
In the long tradition of Nigerian political culture, Boko Haram uses violence to
promote its own interests though to a more extreme level. Their violent activities are
planned and executed with the aim of creating fear and terror. They employ suicide
bomb attacks, simultaneous bomb attacks, arson, kidnap, sustained hours of gun
fighting and targets helpless civilians.
goals (making the country ungovernable and an end to western education). For
example, is the suicide bomb attack in police headquarters at the State capital 2011,
the occupation of police training school 2014, Christmas day suicide bomb attacks
2011, and frequent attacks on secondary and tertiary schools. The selection of these
targets and the magnitude of civilian causalities (women and children) demonstrate
those who oppose their beliefs. The fact that these attacks can be carried out with
the inability of the State to protect its citizens.
Boko Haram is known for its brutal and thorough attacks on targets and locations.
This is demonstrated by choice of weapons and high causalities incurred. In addition
blue prints of attacked organisations or buildings and identity cards of employees
were found in possession of captured Boko Haram members. This indicates careful
planning on the part of Boko Haram before executing violent operations. Below is a
picture taken by the State security operatives of identity cards in possession of Boko






           
    
 
              
           
            
            
           
              
           
             
            
                
                
        
 
             
             
             
             
             
         
            
Image 14: Pictures of Stolen Identity Cards by Boko Haram Members
Source: Primary Data (2013)
Another trait of the group is the release of public statements where Boko Haram
claimed responsibility for terror acts. These statements are released through the
medium of emails, interviews with carefully selected journalists and videos posted on
Youtube and recently on Jihadist websites. Although an above average percentage of
violent operations are not acknowledged by the group, security operatives confirm
these attacks as Boko Haram signature attacks, due to the use of explosives, target
location, suicide bombs and civilian causalities. The explanation for this occurrence
stems from the decentralised structure of the group and the presence of different
factions possessing free rein to carry out violent operations. Examples of Boko
September 2014, attack on the village of Konduga, leading to the death of 23 on
February 11th 2014, and the attack on a village market in Kawuri leading to the death
of 45 people on January 26th 2014.
Another observation of the group is the preferred choice of military fatigues for
violent operations, whether engaged in armed battle with the State security forces or
attacks on civilians. Several attacks carried out by Boko Haram and described by
eyewitnesses mention Boko Haram members clad in military gear and use of military
vehicles. The use of Nigerian military gears by the group ensures immunity and
forestalls questioning when carrying out clandestine activities. Furthermore, the





              
             
             
             
 
 
             
             
           
           
             
       
            
    
 
 
            
             
              
             
             
         
 
            
            
             
   
 
            
              
              
apart from the allegation of theft. The outfitting of Boko Haram in military fatigues
leads to confusion on the part of eyewitnesses and victims, whose initial thoughts
were that the men were the Nigerian military on State business. However during
suicide bomb attacks, the suicide bombers were never described as dressed in military
uniform.
The group, as indicated earlier, are indiscriminate in choice of targets. Targets include
students and teachers of western education both at secondary and tertiary levels, State
police and military forces, Christians, politicians, Muslims, the media and domestic
businesses (International Crisis Group 2014). In addition to domestic targets, Boko
Haram carried out attacks in Cameroon on border villages and the Kidnapped the
Cameroon vice- n-law plus a senior local religious
against Boko Haram. The group is notorious for freeing captured members from
demand to release its
members.
Boko Haram intelligence network is considered low-cost and not so complex in
operation. Street kids, hawkers and unemployed local youths are paid small amount of
money (£5pds) to spy on and monitor the movement of the State security operatives
(Stewart and Wroughton 2014). However Intel on major operations is managed by the
commanders and trained Boko Haram operatives. An officer of the anti-terrorism unit
in Abuja in response to Boko Haram intelligence network:
As mentioned earlier, they have members across different sectors in Nigeria, Jonathan
Goodluck even confirmed it, they get their information from informants in security
agencies, this I know, we have information to back this up (Interview, Security
Officer 2, 2014).
In addition, the intelligence network also involves the infiltration of Boko Haram
members into local vigilante groups set up for the purpose of tracking and identifying




             
               
 
 
   
 
             
             
             
    
 
             
               
              
             
               
               














force, Maiduguri. He was reported to have been involved directly in the Chibok
kidnap in April 2014 and the assassination of the emir of Gwoza, May 2014 (TRAC
2014).
6.6 Conclusion
own ends through violence. In the light of framing theory, social movement theory,
greed and grievance theory, Boko Haram is seen as an organisation that emphasizes
and justifies its existence and use of violence on the socio-economic and structural
failures of the State.
Yet, in considering the ongoing strategies and tactics of the movement the influence
practice of buying supporters and its leans heavily on the elite for financial support. In
other areas such as links with external jihadists and organisational structure there is no
obvious connection with elite political culture. In these areas the thesis concludes that
other factors came into prominence. Elite culture may be an over looked factor in the
rise and development of Boko Haram but it is not an exclusive factor. Single variables





      
  
    
 
            
             
             
               
            
          
     
 
              
               
             
           
          
            
            
              
             
             




COUNTER TERRORISM RESPONSE PROCESS AND POLITICAL
ELITE COMPLICITY
7.0 Introduction
This chapter explores the proposition that the manner in which the Nigerian
government has dealt with Boko Haram and other organised violent groups has been
shaped by elite political culture and has, in reality, only provoked further violence.
Boko Haram and other groups committed to violence is not only the product of elite
attitudes and political ambition, but they have been invigorated by a misguided
counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy that was itself the
outcome of elite interference.
The chapter draws on the past and present processes of CT and COIN strategies,
dating from 1970 2014. The CT and COIN strategies have produced a vicious cycle
of violence perpetrated by the security agencies and Boko Haram. This analysis draws
from an examination of newspaper articles and primary data sources, including
legislative transcripts and excerpts from the transcripts of the semi-structured
interviews conducted for this research. This chapter is sub-divided into phases of
formulation and implementation of CT and COIN processes and further analyses the
impact of elite political culture on governance for security in Nigeria. Sections one to
four examine sequentially each of the four identified phases of the response process
adopted by the government. The diagram below illustrates and serves as a guideline






            
   





    
 
              
     
             
               
             
             
              
             
          
 
    
            
       
 
           
 
           
             
             
     
        
              
       
             
      
 
             
             
              
7.1 Phase One
The emergence of the Boko Haram movement in 1995, then known as the Sahaba
the media. During this period,
from the University of Maiduguri situated in Borno State. Not much attention was
paid to the group by the newspapers or federal and state government, as will be
demonstrated below. There was an absence of published reports about the Sahaba in
both local and national newspapers. At this stage, the movement that would become
Boko Haram was merely one amongst several similar sects such as the Izala, Islamic
Movement in Nigeria, Yan Tauri, Yan Daba, Movement for the Islamic Revival, and
Yan Kalo Kato (Forest 2012; Loimeier 2012; Ubhenin 2012).
activities at that time
activities. However, during a press briefing in 2009, the Director of Defence
Information Colonel Mohammed Yerima insisted that:
period been monitoring their activities (Daily Trust July 31st 2009: 3).
This observation is indicative of scholarly literature (Abimbola 2011, Copeland 2013
and Harnischfeger 2014). The group has since 1995 evolved as a movement changing
its name from Sahaba to Al Shabab, Nigerian Taliban, the Yusufiyya followers and,
most recently, Islamic teacher
and religious celebrity in Borno state attests to
skirmishes with other Islamic groups or sects. In addition to clashes with the Borno
state police, (Cook 2011 and Forest 2012).
In 2009, the Director General of the State Security Service (SSS), Afakriya Gadzama
supported this assertion by insisting that:
His agency had provided adequate security intelligence, but that the people who should
have acted on it fail for example Borno, the stronghold of the sect from




               
                
    
 
             
   
             
   
 
               
            
             
   
 
             
           
              
   
            
             
            
            
             
 
 
               
 
   
      
 
              
           
that was adequately covered; that was adequately reported, but to have the will to take
action on this, people felt reluctant and of course a lot of sentiments (Cited in Daily
Trust, July 31st 2009:5).
intelligence reports by the security agencies, were being classified by the federal and
-
little or no
interference from the local security forces, despite its record of violence (Cook 2011).
Adesoji argues that:
While it was reported that the group had its orientation here and there, the Borno state 
government pretended as if nothing was happening, even when dossier of security
reports were written against them, they would say they are not a security threat 
(Interview, Adesoji 2013).
Likewise, during an interview with a senior security officer in Borno state, the
interviewee maintained that Boko Haram was identified as a non-violent religious
group until 2009. This remained the case until it began directing sermons against the
Borno state government.
reports instigated by the political elite, as mentioned in preceding chapters, allowed
for a tacit alliance where Boko Haram could engage in violent activities with
impunity. This observation is reflected in past responses by the federal State towards 
groups that use violence. Wole Soyinka maintains that Islamic religious groups with
large followings are attractive to interested political elite for the purposes of political
mobilisation:
It is because the hard core northerners are embarrassed to admit what really is behind
the polit 
then (Soyinka
cited in Sahara Reporters 2012).
A previous example would include the Maitatsine crisis that occurred in Kano in the




             
       
              
            
             
            
 
                
                  
               
             
              




       
              
             
 
          
                
       
                
 
 
                
     
 
          
             
involvement. The response was the decision to relegate the Maitatsine movement to a
-violent. As a result of this decision
the movement became a tool for the pursuance of political interests by the political
elite. The same government response applies to Boko Haram. Recall the proposition
that alliances between social movement groups and the political elite are premised on
quid pro quo exchanges of required services from both groups. Adesoji contends that: 
Mohammed Marwa [leader of Maitatsine] was able to do what he did for a long time
because he was a tool in the hands of the National Party of Nigeria who wanted to take
control by all means from the Redemption Party, which was in control of Kano
state, so Marwa provided a means for political mobilisation. When the Governor of
Kano state Abubakar Rimi called for help from the federal government he was ignored,
until the group got out of hand (Interview, Adesoji 2013).
The promise of immunity from prosecution in
boldness aided in the expansion of the group as well as violent activities. This
as Yan Banga, Yan Kala Kato and Yan Dauka Amarya (Danjibo 2009).
Both statements, verified by previous analysis in chapter 5, identify
alliance with the political elite and its use of violence with impunity as the outcome of
growing radical and extremist belief
was noted and reported by the security agencies, as stated by a senior police officer in
Kano:
Every effort to get rid of them had proved negative due to political bubble in the state 
(Cited in Falola 1998:139).
Essentially, the federal and Kano state government disregarded intelligence collected




             
              
               
               
     
 
 
            
              
             
            
            
                
   
   
 
              
             
    
              
             
           
             
                
               
              
   
 
            
            
           
intervention. This is further supported by the empirical findings of Agi (1998:71). Agi
reports that the federal and Kano state government waited and observed for two years
before making a move. Only then was the leader of the group and his followers
ordered to leave the city of Kano. When that failed, military force was employed by
the federal security forces.
ess
extremist Islamic association, who were nonetheless still willing to use violence. In
the past they were involved in violent clashes against Christians in the northern region
and associated with political violence (Agi 1998: 51; Falola 1998: 106). The Kaduna
the JNI shifted towards a more political than religious position, agitating against
southern and Christian interest in the federal government. This explains the federal
remain passive towards the activities of the JNI, as a result of its relevance to northern
use of
violence with impunity.
These past events established a pattern of response. There has been a culture of
deliberate inaction by the government at the early stages of any social movement
violence. This pattern
is due to the mutual advantage of an alliance between these social movement groups
and the political elite. However, such alliances tend to transform such groups to
organised violent groups. Intelligence reports predicting violent activities alerted the
federal and state government to the likely outcome of such alliances leading to
violence, as had happened in the past. Yet, for the elite, an increase in levels of
political violence seems to be a price worth paying for the benefits that accrue in
terms of the co-option of the militant elements within these movements for their own
coercive purposes.
The case Boko Haram follows this trend. The previous interview statements by
Gadzama and Adesoji clearly indicate that the main actors concerned with the




              
             
              
         
 
             
            
         
 
              
             
             
      
 
            
 
  
               
 
            
             
              
   
 
               
              
           
       
 
             
      
violence were elements within the security agencies: the SSS and the Borno and Kano
state police forces. Some Muslim Clerics, such as Sheikh Abaniyi in Kaduna state
claim to have made allegations against the group to the federal and Borno state
government authorities. An Islamic cleric in Kaduna state claims:
volunteered to intensify my sensitization program on radio in order to debunk the
preaching of Mohammed Yusuf but he took the matter with levity Sheikh Abaniyi,
reported in Daily Trust August 5th 2009: 7).
-
up report to the Daily Trust article mentions the condemnation of Boko Haram actions
by Muslim and Christian clerics before it became a terrorist organisation. It is 
inferred that the federal government largely ignored the threat posed by group. Other
reports, by the Daily Trust record:
courts have continued to grant him bail (Daily Trust 31st July 2009:3).
[Yusuf]
retaliate when and how I would not disclose to you (Daily Trust July 19th 2009:3).
Significantly, this verbal threat by Mohammed Yusuf failed to secure his arrest,
despite the overwhelming evidence of arms and bomb making materials found by the
Borno state police three days before the July 2009 uprising in possession of arrested
Boko Haram members:
74 empty homemade bomb shells and bomb heads, 23 bags of gun powder, 11 motor
vehicle filters, 4 bottles of methanol explosive acids, 7 rubber of containers of sodium
chemical, an implement for measuring chemicals and other components for making
bombs ( Daily Trust, July 25th 2009:5).
These items were recovered in Biu local government area, after the police received





               
              
            
       
            
      
 
     
 
             
               
              
            
         
        
   
 
           
 
             
      
 
its publicized association with the political elite in Borno state is a reason for the
between the political elite and the state government, the adoption of a COIN strategy
that actively allows, indeed, tacitly supports, political violence and offers impunity to
-interest that lies at the heart of
Nigerian political elite culture is not constrained by the highly damaging and
dangerous consequences of its actions.
7.2 Phase Two
T 
2009 was preceded by a media campaign using specific images and rhetoric designed
to distance the elite from its alliance with Boko Haram, and its previous rhetoric that
that it was a harmless religious movement. This followed the collapse of the tacit
alliance between the government and the political elite. Previously, the elite rhetoric
hastily borrowed from the manual using phraseology such as
again ; y to now emphasis the isolation of Boko
Haram.
extremist sects involved in these attacks (Daily Trust, 28th July 2009).
-going face-off with the militant Boko Haram sect terrorising some states in the





    
      
 
                
           
                
              
     
                
    
 
 
    
      
 
Image 15: Newspaper Headline
Source: Daily Trust 12th December (2011)
Image 15 is an example of the use of phrases ( attacks under way Boko
and images which enforces the need for heavy handed military intervention. 
This was a deliberate switch in the language used by the state government. Prior to the
onset of the military operation against Boko Haram, there had been only a single
recorded use of the word e 
government. This switch in rhetoric was alluded to in an article in the Daily Trust of
July 2009,
Image 16: Newspaper Headline




     
        
             
          
             
      
 
             
              
            
           
           
               
    
 
             
             
           
            
               
            
      
       
         
 
                
    
 
The newspaper headline and sub-title
- State Security Services. Furthermore the headline
-
examination of phrases and images employed by the media, the federal and Borno
state government and other social movement groups and/or religious associations,
indicate that these phrases and pictures were not neutral, but targeted towards a
proposed response. That is military intervention.
It has been argued that critical discourse analysis of texts highlights the relationship
between the use of language and images to formulate, implement and justify CT and
COIN measures (Jackson 2005:16 and Richardson 2007:26). It was observed in the
selected newspaper articles and the legislative transcript debates, that phrases and
images were constructed to categorise Boko Haram as enemies of the State 
influencing a COIN response based on the perception of identity and not the goals or
root causes.
Articles examined exhibited the use of specific words and images in describing and
classifying the group. This was interpreted within the context of the subject matter.
The images and headlines published in both newspapers, Daily Trust and Leadership, 
were provocative. They serve to graphically evidence the reality of organised violent
activities in the State. This justified the decision for the military invention on 28th July
2009 against Boko Haram. Critics such as Agbiboa (2013), Onuoha (2010) and
Serrano and Pieri (2014) emphasise the
instigated by the political elite and the
dange 
State grounded on the happenings of 28th July 2009.
An article published on 19th July 2009, a few days before the offensive refers to




    
             
 
                
          
 
            
      
 
              
          
 
             
         
 
            
        
     
 
                  
               
     
 
     
     
 
 
                                           
                 
backpack who are
said to have come from Katsina state (Daily Trust 19th July 2009:3).
The major intent of this report is to militarise Boko Haram. This was expressed in the
statement released by the Biu police command in Borno state:
following intelligence reports the group was preparing to cause trouble in the state 
(Daily Trust 25th July 2009:5).
as a peaceful state, was on the cusp of descending into violence. Furthermore, the
Borno state commissioner of police, Christopher Gega, insisted that:
The group doctrine does not recognise government and all its agencies including the
security men (Daily Trust July 19th 2009: 3).
Now, the previous alliance abandoned, Boko Haram are explicitly depicted by the
This was substantiated in a statement made by
the Senate president, David Mark:
we are going to give the security agencies enough muscle and power to be on top of the
situation, to make sure that they protect the lives and properties of all Nigerians (Daily
Trust 29th July 2009:2).
These scenario. This division was
further illustrated in newspaper headlines
Image 17: Newspaper Headline Image 18: Newspaper Headline




      
        
              
              
           
 
                  
            
     
 
                 
               
       
 
           
 
  
            
             
            
           
 
 
    
 
             
           
           
            
             
                
         
These headlines, and many more, stressed
The identification of the group as enemies of
the State was not limited to rhetoric. The categorising of violent activities into three
blocs - religious, political and ethnic - by the elite was demonstrated in statements
made during the Senate debate on the 11th January 2012:
The Madalla attack was not only a direct onslaught on a place of worship, but a clear and
grave assault on Nigerians of south east origin (Deputy Senate President, Ike
Ekweremadu N.A.D, 11th January 2012).
This is the moment of truth, the Igbos have been more Nigerian than others, I do not
know why anytime there is a problem the first people attacked are the Igbos (Senator
Abdul Ningi N.A.D, 11th January 2012).
dangerous, rather than religious and harmless as in phase one.
The deliberate foc 
attacks by the newspapers, instigated by the elite, ensured two outcomes. It
encouraged the shift from why Boko Haram emerged to its violent activities, thereby
ignoring elite complicity and justifying the use of military intervention. And it
against representatives of the State, justifying its own attacks as legitimate self-
defence.
7.3 Phase Three
The offensive launched by State security forces on July 28th 2009 preceded the
extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf and the systematic destruction of identified
Boko Haram hideouts. Large scale arrests and extra-judicial killings of suspected
Boko Haram members were carried out (Agbiboa 2013, Copeland 2013 and Daily
Trust 2009:1). The immediate impact of the military campaign was a temporary return
to relative security in the northern state. Indeed, the actions of the military came in for




           
           
   
 
                
        
 
 
             
      
 
          
 
             
             
               
               
            
              
           
             
           
               
             
 
                
              
         
 
 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International (Copeland 2013, Daily Trust 2009, Salkida
2013, Sampson 2013, and Thurston 2011). Despite this, the federal government
defended its actions:
I believe that the operation we have launched now will be an operation that will contain
them, once and for all Daily Trust July 29th 
2009:5).
The state government has relaxed the curfew imposed on Maiduguri and Jere local
government (Daily Trust July 31st 2009:5).
-
(Governor of Bauchi State, Isa Yuguda, Cited in Tell 2009:39).
enclaves to re-enforce the defeat of the group. Yet, the brutality, and extra-legal
nature, of the military response prompted a backlash. An attack on Bauchi state
prison, led to the escape of 700 suspected members of Boko Haram. The scale and
increase in the number of terror attacks by the group encouraged its own logic of
reprisals. As with previous COIN operationsin Nigeria, such as the campaign against
MEND in the Niger Delta, the ferocity of the military response provoked an equally
ferocious response from the insurgents (Francis, Lapin and Rossiasco 2011; Obi 2009; 
and Okafor 2011). Terror tactics used on an increasingly large-scale were unlike those
used by previous insurgencies including suicide attacks and indiscriminate attacks on
civilians. The seeds sown by alliances forged by the elite in the 1990s with the
precursor social movements to Boko Haram were now reaping a terrible whirlwind.
We have hundreds of members that are willing to sacrifice their lives in this crusade; the
unfortunate incident of Saturday will not discourage us; if anything, it will encourage us






             
           
            
       
 
       
 
  
           
           
           
 
              
            
           
             
          
    
 
                 
              
   
 
       
            
    
 
              




military engagement between the Joint Task Force (JTF) and Boko Haram in Kano.
The message was released via phone call in a press conference (Leadership 
Newspaper 2011). Yet, now committed to the logic of force, the government
continued to ratchet up the military response:
(Interview, Anonymous Counter Terrorist Unit Officer 2013).
Rather than drawin 
through the provision of human security goods, the strategy remained relentlessly
militaristic (Onapajo, Uzodike and Whetho 2012). Yet, Boko Haram proved capable
of a flexible and resilient response to the military onslaught.
The emergence of suicide bomb attacks forced the need to expand CT and COIN
strategies, hence the solicitation of amnesty, dialogue and negotiation by other interest
groups (Ahokegh 2012, Leadership 2012, and Onapajo 2013). The ineffectiveness or
the slow pace of military intervention exacerbated the call for alternatives to the
military response. This intensified the longstanding debates focused on north-south
opposing parties:
He created the crisis because he was the chief security officer of the state, he did not
manage the crisis well (Senator Ndume referring to Ali Modu Sherif, cited in Daily
Trust15th July 2011).
ble murder to cover up some politicians
and security officers apparently behind them (Alhaji Abubakar Tsav, cited in Daily
Trust 3rd August 2009:2).
The cartoon below is a perfect illustration of opposing views of granting amnesty to






               
 
      
 
             
              
    
 
               
             
    
 
            
  
 
   
      
 
               
      
 
            
               
Image 19: Illustration of opposing views of granting amnesty to elements of the Boko
Haram
Source: Daily Trust August 6th 2009
Proponents of amnesty insisted inconsistency on the part of the federal government in
dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency as opposed to its willingness to negotiate an
amnesty with MEND:
The federal government had already set a precedent with its handling of the Niger Delta
militants, and should extend same to Boko Haram, (Civil Rights Activist, Shehu Sani,
Leadership 22nd June 2011).
for Niger Delta militants but summary execution for Boko Haram (Daily Trust 8th 
August 2009).
The Niger tate
police (Daily Trust 1st August 2009).
The State should adopt the Niger-Delta option which has so far proved to be highly
effective (Daily Trust 3rd August 2009).
Opponents of amnesty highlighted the possibility of other groups following in the




            
   
 
 
                
                
           
 




             
              
              
             
               
 
 
              
            
  
 
              
               
             
  
 
              
               
            
2012 and Thisday Newspaper 2013). Ekanem, Dada and Ejue (2012), strongly assert
was premised
There should be no amnesty for them. The idea alone that we are providing amnesty for
perpetrators does not add up. It will even encourage another sect to rise up, if the
amnesty pulls through (Mr Ayo Akerele, A lawyer, Thisday Newspaper 2013).
However, at the time of writing, the issue of amnesty remains peripheral following
oha
2014).
In addition to CT measures implemented in dealing with the terrorist activities of
Boko Haram, a state of emergency was declared in three states in the north-eastern
region where Boko Haram is most active. This move by the president was accepted
with misgivings by the northern political elite, who believed that the southern region
had plans to reduce the voting power of the northern region in the upcoming 2015
elections:
Wake-up call to Nigerian leaders to fight this deliberate plan designed to bring the
north to its knees. (Ali Rafkana, president of a civil organization, Muryar Talaka 
Houlton 2013:1)
We will never allow them to destroy the north by imposing emergency rule when
policemen and soldiers are being killed daily in Bayelsa and other parts of the country
without any discussion of emergency in those states of the Niger Delta (Vanguard 14th 
May, 2013)
We are convinced that there are some people in this government, who deliberately want
to destroy the north and then provoke the people to revolt by always talking about




           
      
 
             
          
             
             
                
             
       
 
    
 
            
               
              
             
           
               
               
 
 
             
         
             
       
 
                
       
 
          
            
                
massive killings, kidnapping and oil bunkering in the south-east and south-south
northern Elder (Vanguard 14th May, 2013)
From these statements, it is clear that governance for security in the north-eastern
region of Nigeria highlights intra-elite tensions between northern and southern
political elites rooted in the competition for federal State power and the pecuniary
advantages that accrue. Opponents of the state of emergency in areas targeted by
Boko Haram simply classified this move as one more in the series of ad hoc and knee-
jerk responses implemented by the government (Clottey 2013) in the absence of a
holistic CT and COIN strategy.
7.4 Phase Four
In addition to CT and COIN strategies implemented such as military intervention,
work continued on the drafting of a Terrorism Act that was finally passed in February
2011 and amended on February 2013 to include the death penalty for offenders. The
Act gave the authorities increased powers of search and surveillance in cases of
suspected terrorist activities. Also, the authorities were given increased powers to
seize propaganda materials and block Internet sites. A core element of the Act was a
However, to date, there is no record of any frozen bank accounts and only limited
Flaws in the federal judicial system have been apparent throughout the evolution of
Boko Haram from social movement to terrorist group. Recall
regular arrest and subsequent release. This was further supported in an interview with
officers of the anti-terrorist unit in Abuja:
Every time we make an arrest, someone calls and the person is released, so we capture
them and kill them -Terrorist Unit Officer 2013).
Whilst extra-judicial execution is widespread, and considered an acceptable response
to lawlessness by many in Nigerian society (Campbell, Bunche and Harwood 2012




   
           
            
               
      
 
             
           
    
 
              
              
            
            
           
            
             
          
    
 
  
               
               
         
 
           
         
                
       
 
            
              
          
a terrorist
organisation (Forest 2012 and Walker 2012). The heavy-handed response of security
forces, subsequent execution of Boko Haram members and family members of the
group and the slow response of the judicial system has triggered a violent response by
by surviving members of the group.
Whenever the Nigerian police are involved in quelling riots it results into incessant
human carnage. Unfortunately this has always been the way. (Hon Suleiman
Abdulrahman Kawu N.A.D 2010:0532).
The culture of violence with impunity is entrenched in State security and has become
an accepted norm. Therefore the inability of the State to stop this activity is
constrained by the internal political dynamics in Nigeria. Recall the assertion that
certain elite individuals control or interfere in the business of national security.
Empirical findings by the CLEEN Foundation (n.d), Vanguard (2012b), Iyang and
Abraham (2013) and Baker (2010) evidence the lack of resources available to
demoralised State security agencies, but also, and most importantly, the existence of a
patronage system which impedes their capacity to function effectively. Senator
Nkechi Nwaogu states:
Year in y 
the security agencies, our security agencies has failed us; not because of their own fault
but because of the system, we need to look at the root causes [Boko Haram emergence] 
and avoid emergency approach [a military approach] (N.A.D 2011:0050)
From the statement above, the issue of extra-judicial executions, insufficient resources
and police brutality is identified as the product of mis-
knowledge of this issue and the lack of political will to rectify this problem evidence a
disregard for effective internal security provision.
The diagram below illustrates the implications of the CT and COIN strategies
adopted. The reliance on a military response to the exclusion of other strategies limits




                




   
 
   
 
             
              
              
             
            
           
            
            
            
             
Rather it served as a temporary fix as illustrated in the months after the July 2009
offensive action against Boko Haram.
Source: Author (2014)
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter argues that far from effectively responding to the violence peretrated by
Boko Haram, the State (and states) CT and COIN responses have impelled more, and
more extreme, violence of the part of the group accelerating its transformation from a
social movement to a movement willing to use violence to a full-blown terrorist
group. The chapter explores a step-by-step process response using CT and COIN
strategies and tactics implemented in previous and the current Boko Haram
insurgencies. This approach, driven by the recourse to violence inherent in political
elite culture, differed little from the militarised reponse to previous episodes of
political violence with the principal difference that Boko Haram adopted the extreme





             
              
               
            
         
              
            
        
  
  
The absence of a holistic CT strategy has sustained Boko Haram. Examing the
evolution of the State (and state) CT and COIN strategies as a process, the
involvement of the political elite is apparent in each of the four phases. Initially, Boko
Haram, or its precursor movements, were presented as harmless organisations in order
became counter-productive to elite ambitions, heavy-handed military response was
adopted by federal and state governments that resulted in a switch to guerrilla tactics
against the military and police which further rtransmuted to extreme terrorist tactics






   
 
            
          
              
              
             
           
         
 
             
       
                
             




Various forms of organised violent activities have engulfed the Nigerian State since
independence, which are usually manifested in military coups, religious clashes,
ethnic clashes, political violence and acts of terror. Graph 5 and 6 illustrates records
of organised violent activities in Nigeria and the perpetrators from the year 1997 to
2014, emphasising its continuing presence and the massive spike in recent years.
Graph 5: Conflict Event by Actor Type, Nigeria January1997- March 2013
Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (2013)
Explaining the prevalence of these violent activities, this thesis has argued that they
are the symptoms and outcomes of a dee -
serving culture. It is a culture that is willing to use any means including violence to
promote their own interests and one that nurtures poor governance with its associated




              
             
               
             
               
            
          
 
            
            
           
          
              
            
             
               
 
 
organised violence in Nigeria, the role of elite political culture has been glossed over.
There are good reasons for this. Traditionally, the prevalence of organised violence in
Nigeria has been explained by the elite, the media and the academia as being the
product of differences between social groups who were thrust together as a single
State as a result of the policies of the British administrators. The root causes of
violence were therefore the product of competition between these social groups, and
for State power, producing poor governance and a democratic deficit.
The programes of these social movement groups are usually published as seeking
religious, ethnic or socio-economic change, hence feeding into the perception of a
clash of civilisations, poor governance and the competition between social groups.
This thesis acknowledges the relevance of competition between social movements,
however, a critical analysis of elite political culture and its link to organised violence
shows that the roots go deeper. These conventional perspectives overlook the political
has found a consistent pattern of elite practices that initiate and sustain organised





         
      
 
              
             
              
               
               
            
             
               
 
         
 
              
              
             
Graph 6: Cumulative Weekly Reported Violent Events by Perpetrators
Source: Council On foreign Relations (2014)
In this conclusion this thesis highlights three key aspects of the elite political culture
that this research has argued has promoted political violence including that of Boko
Haram. First, the awareness by elites that Nigerian politics is a zero sum game,
meaning that there are very large financial gains to be had by securing political office
and few financial gains for those who are frozen outside of office. Second, the
identification by the elites that success in political competition arises from mobilising
key social groups, such as ethnic and religious movements and political parties. Third,
the recognition by the elites of the value of politicising conflicts in the State.
8.1 Nigerian Politics is a Zero Sum Game
The high percentage of crude oil revenue and subsequent control of this revenue by
State officials at the national, state and local level created the conviction among the




            
             
        
 
             
              
          
           
    
 
              
             
            
               
                
 
              
               
           
           
               
   
             
    
           
             
  
 
             
        
     
wealth. Centralisation of power at the governance level further fuelled this conviction.
As earlier mentioned in chapter four, Obasanjo, a former president of Nigeria noted
the relevance of State power for financial benefits:
The enormous powers of the executive presidency are the only real backbone of
contention in national politics. Through the control which the head of State exercises in
releasing or withholding statutory allocations in awarding petroleum contracts, in
making key appointments and in giving special grant (Obasanjo cited in Sunday
Vanguard 1994:16).
Falola (1999:143) and Lewis (2006) identify Nigeria as a rentier State. This is based
sourced from Crude oil (Nigeria Oil and Gas Report 2014). State revenues are
primarily sourced from oil royalties and not dependent on production and taxation.
The political elite have control of this revenue and little or no accountability to the
populace on how revenue is being spent or allocated. This is evident in reports of top
Premium
Times 2015 and Quartz Africa 2015). It was also evident during the military regime,
where the benefits of oil wealth were reflected in the lifestyle of the top ruling
military officers and members of their patronage networks. John Campbell an ex-
political counsellor and United States ambassador to Nigeria underlined the
locations owned by the top military officials as an example of the excesses of the
military leaders (Campbell 201 
of patron-client networks, which were created to reward the supporters of the political
and forced
resignation of the then commissioner for communication Joseph Tarka. The salient
point is the equation of State power with the attainment of personal economic
rewards.
The wealthiest people in Nigeria are generally people who have acquired wealth through
State power: by political corruption, by access to S 




              
 
 
           
            
         
              
              
               
      
 
              
            
            
              
           
              
          
              
          
            
         
 
               
            
 
            
              
              
          
service of personal interests by the dominant faction that is the elite (Ake 1996:29,
127).
ineffective State funded projects managed by members of his patronage networks
including his wife. Such projects included, Better Life Programme for the Poor,
Structural Adjustment Programmes (Ikejiaku 2013). Reports indicated that the
proposed benefits of these projects were not evident in the socio-economic lives of the
populace. This was illustrated in the data that recorded the increase in poverty level
from 46% to 66% collected by the Federal Office of Statistics during and after the
government of General Ibrahim Babaginda.
The approach to governance by the political elite is tainted by the absence of
motivation for public service. In the past social movements groups have been formed 
and geared towards the social welfare of only selected populations. Such groups
include MEND calling for the development of the Niger Delta, Bakassi focused
on securing selected eastern states against rampant armed robbery and insecurity
issues. As long as State governance is understood as a means to further personal
interests, relevant Statebuilding indicators such as economic development and good
governance will remain absent. This in turn leads to the formation of groups dedicated
to fighting and demanding socio-economic development, including groups willing to
use violence to attain stated goals. Commenting on this assertion, Nathaniel Danjibo
an expert on religious violence in Nigeria maintains that:
So long as we continue to practice this kind of governance, people will continue to
provide an excuse for groups to emerge as terrorist groups (Interview, Danjibo 2013). 
demanding the positive benefits of governance from political elites. He suggests that
the emphasis on State wealth by the political elite aided the emergence and sustenance
of violent groups in the State. The mandates of these groups premised on the




             
 
              
             
 
          
              
              
           
              
            
            
              
               
          
               
            
          
             
           
   
 
                
             
            
             
           
 
 
              
            
assertion. Recall figure 24 in Section 6.1.1 in chapter six which analysed Boko
-economic
deficiencies and the ineffectiveness of the ruling elite in meeting the needs of the
populace 
framed to justify their existence and ultimately their employment of violent tactics.
Nigerian history records the elimination of violent groups through military
intervention as a means to stop their activities. The elimination of these groups such
as Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and Maitatsine did not
bring an end to organised violent activities. Rather COIN measures implemented
ensured the creation of more violent groups such as MEND and Boko Haram echoing
the same sentiments and thriving in the same environment as previous eliminated
groups. The key re-occurring element in these groups violent existence was elite
political culture and their interference in governance. This occurrence is as a result of
the presence of the same enabling factors that lead to the establishment of the groups
mentioned above. These factors are identified as poverty, unemployment, injustice
and corruption (see chapter 3). Recall that these enabling factors are a result of poor
governance, which is rooted in elite political culture and impedes State building,
subsequently leading to dissatisfaction amongst the electorates. The emergence of
organised political violent groups is not limited to the personal interests of the
political culture grounded on personal pecuniary interests (analysed in chapter four
and five).
The political process is shaped by the awareness that to win is everything to lose is
death. Zero sum politics has promoted the militarization of political campaigns for all
levels of elected government appointments (Bratton 2008 and Okeke 2014). This is
reflected in the deployment of security forces to election polls and the consistent
reports of electoral and political violent activities. Former vice president Atiku
Most elections are rigged before they occur; these include the use of thugs, corrupting




           
 
 
             
             
             
             
              
             
    
 
              
           
           
              
            
        
 
    
            
            
             
       
 
   
      
 
             
        
               
illegal and violent methods (Abubakar 2005; cited in Agbaje and Adejumobi
2006:36).
electoral violence in Nigeria. As such the employment of thugs or organised groups
by political candidates during election period is accepted as the norm and usually
expected. This was exhibited in the 2003 gubernatorial election in Rivers state where
local youth gangs and local vigilante groups were armed and turned into political
thugs by PDP politicians, leading to the death of over 200 people and the
displacement of a large population of people in Rivers state (Human Rights Watch
2004 and 2008).
The PDP was not the only political party involved in the employment of thugs.
Democracy (AD) were also identified as being complicit (NWGAV and AOAV
2014). Inherently, the thriving industry of political thuggery, demonstrated by the
reports of political violent activities illustrated in graph 5 and 6, sends a strong
message to potential political candidates that the implementation of violence is an
acceptable method for access to State power.
e is that governance
or authority was sourced with limited help from the electorate. Hence the
responsibility toward the electorate needs is not primary. Aminu Jubril a former
Federal minister of Education, Petroleum and Mineral resources, as well as a senator
in Adamawa state, emphatically stated that:
(Jubril, cited
in AllAfrica 2003 and Agbaje 2006).
Likewise the electorates are sceptical and are not inclined to expect equitable service
from the political elite. Findings from Afrobarometer indicate




           
  
 
              
             
           
            
           
             
             
               
          
           
 
            
                 
                
 
          
            
            
             
              
             
              
               
               
             
  
 
               
            
     
             
rigging and electoral violence amongst other identified factors (Bratton and Logan
2006).
Political candidates regard access to State power to be assured by the decision to
employ violent and other underhanded means. Therefore the vote of the electorates is
irrelevant. Legitimacy is usually sourced through the motions of elections and
alliances with key interest groups such as religious, ethnic or social movements
groups (see Chapter Four). Intrinsically, the quality of governance is inevitably
questioned and serves as a catalyst for the development of groups geared towards
critiquing the actions of the ruling leaders, usually expressed in violence. An example
includes the Niger Delta insurgency, which started in the early 1990s as a platform for
the demand for socio-economic emancipation and environmental protection for the
Niger Delta region and later morphed into an organised political violent organisation. 
Cases of electoral violence were recorded during the 2013 local government elections
in Edo state (Fund for Peace 2014), and in the north west region of Nigeria with the
aid of gangs such as ECOMOG an umbrella name for militant groups in Borno state
-Suka
(CLEEN Foundation 2013). Other examples include the 2007 presidential elections,
where supporters of Yar Adua Umaru (Olusegun Obasanjo) and his opponents (Atiku
Abubakar) where embroiled in the electoral race. The 2007 election was specifically
noted for political violence. An assassination attempt was targeted at the running mate
of Yar Adua Umaru days before the election. Moreover records of violence and the
presence of political thugs at the election sites were reported. Reports indicated the
killing of over 300 people related to electoral violence in 2007. Specific cases include
the death of three people in Ondo state during violent clashes between PDP and the
ruling Labour party (LP) on the day of the 2011 gubernatorial elections and the death
of eleven youth corps members in Bauchi during the 2011 elections, amongst other
cases.
Elections in the State are best described as a theatre of violence (Bratton 2008). This
is reflected in the involvement in electoral violence by interested politicians and
elected rulers with impunity. It




              
              
              
               
                
              
              
              
            
 
          
             
              
           
             
             
              
             
               
               
                
             
           
  
 
             
               
             
             
            
          
           
of the All Congress of Nigeria (ACN) party hiring thugs to attack supporters and
members of the PDP in Akwa Ibom state during the 2011 presidential elections rally.
Buildings and properties of the PDP members were destroyed, in addition to the death
of an unspecified number of people. It was reported that 51 youths were arrested and
identified as hired thugs of the ACN however there was no record of the arrest of
CAN party members in relation to this violence (Adele 2012). The arrest of these
youths proved that there was an alliance or an agreement between these youths and
the CAN. The significant point is the absence of prosecution of ACN party members.
Although an enquiry was conducted the result is yet to be published.
Human Rights Watch (2007) interviewed retired employees of Katsina state
government who argued that the Katsina state government paid a monthly stipend of
political thuggery services. These funds were said to have been sourced from the state
government security vote, which was earmarked for prompt response to security
threats. This assertion is evident in the 2007 gubernatorial elections, where acts of
electoral and political violence were reported and levied against the PDP in Katsina
state. Another case is the attack attributed to PDP targeted at an ACN senatorial
candidate, General Lawrence Onoja in Benue state. This attack was preceded by an
ACN attack with the aid of political thugs against the convoy of the deputy governor
of Benue state Steven Lawani (PDP), killing the chief press sectary and a driver. Yet,
there is no record of the arrest of PDP or ACN members. However there were records
of the arrest and immediate release of identified political thugs (Aniekwe and Kushie
2011). The prevalence of these activities indicates, that violence, electoral fraud,
briber 
strategy.
The pervasiveness of these violent expressions is considered as a function of the
scramble for power in a zero sum game. Chinua Achebe asserts that the pursuit of
power and material comforts by would be and incumbent leaders encouraged the use
of violence to secure and maintain this position. Achebe also maintains that the
cultivation of this phenomenon ensured the negligence of these leaders towards the
socio-economic development of the State (Achebe 2012:69). This assertion is




              
             
             
      
 
              
               
              
            
          
               
             
            
            
            
          
            
           
           
           
 
             
             
           
            
              
           
          
            
             
accessing State power aided in the decline of State services and the development as
well as sustenance of organised political violent groups such as MEND and Boko
Haram. This culture of violent political campaigns is interpreted as a manifestation of
the illicit resources available to office.
This politics by violent means only promoted the use of violence by social movement
groups to achieve their own goals. This was exhibited in the Niger Delta region and
the north eastern part of the country. Social movement groups in the Niger Delta
merged under the umbrella of MEND and turned militant. Through their violent
development of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and Amnesty
program. The existence of these movements is not directly as a result of violent
political campaigns. Access to weapons and immunity from prosecution as a result of
alliances with political elite ensured the sustenance of violent activities perpetrated by
these groups. Alliances between the political elite and social movement groups fuelled
the transition of these groups to organised violent organisations. In addition, the
governance, created an environment conducive for the development of social
movement groups. This aided in the formation of networks with interested political
elites and subsequently morphed into violent organisations. This was demonstrated in
chapter four analysing the alliance between two successive PDP governors (Chinwole
Mbadinuju and Chris Ngige) in Anambra state and the Bakassi boys.
The link between the norm of violent political campaigns and the prevalence of
organised political violence groups in Nigeria is centred on the motivation for State
power. Aspiring elected officials motivated by pecuniary interests will employ any
method including violence to secure government office. This has been proven and
examined in chapters four and five. With the inclusion of violence, support is secured
from political godfathers and business elite, whose patronage network and funds
ensures victory for elected aspirants. The stakeholders involved in electoral
campaigns in the State such as the elite - dentified as the





          
             
            
               
           
             
       
 
             
              
       
 
            
              
             
               
  
 
           
 
 
              
            
              
                
              
            
            
              
             
             
           
patron networks between former president Olusegun Obasanjo, Aliko Dangote and
Femi Odetola amongst others. President Obasanjo was not the only elected official to
form networks with selected political and business elites. Relations with these actors
ensured that the interests of these actors are put before the State or electorates. Human
Rights Watch (2007) identifies political godfathers and their network patronages as
supported by findings from empirical analysis, amongst which is the statement from a
former governor of Oyo state Victor Olunkloyo.
Oyo state house of assembly), they want the patronage of the puppeteer. Afterwards
money will flow in the opposite direction back from the puppet to the puppeteer 
(Olunkloyo 2007 cited in Human Rights Watch).
These unwritten rules shape the governance decision of the ruling elite (Cilliers
2003). The allocation of State resources to these select few serves as an impediment
to State building and is usually manifested in flagrant corrupt practices which are
witnessed by the masses and capitalised on by groups such as Boko Haram to justify
violent responses.
8.2 Success in Political Competition Arises from Mobilising Key Social
Groups
Social cleavages in the context of this thesis are defined as deep divisions within
society amongst social groups. These groups are categorised by religion and ethnicity.
Members of these groups relevant to this analysis are limited to the representatives of
these groups who serve as decision makers and mobilizers. This is as a result of their
influence on the general population of a particular social group. The size of social
groups present in a particular community, constituency or country impacts on the
level of competition between these social groups and its relevance to competing
political parties or politicians. This is considered within the context of this research a
reaction to competition for State resources and State power. The presence of these
social groups and its impact on political network patronage highlights its relevance to




         
           
            
             
            
               
             
             
       
 
               
           
     
 
             
           
           
             
            
           
            
             
              
              
            
           
 
             
          
               
             
           
              
relationship between selected Islamic religious associations and Kano state
government. Where Kano state government gave preference to the Islamic community
over the Christian community and other religious groups, in exchange for political
legitimacy, the same was recorded in Kaduna, Zamfara and Borno state. It was
observed that, there were similar patterns present in events of organised political
activities during the period leading up to elections at the local, state and national level.
Deliberating on this circumstance, a commander of a joint task force in northern
Nigeria maintained that violence between social groups is as a result of elite
competition for control. He stated that:
Lack of the appropriate platform for people to gain dominance ensures that they resort to
exploiting religion, ethnicity and all this tendencies to win elections (Interview,
Commander Joint Task Force 2013)
This assertion is supported by previous cases of violent clashes between social groups
manifested in political undertones. History records political lines drawn by ethnic,
religious and socio-economic affiliations which are reflected in the formation of
political parties. The formation of the Action Group political party was focused on
representing the political interest of the western region (the Yorubas), while the
National Party of Nigeria represented the northern region (Hausa-Fulani) and the
Nigeria Peoples Party represented the political interest of the southern region (the
Igbos). These political parties were not formed for national unity, but rather were
developed as a result of competition between the three major ethnic groups for access
to State power and control of resources (Falola 1998: 55, 66). Focusing on the
perceived competition between the three ethnic groups for supremacy in the State
ensured political campaigns launched on the platform of ethnic solidarity.
Likewise, religion has been used for mobilisation of support. This is evident in
northern Nigeria, specifically during the 1999 gubernatorial elections where sharia
law was a major part of the political campaign. Members of the general public were
encouraged to vote for candidates of certain political parties who had a particular
religious preference. Examples include the electoral victory of Zamfara state governor




               
             
            
           
           
            
    
 
               
               
             
             
           
             
              
               
     
          
             
             
              
         
 
                 
            
             
          
            
             
           
             
             
             
visit to the Redeemed Christian Church of God, which is one of the largest churches
and whose general overseer is well respected by the Christian population in Nigeria
during his first presidential campaign is another example of religion being mobilised
within a political campaign. The manipulation and mobilisation of social divisions
(ethnicity and religion) by political elites fosters competition between these groups.
Frequently leading to increased tension and the expression of violence during the
period leading to election.
A case of this phenomenon was the eruption of violence in Warri, Delta state during
the run-up to the 2003 state and national elections. Violent conflicts were as a result
of disagreements on how the government chose to run the elections (Human Rights
Watch 2003). Culprits were identified as youths of the Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo
ethnic groups. Reports indicated that each ethnic group alleged that political
candidates and the allocation of local government areas based on ethnic origins were
unsuitable and as a result they called for the suspension of the elections. Likewise
members of the PDP, AD and APGA insisted that the eruption of this violent clash
other social groups (youth ethnic
associations). The political undertones coupled with existent competition between the
three ethnic groups resulted in violent clashes manifested during the period leading up
to the 2003 elections. Despite these occurrences the elections were still scheduled to
take place in areas affected by the violence regardless of mass death and large
displacement of people, consequently making the results questionable.
The principal issue of this crisis was the timing of the conflict, the attack on the office
of the independent national electoral commission (INEC), the decision to go ahead
with the elections in affected areas and the presence of political thugs and
intimidation by the political parties involved. This suggests the deliberate
manipulation of social divisions based on ethnicity to instigate violent activities. The
underlying point was the decision to count votes of electorates in communities which
were attacked and almost deserted (Human Right Watch 2003). The political
representation of different social groups catalysed the use of violence in the absence
of alternative methods of solving perceived slights by the different social groups. This




            
              
               
            
            
          
  
 
              
            
              
               
             
             
            
             
                
             
   
 
           
              
              
              
              
           
            
            
         
 
             
             
    
the Matatsine crisis and the Niger Delta insurgency. Chapters four and fiveexamined
the alliance between the political elite notably in Kano and Rivers state allied with
these groups by agreeing to present their cause on a political platform in exchange for
political mobilisation. The implication of violence used as the language of political
campaigns aided in the violent expression of these social groups encouraged the
development and creation of organised political violent groups representing these
social groups.
As the State developed, the political elite realised that relying on ethnic and religious
divisions as tools for political campaigns was becoming unmanageable, due to the
difficulties in managing militias. This was reflected in the kalo kato riots, Bakassi and
the maitatsine riots as well as the ECOMOG group, where each group was allied with
the ruling elite in Kano, Anambra, Bauchi and Yobe state. Hence emphasis was
placed on creating a political party that reflected both ethnic and religious differences.
However class distinction became an important factor. When the PDP was created,
the party gave the impression of being secular and non-ethnic and it embraced
nationality - a party for all the people. The essential factor of this party was it
exclusive top membership of the elite (the wealthy) from the military, business and
political sector.
Zero sum politics encouraged the manipulation of social cleavages by competing
political parties or candidates. The mandate or grievance of a social group is adopted
constituency and ensure high voter turnout. This is reflected in the age long Christian
versus Muslim conflict. Religious division is used as a tool to reduce the importance
of other social divisions such as tribes, labour groups, and class. The focus on
religious supremacy eclipses other social divisions. Examples include the support of
sharia law by Zamfara governor and Kaduna Governor and the resulting violence
perpetrated by members of Christian and Muslim groups. Note that this conflict
occurred during the run-up of the gubernatorial elections.
The cases of November 2002 miss world pageant riots in Kaduna state, which





            
              
            
            
           
    
               
             
              
             
             
            
           
      
 
             
             
              
              
             
            
              
           
               
               
            
             
              
            
             
          
           
             
was retracted (Human Rights Watch 2003). However the slow response by the
Kaduna state government resulted in the escalation of the conflict leading to the death
of Christians and Muslims alike. During the conflict, posters for the re-election
campaign of the Kaduna state Governor Ahmed Mohammed Makarfi were torn and
buildings housing his campaign offices and posters were attacked (Human Rights
Watch 2003). This vandalism
contrary to the branded cause of it, which was identified as an attack on Islam
religion. Although Governor Makarfi won the elections, the period leading up to the
election was riddled with violence. It is suggested as indicated by the Governor during
a press conference that his political opponents were behind the attacks. The essential
issue is the deliberate stoking of religious dissent leading to violent uprisings to
undermine the competency of the opposition group. This was manifested in the
electorate s complaints against the ruling governor during the violent uprisings and
the violence (Weekly Trust 2002).
In effect, conflicts between social groups are fuelled by opposing political parties or
candidates for the purpose of securing electoral votes and legitimacy. Recall the case
of the alliance between the Niger Delta social movements groups and the PDP in
River State 1999 elections. Likewise the case of an alliance between the Kalare gang
and the political elite in Gombe state, demonstrated during the 2007 elections. The
Kalare gang are identified as a criminal organisation whose emergence amongst other
factors was termed as a result of unemployment and poverty identified outcomes of
political elite governance. Human Rights Watch (2007) identified this group as
the main source of political thugs for opposing parties in Gombe state PDP, ANPP
and the Democratic Peoples Party (DPP). A specific example of this alliance was the
arrest of former governor Abubakar Hasbidu who was a gubernatorial candidate in
Gombe state in relation to political violence charges. Upon his arrest and arraignment
in court, members of the Kalare gang stormed the court premises and attacked the
magistrate and violently secured the release of Abubakar Hasbidu. He was never re-
arrested. This event was reported by the leadership newspaper February 7th 2007. In
exchange for services rendered, these social movement groups get political
representation for their grievances, access to resources and immunity from legal




              
           
            
 
 
    
              
             
            
              
               
                 
                
              
 
             
            
             
             
 
       
 
         
 
            
            
           
             
             
the decrease of the State monopoly on violence and the increase in privatisation of
violence by social movement groups and interested political elites. The current
onslaught of organised political violence by Boko Haram is linked with this
phenomenon.
In relating this phenomenon
before its evolution into a terrorist organisation was a Muslim sect and a social
geared towards social and political reforms. As such the group amassed a large
following, which attracted the attention of the political elite in north-eastern Nigeria.
Ali Modu Sherif a Senator with aspirations of becoming the next governor of Borno
state under the flagship of the All Peoples Party (ANPP) was one of the identified
elite. Boko Haram was not the only Muslim sect in Borno state and Islam was not the
only religion in the state. There was a social divide within the state and each division
naturally required access to a power base or a political patron. The alliance between
an
religious mandate. The acceptance of this alliance as a political campaign strategy is
rooted in elite encouragement of religion in the political sphere. Elite manipulation
of the mandates and grievances of social movement groups, ethnicity or religion for
political rewards is a catalyst for the transition of these groups into organised
politically
terrorist organisation, analysed in preceding chapters.
8.3 The Value of Politicing Conflicts in the State
The engagement in political debates centred on conflicts is consistent in global
political campaigns such as the presidential debates of George Bush and Barack
parties and their opponents illustrate the politicisation of violent and non-violent
conflicts in the State. Hence Senator Zanna of Borno state accused former Governor




         
            
              
             
             
             
         
            
             
           
        
 
             
              
  
 
               
                 
                
              
 
               
           
               
             
            
             
         
               
           
             
    
newspaper, March 27th 2014. Likewise APC member Honorable Salisu Daura 
referring to the Boko Haram insurgency in Blueprint newspaper 22nd October 2012.
The pertinent concern is the implication of this blame game and the escalation of
organised political violent activities in the polity. It is suggested that, political debates
or the blame game participated in by political parties and their opponents, triggers
violence or escalates violent conflicts within the polity. Recall the argument that the
are rooted in the encouragement of violence as an
expression or method of accessing power. Therefore the politicisation of conflicts by
elected officials or potential elects is not limited to highlighting perceived flaws of
incumbent elected officials but rather calculated to manipulate existing conflict and
escalate violent uprising to access State power.
On May 14th 2012, General Muhammadu Buhari a presidential aspirant for 2015 was
recorded to have made a statement which was interpreted as a calculated strategy to
incite violence.
God willing by 2015 something will happen. They either conduct a free and fair election
or they go a very disgraceful way. If what happened in 2011 [referring to the case of
PDP rigging the election] should again happen in 2015, by the grace of God, the monkey
and the baboon will be soaked in blood (Cited in Adedayo et al 2012).
Buhari denied the motive attributed to this statement and insisted that he called for a
strong resistance to PDP winning the elections. This statement triggered dissention
between the supporters and opponents of Buhari, best described as a call to arms by
both camps. Buhari was reported to have made provocative remarks before the 2011
elections which lead to escalation of violence between the northerners and southerners
the opposition party PDP to tarnish his reputation. The aftermath of the 2011
presidential elections recorded post-electoral violence concentrated in the northern
part of Nigeria. The media in Nigeria reported the crisis as a case of re-occurring
religious conflict, however a large percentage of properties destroyed were identified






            
           
             
             
           
       
              
       
              
             
             
      
 
               
              
               
              
           
              
              
             
              
              
              
           
         
           
              
          
              
The contention is these statements were released during a period fraught with
Christian and Muslim tensions and north and south divide debates. Consequently,
historically been limited to the northern region and followers of Islam. Any statement
perceived as provocative is termed as a battle call against Christians or the
southerners. Likewise a statement released by the Northern Elders Forum, supporters
of APC and opponents of PDP, asserts
is shifted from the emergence and sustenance of Boko Haram violent activities to the
age old battle of north versus the sou 
discontent and shifting the focus from electoral selection based on merit and agenda.
The significance of this statement assert that only a government headed by a
northerner can put a stop to terrorism, hence cultivating a climate of dissention
between citizens of both geographical regions.
Another politicised conflict that led to the escalation of violence in the State is the
Niger Delta crisis. The Niger Delta insurgency is decades old and consisted of warfare
between the Niger Delta militias and the federal, state and local government as well as
the oil producing companies in the region. The goal of the militants is resource
control and compensation for oil producing communities whose source of livelihood
were destroyed as a result of the drilling activities of oil producing companies. The
renewed campaign of the Niger Delta militants after the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa
was non-violent. The petitions and campaigns of the groups were largely ignored or
payed lip service to by the local, state and Federal government (Obi 2009). Increased
agitation by these social movement groups led to the increase of revenue allocated to
the oil producing region, yet the standard of living and basic social and infrastructural
amenities showed little improvement. This is another occurrence of violence resulting
governance. The unimproved plight of the oil producing
communities fuelled resentment against the State and the multinational oil companies
by the Niger Delta groups, which was later manifested in acts of vandalism and
hostage kidnappings. Against this backdrop, the local and state political elites 




           
             
              
              
             
             
             
               
           
            
            
     
            
            
             
              
                
          
 
                
              
   
 
         
              
              
            
               
          
 
         
             
 
intimidate their opponents and rig the elections (Muzan 2014). Recall network
analysis of alliances between the political elite and interest groups in chapters four
and five. This was achieved by promising the leaders of these groups access to
political incentives to aid in the achievement of their objectives. This led to the
militarization of these groups (Bagaji et al 2011, Human Rights Watch 2004 and
Walker 2008). The subsequent fallout between these groups and the political elites led
to an all-out war against the State. Examples include alliances between the governor
of Rivers State Peter Odili and Mujaheed Asari and Ateke Tom, leaders of Ijaw Youth
Council and Niger Delta Vigilante group respectively (Human Rights Watch 2007).
The perpetrators and sponsors of political and electoral violence were not prosecuted,
hence promoting a culture of violence with impunity for political objectives. The
salient point is the manipulation
pursuance of political interests. Commenting on this issue, Onuoha, a research fellow
in national defence war college Abuja, cites the relationship between Niger Delta
militants and southern political elite as a comparison with the emergence of Boko
Haram and its ties with northern political elite. He maintains that the emergence of
these groups is as a result of the internal challenges faced by the State, which this
thesis identifies as the olitical culture and poor governance.
As the society evolves, the political class masters the dynamics of the society and tries as
much as possible to use any instrument they can to get and retain political power 
(Interview, Onuoha 2013).
observation tallies with the proposition that organised political violent
groups were not created for access to State power, but rather their mandates were
politicised by the political elite access to power. The existence of these groups and
their grievances or objectives served as a platform for political campaigns and
alliances. This view is shared by Adesoji who argues that Boko Haram at its early
stage was manipulated by the political elite resulting in violence:
Boko Haram is not the first of its kind




   
    
           
             
           
   
 
            
            
      
       
 
 
              
    
 
     
               
            
             
             
              
            
           
            
               
            
              
                 
             
in chapter six
overnment (ministry of Islamic
affairs) validates an association between Boko Haram and Borno state government.
Likewise, Joshua Bolarinwa a research fellow in the NIIA supports this argument. He
maintains that the run up to elections makes socio-economic movement groups
attractive to politicians:
Unfortunately the political development of Nigeria encourages the use of political thugs,
we see the 2010-2011 election campaign of Goodluck aggravating the operations of
he politicians promised the Boko Haram
ministry of Islamic affairs (Interview, Bolarinwa 2013).
Boko
Haram and the Borno state government. See chapter five where it was discovered that
Ali Modu electoral victory.
e of a movement politicised
for its strong ethnic origins, social and political networks. The OPC was formed as a
response to the perceived slights against the Yoruba ethnic group. The successful
election of Olusegun Obasanjo a Yoruba president in 1999 brought a temporary end
to the political violent attacks by OPC (Guichaoua 2007). Records of violent clashes
between the OPC and APC (Arewa Peoples Congress a response to the formation of
OPC), representing the interest of Hausa Fulani political interests attests to the
politicisation of ethnic conflicts by opposing parties. Reports indicated the vocal
displeasure of the northern political elite such as Abubakar Rimi, Muhammad Buhari
and Wada Nas against a re-election by Olusegun Obasanjo a Yoruba in the year 2003
(Ukiwo 2003). The resulting implication of this event was evidenced in violent
clashes between the Hausa Fulani and the Yoruba across the polity. This was reflected
in attacks on the PDP and ANPP campaign offices and their staff. This was due to the




            
             
              
              
              
               
  
 
                 
              
             
           
           
              
               
               
             
               
           
           
             
     
 
                
             
 
                
            
            
  
 
                
        
An example was the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections where M.K.O
Abiola, a Yoruba won the elections. Nonetheless, the group was recorded to have
escalated into a vigilante and criminal gang. It is considered that, after the usefulness
of the group as political enforcers was no longer deemed relevant by the political
elites, armed members and unemployed youths who had adapted to violence as a tool
for access to resources or attainment of goals were relegated to a life of organised
violence.
The Jos crisis in 2004 and 2008 that led to the deaths of over 1,800 people occurred
shortly after the national and local government area (LGA) elections. It is argued that
these violent clashes escalated as a result of the politicisation of existing conflicts
between ethnic groups (Jasawa and Afizeres versus Berom and Anagutas) and
religious (Christian versus Muslim) groups in Jos, regarding LGA chairman allocation
as such voters were polarized (Kwaja 2011 and Sampson 2012). This was reflected in
events leading up to the LGA election in Jos-north, the governor of Plateau state was
recorded to have imposed a non-indigene of Jos north LGA as a candidate for LGA
chairman in Jos north (Ostien 2009). This enflamed dissent and conflict amongst the
ethnic and religious groups. It came as no surprise when supporters of ANPP and PDP
parties representing the rival ethnic and religious group resulted in post-election
violence. Ostien (2009) highlights the dynamics of the competition between the
religious and ethnic groups for political supremacy in Jos north during the period
leading to the LGA elections:
The pastors were preaching in the churches that everyone should go out to vote, that they
them before and they disappointed us (Interview 11, 2009 cited in Ostien 2009)
Some Muslim preachers were saying; if you are in PDP or vote for PDP you are
rs of the Hausa Fulani community were being sensitized in mosques to
vote for the Muslim ANPP chairmanship candidate (Interview 12, 2009 cited in
Ostein 2009)
The indigenes believed that there will be a fight, especially if the Hausa Fulani did not





            
               
           
           
             
              
              
         
 
           
              
           
          
             
             
           
                
            
 
            
           
                 
   
 
                   
                  
       
 
              
              
               
           
The comments above, indicates the overlap of local politics and existing discord
between these social groups and how this was politicised by members of the PDP and
ANPP for political interests. These observations were reflected in violent clashes
between ethnic groups and religious groups shortly after the elections (International
Crisis Group 2012). Violent clashes during elections in local government areas in Jos
2004, were instigated as a result of stirred up land conflicts between communities in
the LGAs, these elections were used as an avenue to propagate land rights and
political power between the communities (Human Rights Watch 2004).
The manipulation of existing conflicts between competing social groups by political
elites is manifested in electorates voting as a result of ethnic, religious and social
preferences excluding the merits or suitability of candidates for government positions.
Therefore, elected leaders take advantage of existing ethno-religious conflicts to
secure legitimacy and approval from the public as opposed to legitimacy and approval
accessed by performance or mandate. The consequence of this is the absence of
leadership accountability. Leaders who are willing to manipulate existing conflicts to
secure positions of State power are less liable to secure the end of these conflicts as
well as exhibit qualities of governance that encourages State growth and development.
Obiageli Ezekwesili, the former World Bank vice president for Africa and co-founder
of transparency international Nigeria addressing Mehdi Hasan in the Al-Jazeera head
to head program, May 2015 sums up the problem of Nigeria and the root cause of its
political violence:
It is not a religion issue, it is not an ethnicity issue, it is not any other primordial issue
that we are dealing with, we are dealing with the failure of our elite class to galvanise a
shared view for our society (Ezekwesili 2015).
Identifying the role of the political elite and their complicity in organised violence has
not been clearly recognised before in the literature. The challenges that such an elite
culture creates for Nigeria are not unique to it, as many countries in Africa notably




               
                 
             
              
             
               
          
 
              
             
              
             
               
             
               
              
            
              
           
           
           
            
   
             
        
           
           
             
           
and the ideology of State or political power as a souce of financial rewards should
serve both as a warning and as a cause for action. Yet this study shows a persistent
neglect to tackle the issue and hence repeated political complicity in events of
organised political violence. The inattention to the problem has created a sense of elite
immunity from interference. Hence the senator in Borno state who was identified by
the State sercurity service as an ally and financial sponsor of Boko Haram was never
prosecuted and continued his public service as a senator.
The case of political elite complicity in political violence raises the question of why
prevalence of this form of violence, but rather records an increase in political
violence. The answer lies in the overwhelming presence of the elite in the political
system and their influence in State governance. Nigeria since 1999 till date has
local levels are individuals from the military regime elite or under the patronage of the
leaders share the same cultural traits. In essence the interpretation of democracy by
the political elite is limited to the election process within a context of zero sum
politics. It ensures that the votes of the electorate are undermined by ballot box
accountability from elected State officials to the populace. This research concedes that
there are networks and oversight institutions set up for the sole purpose of regulating
and monitoring State and governance activities. However, the existence of patronage
networks linked to these insistutions makes the business of demanding accountability
from elected leaders or government officals difficult or near impossible. Although
newspaper reports, television shows and the presence of civil rights activists amongst
other avenues gives credenc 
accountability from the ruling elites. Two factors remain prevalent: loss of faith in
ng influence in governance activities as well as
patronage networks such that they escape prosecution for fraud and embezzlement
cases. These realities discourage the populace from direct involvement. Hence the
continuation of State elected officials who are unwilling or unable to provide the




           
            
           
              
     
 
            
           
                
           
        
 
       
             
           
              
        
            
           
              
               














social movement groups targeted towards filling in the demand for socio-economic
development. These groups not only met the immediate needs of those they
represented but too often morphed into violent groups whose criminal activities
became difficult to control by the governing authority, as a result of political elite
alliances with these groups.
This study highlights the question of change regarding political elite complicity in
organised violence. Despite changes in the social, political and economic environment
in Nigeria, the role of the political elite and the link to violence remains constant. In
other words, electoral violence still persists, elite manipulation of grievances and
regional level and widespread socio-economic problems remain.
This research examined the aforementioned factors in
emergence and cited similar cases with different groups across the polity. Specific to
Boko Haram, the socio-economic and political environment created by the political
elite ensured the development of this group. Furthermore, just like other groups in the
-opted by the political elites for their own
political interests. The subsequent alliance between Boko Haram and the political elite
influence happenings in the political environment. This conclusion means that the
elimination of Boko Haram will not bring an end to organised violent activities in
Nigeria. It will only serve as a temporary reprieve before the advent of the next
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or violence is an effective tool?
Question 4










              
             
            




            









                




             
             







Nigerian history has recorded a collection of violent groups such as the OPC, MEND
and most importantly Boko Haram. These groups were formed for the propagation of
a particular cause and subsequently adopted violent and terrorist techniques. In the
case of Boko Haram, how can this phenomenon be explained?
Question 2
emand are not quite clear but however statements made by the group
leans towards religious issues such as Islamisation of the Nigerian state, is religious
Question 3
What are those issues that may have provoked the emergence of Boko Haram?
Question 4
Could the origin of Boko Haram, in terms of ideologies and motives be linked to the
maitatsine crisis? If so could you elaborate more?
Question 5
There seem to be a symbiotic relationship between religion and politics in the
Nigerian polity, taking this fact into cognisance is there a possibility of this








                 




              




                
             




             




Is it possible that the sect has been successful in getting its strategic aims across to the
general populace as well as articulating what it is trying to achieve?
Question 7
Could the development of Boko Haram be linked to the desire by Northern political
interests to
Question 8
In a video by the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, it was indicated that Boko
Haram forces are stronger than the Nigerian military forces, how prepared is the
Nigeria military for the continuing confrontation?
Question 9
Placing Boko Haram within the international context, is there a link between the
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